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ABSTRACT 
 
The intention of this thesis is to define a guideline for the creation of a safety case for use in 
the field of civil light UAVs. It provides stakeholders with an opportunity to understand 
how the UAV, as a complete system, has been designed, assembled and will be operated in 
a safe and competent manner. Not only can it be used to create a safety argument to prove 
an extant system’s integrity, it can be used to identify weaknesses within a new system to 
allow further energy to be focussed upon the delinquent areas. 
 
The need for this approach is linked heavily to the UK’s civil UAV market and the vast 
growth which is forecasted to occur within it over the next two decades. The requirement is 
also driven by the extant minimal level of regulatory guidance available from within the 
UK’s CAA. 
 
The final guideline also applies a more qualitative approach to safety and encompasses 
those elements of a system which have been predominantly excluded from the majority of 
safety arguments. By combining a traditional ‘hard’ safety engineering approach, with a 
more qualitative and ‘people’ focussed approach, an enhanced safety argument is created 
which applies the fundamentals of today’s Systems Engineering regime. 
 
It should be noted that this revised approach to assembling a safety case for light UAVs 
does not tackle the most demanding of current UAV challenges which is that of ‘sense and 
avoid’. The aim of this revised form of safety case is to facilitate a more complete body of 
evidence so that safety engineers, safety managers (or regulators) may make a more 
accurate, relevant, and consolidated safety assessment of the system under scrutiny. Any 
decisions at national, or international level, which relates to the ‘sense and avoid’ issue, 
may be decomposed and included in further iterations of this guideline. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1   Thesis Overview. 
This chapter is designed to introduce and explain the construct of the overall thesis. 
Predominantly it provides context to the subject matter and explains the author’s thought 
processes in identifying the specific area of research. The chapter identifies the catalysts for 
pursuing the research question and lays out how the author has subsequently addressed 
those issues which  are fundamental to its answer. In addition to the aforementioned, this 
chapter defines the scope of the thesis, bounds the problem area and provides justification 
for the pursuit. In its latter stages it explains the relationship between the chapters as a 
‘storyboard’, helping the reader to understand how two predominantly disparate fields are 
brought together to create a truly synergistic output. 
 
1.2   Research Area Catalysts. 
The author’s specific role within the company at the time of this research was relatively 
fluid though his overarching role was that of providing safety, technical and operational 
guidance to a number of Test and Evaluation (T&E) Range capabilities across the United 
Kingdom (UK). The original intent of the research was to investigate the creation of a 
safety argument to allow T&E activities to be conducted at one site through the application 
of a remote command and control facility. In simple terms, the aim was to capture raw 
trajectory data at one site and to display it at a remote site so that it may be used in real-
time to control assets employed in the conduct of T&E activities such as live air to air 
missile engagements. 
 
During the same timeframe the author was drawn into safety management discussions 
within the company; these discussions had been provoked by the report of the United States 
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel (BP, 2007) which had investigated the fatal 
incident at the British Petroleum (BP) Texas City refinery in March 2005. The incident, 
where five workers had died and 180 workers had been injured, had raised the profile of 
process safety across the world’s largest organisations. The author’s employer started to 
 2 
review the learning and recommendations offered by the report and had begun to take 
active steps to investigate its own organisation’s extant safety climate and safety culture. 
 
During his time as the Range Operations Manager at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) site, 
Aberporth, the author had been heavily involved with reviewing safety submissions and 
Concept of Operations (ConOps) documentation which served as base ‘safety cases’ for 
many hundreds of trials activities. This experience, combined with a background in 
electronic and instrumentation radar engineering, had led to the creation of a mindset which 
was predominantly influenced by traditional quantitative safety approaches such as logic 
diagrams, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and a very mechanistic (ordered) method of deriving 
an acceptable rationale for allowing trials activities to occur. In all honesty, the author, at 
the time, lacked the deeper reflective and cognitive insights. Upon the arrival of a need to 
review the cultural aspects of safety within the organisation, brought upon by the BP 
incident, the author struggled to rationalise how the two, somewhat disparate fields 
(engineering and culture), could be interlinked; this amalgam was effectively clarified and 
consolidated by later studies in the field of Systems Engineering. 
 
In the years leading up to the commencement of this research the author had been heavily 
involved in the rationalisation of the UK’s QinetiQ operated Air Ranges; a role which 
demanded not only a technical and safety related input but also a business perspective. 
Ultimately, a small peninsular airfield site at Llanbedr, in North Wales, was closed and 
three other sites suffered heavy redundancies as a direct result of the project. Another key 
output from the rationalisation was the transfer of Aberporth’s airfield from MoD to the 
Welsh Development Agency (WDA) (via other parties) in direct support of the Welsh 
Assembly Government’s (WAG) vision to create a ‘centre of excellence’ for Unmanned 
Air Vehicle (UAV) operations. The investment of £21million to create the centre, adjacent 
to the MoD’s Range, was based upon a 50 acre site and a vision to attract technology 
leaders for the development, testing and evaluation of both UAVs and future Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs). The infrastructure deployed has the ability to support up to 
1,000 jobs (SBAC, 2005). The author, in over one hundred events, presented the  Range’s 
technical and operational capabilities, in the context of  UAV activities, to many  captains 
of industry and government leaders during the centre’s formative period. It was whilst 
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engaged in many of the centre’s marketing and strategy activities that the author became 
consciously aware of the future requirement for small, civilian classified, UAVs to be 
operated on a commercial basis to support various industries. 
 
1.3   The Research Question. 
Having identified the key catalysts for this research the reader may identify how the author 
has further developed the concept of creating a more cost effective, and reduced timeline, 
safety case model. This new model would need to not only encompass the majority of the 
system’s engineering facets but would also need to look at the ‘softer’ and cultural aspects 
of the operating organisation. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the author’s thoughts, subjected to 
the preceding influences, led to the topic of research. 
 
 
Fig 1.1 - Diagram illustrating the author’s evolution of thought for the research. 
Remote T&E 
Safety Case 
BP Report 
introduces Process 
Safety 
Small UAV 
developments at 
Parc Aberporth 
Experience of Safety case 
Reviews (Quantitative & 
‘Traditional’ Engineering 
Mindset) 
A requirement to develop a new 
approach to Safety Cases for small 
UAVs which encompasses ‘soft’ 
issues such as culture. Reduced 
timelines & costs 
Efficient business 
processes 
Systems 
Engineering 
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It should be noted that the prime driver amongst all of the requirements highlighted was 
that of creating a safety case model which was going to be realistically useable by the 
smaller companies which were being drawn into the civil UAV market. If these 
organisations were going to be subjected to the industry’s extant and  preformed views of 
safety cases, predominantly driven by the military’s hard-line and costly approach, then the 
industry as a whole could suffer. As in most other industries, it is the absence of barriers to 
entry which allows a positive contribution to technology transfer and evolution. The author 
believed, by creating a simplified and more holistic model for developing a safety argument 
for civil light UAVs, that it would appear not only as being more acceptable to those small 
companies seeking market entry but that it would act as an enabler and demonstrate the 
industry’s cognisance of its current limitations and willingness to evolve. 
 
The author is very much aware of the need to effectively analyse and decompose many 
complicated sub-systems within the heavier and larger UAV platforms to create an 
effective safety argument prior to allowing it to operate. The concept of a simpler safety 
case is not in any way designed to undermine those processes which underpin the larger 
UAV platforms; on the contrary, much of what is proposed within this thesis has been 
evolved from the way that larger platforms have been effectively and safely managed by 
the defence industry for over fifty years. The author advocates that as technology and 
society advances then reviews must be conducted periodically upon any long standing 
processes where lessons may be learnt and best practices adopted. In a similar vein the 
author believes that there are occasions where processes may need to be adapted to more 
suitably and effectively manage the subject material; in more common terms there are 
always opportunities to ‘use the most appropriate tools for the job’. 
 
Finally, as the author started to research the small UAV environment in more detail the 
initial concept was very much given a boost when it was uncovered that the Civil Aviation 
Authority’s (CAA) light UAV class exhibited a minimal level of regulatory control and 
guidance. The classification relies heavily upon long standing extant practices which fail to 
take into account the quickly advancing environment of commercial civil UAV 
development. 
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The research question that was finally distilled out of the earlier mélange of thoughts and 
challenges was; 
 
“Can a revised, time efficient, ‘fit-for-purpose’ and more holistic safety case elicitation 
tool  be created to support the activities of lighter and smaller scale civil UAVs which are 
to be operated within the UK? 
 
1.4   Thesis Aims. 
This thesis has been written to both clarify expectations and to support safety management 
within the UAV industry. It attempts to provide clear guidance for operators within a 
defined UAV class and also support to those who are charged with ensuring the safety and 
integrity of the operation. The thesis specifically addresses the following five key areas; 
 
• The author, from research and experience, is unaware of any definition or 
prescriptive requirement for a safety case to support the activities of civil light 
UAVs (<150kg). The safety case elicitation tool created within this thesis is the first 
ever attempt at formalising the requirement. 
• Research and experience in the field of safety cases suggests that there are clear, but 
relatively high-level, definitions to safety cases. Whilst this approach may be 
adequate for extremely large systems, where support tools (e.g. HAZOP) may be 
used to identify key areas which require investigation, smaller systems, such as 
civil light UAVs, require a clearly identified and more granular series of cues to 
support the safety case development. This observation and requirement is especially 
driven by the potential for such systems to be designed, built and operated by lesser 
experienced organisations given the commercial opportunities which may become 
available as the UAV environment grows. The safety case elicitation tool created 
within this thesis is the first ever attempt at providing a formalised, specific and 
granular approach to civil light UAV safety planning and management. 
• Safety cases, from the author’s experiences, are becoming extremely bureaucratic 
in structure and in nature, often resulting in an abundance of pages and even 
volumes of text and diagrams. Lord Cullen highlighted in the Ladbroke Grove Rail 
Inquiry that the purpose of the safety case regime was to “encourage people to 
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think as actively as they can to reduce risks”(Cullen, 2001). The creation of a safety 
case for an activity or a system is likely these days to be sub-contracted to either a 
different sub-division within the company or an external organisation as the task is 
often seen as ‘too difficult’ and/or ‘requires specialist skills’ to be generated from 
within. By ‘exporting’ the task the draft safety case quite often requires a degree of 
correction and ratification by the service demander; this in turn suggests that there 
is a degree of misunderstanding of the system under scrutiny being demonstrated by 
the safety case author. This also suggests that competency is relatively low, 
especially in those areas where human interactions are important (granular and 
technical user levels) and that ownership of the safe processes is not embedded 
within the system’s operating regime. The author suggests that the wrong people 
are involved in the process. At times it may be considered that the creation of such 
a safety case is purely driven by the need to support the regulatory requirement 
(compliance) and not to underpin safe operations. The simplified and holistic safety 
case elicitation tool created in this thesis attempts to minimise the need to sub-
contract and to refocus safety ownership. 
• Irrespective of the robustness and/or the depth and breadth of any safety case, the 
integrity of the final operation is limited by the safety effectiveness of those humans 
who control and exercise the system under scrutiny. The simplified safety case 
elicited from this thesis combines and integrates traditional ‘hard engineering’ 
principles with ‘people’ issues, predominantly those elements concerned with an 
organisation’s safety attitude and culture. From both experience and research, the 
author  believes that this is a first within the field of UAV safety cases. 
• Safety cases are predominantly driven and managed by safety managers with an 
engineering background. Engineering, within itself, is very much a quantitative 
discipline; it relies upon and uses a quantitative approach to deliver tangible outputs 
to the real world. Mathematics and statistics are used to support designs, 
developments and analysis of most environments whilst any qualitative input is 
often relegated and assigned to a poor second place. This thesis, and the simplified 
safety case elicited from within it, attempts to identify and communicate the need to 
re-assess the importance of qualitative information within the field of safety 
engineering and any subsequent creation of a safety argument. The simplified 
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safety case relies heavily upon qualitative, and even subjective appraisals, in 
creating a safety argument; this in itself is a new form of approach to civil light 
UAV safety. 
 
1.5   Focussing Upon The Research Area. 
The overall objective of this thesis is to define a guideline for the creation of a simpler 
safety case for use in the field of civil light UAVs; this field is of great interest to the author 
given the potential within the industry. The lack of a heavy regulatory regime offers 
opportunities to develop a relatively new approach to their safety  management. Such UAV 
systems fall within the CAA’s light UAV (<150kg) class. 
 
The final output of this thesis is a simplified safety elicitation guideline which assesses not 
only the technical integrity of the owning/operating organisation but also its inherent safety 
culture and safety climate. Such organisations are predominantly low business scale/low 
budget organisations which cannot afford to conduct a full scale safety assessment and 
analysis of their vehicles and sub-systems. Quite often such systems use Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) component parts which have a limited engineering integrity and would 
be extremely difficult to qualify using quantitative safety tools. The author’s experience of 
such approaches would suggest that safety engineers are easily drawn to err on the side of 
optimism in assigning failure modes and probabilities to low integrity components. The 
failure effects are also often exaggerated by the demonstrable lack of system awareness and 
ignorance of the interactive way by which single component failures may effect a 
systematic failing.  
 
The civil UAV industry is, by and large, relatively slow to develop within the UK whilst 
the military arena has been operating UAVs for many decades, both as reconnaissance and 
target vehicles. One of the major current drawbacks in the UK is that the rules for flying 
UAVs are extremely restrictive. Military UAVs are heavily regulated and are forced to fly 
within permanent segregated airspace such as military danger areas. Such activities and 
environments are heavily regulated and rely upon large volumes of airspace augmented by 
technically superior and costly surveillance services. Civil UAVs, predominantly 
recreational model aircraft, may be flown without the protection of any segregated airspace, 
Formatted: Bullets and
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often in green field sites with virtually no surveillance facilities. Such civil UAVs fall 
within the <150kg classification and are predominantly restricted to flying within visual 
distance (500m) of the operator and at a maximum altitude of typically 400ft. 
 
Having been involved in the development of the West Wales UAV Centre (WWUAVC) at 
ParcAberporth the author has always had concerns over the safety assessment of those 
civilian UAVs which would be operating from its airfield. Some of these UAVs would 
certainly fall into the <150kg classification. Such classifications of UAV operations have in 
the past been largely unregulated though in more recent years the CAA have started to 
address these requirements through the development of a Light UAV Policy (CAA, 
2004a.). This policy will be further examined in Chapter three of this thesis. This policy 
outlines the structure and inter-relationships between Civil Aviation Policy (CAP) 722 
(UAV Operations in UK Airspace-Guidance), CAP 393 (The Air Navigation Order (ANO) 
2000 (as amended)) and CAP 658 (Model Aircraft: A Guide to Safe Flying).  
 
The author’s vision was to develop an approach to creating a safety case for smaller scale 
projects which did not rely as heavily on the highly quantitative and often probabilistic 
approaches which is the norm within his industry of aerospace and defence. Whilst the 
author  is cognisant of the fact that most, if not all, of the projects that he has been involved 
with to date have been relatively large and coupled to the management of relatively large 
hazards, he strongly believes that there is an opportunity to develop a more condensed, less 
laborious and cheaper model for safety management. The author believes that there is  an 
opportunity and a need to develop a simpler form of conveying a safety argument for 
smaller and more simplistic projects. This belief has been amplified in recent years by his 
involvement with the WWUAVC and the clear need to simplify and condense the process 
of flying civil light UAVs. 
 
To create a more rounded, realistic and reliable form of safety case for these lighter UAVs 
the author has adopted a Systems Engineering approach.  
 
This revised approach to assembling a safety case for civil light UAVs does not tackle the 
most demanding of current UAV challenges which is that of ‘sense and avoid’. The aim of 
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this new type of safety case approach is to facilitate a more complete body of evidence so 
that safety engineers, safety managers and/or regulators may make a more accurate, 
relevant, and consolidated judgement of the system under scrutiny. The decision upon how 
to manage the ‘sense and avoid’ issue may be incorporated into the safety case, at a later 
stage, once an agreed policy and procedure has been identified by the relevant regulatory 
authorities. 
 
1.6   A Systems Approach. 
Whilst there are subtle variations in the definitions offered to what constitutes a system, 
(Hitchins, 1992 & Weinberg, 1975) there is an underlying consistency in the opinion that 
any system is comprised of a set of interacting elements which work towards a common 
theme or purpose within a specific environment (Skyttner, 2001). To allow these elements 
to qualify as components of a system they must display a number of fundamental 
characteristics such as holism, complexity and emergent properties (Flood & Carson, 
1993). Such notions may be illustrated by applying them  to a modern airliner. The 
common goal for the system is that of transporting people and/or freight across large 
distances within an agreed network of routes. The aircraft itself may be broken down to its 
prime sub-components of engine, control surfaces and aircrew. Whilst each sub-component 
serves a function in isolation, they may only transport people or freight when brought 
together as a single entity. When assembled they provide a synergistic benefit which is 
greater than the sum of the individual parts. 
 
The modern airliner, especially the new Airbus A380 super jumbo with its leading edge 
application of advanced technology, is a prime example of current day systems thinking 
developments. Whilst in the early periods of systems design a project would be 
predominantly controlled by one individual who relied upon his own knowledge and 
experience, the modern application of systems thinking necessitates an input from many 
experts from many specialised fields. Whilst early projects relied upon the knowledge 
contained within one person’s head the ideas and visions were easily converted into a 
completed system through the use of local skilled labour which was co-located within the 
same workshop. As technology advanced then so the degree of system complexity grew; 
quite often this led to the use of larger and disparately skilled teams located in different 
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places. This, coupled to the use of more components led to a system whose complexity was 
too great for one person to understand. As both systems and project teams grew in size and 
complexity a need arose to maintain a structured and well defined regime for managing the 
complete entity. When assembling the ideas and views of many experts to enable the design 
of a complete system there is an inherent requirement to define an approach which both 
ensures and assures thoroughness and completeness of the final creation. Such an approach 
supports the management of these complex tasks as well as minimising the likelihood of 
poor component integration and/or creating a final product which does not fulfil its design 
criteria. As technology and specialisms grow then so the need for a common language such 
as systems engineering must develop with them. 
 
Through embracing a systems approach and by focussing upon both the technological and 
human domains of a system under scrutiny the whole system may be systematically broken 
down and analysed in a logical manner. Hitchins (1992, p3) allows these domains to be 
classed as socio-technical, where quantifiable engineering elements are fused with 
dynamic, unpredictable and un-quantifiable humans (Waring, 1996). Any applications 
and/or assumptions should therefore take account of a human’s ability to modify the 
behaviour of a system under scrutiny in either a positive or negative sense. This is a very 
important observation and property; within the context of a safety critical system and in the 
creation of a safety argument, cognisance and due diligence to the human interaction 
should be applied if the analysis is to be both accurate and veritable. 
 
Safety fits relatively naturally within the general systems engineering process and the 
methodology of problem solving that it brings with it. Such a problem solving process 
involves several stages. The first stage requires the problem to be specified in terms of its 
objectives which must satisfy any specified criteria; the process then continues to 
synthesise all options in an iterative fashion to create a set of results which will reflect upon 
all of the alternative options. Having analysed and evaluated the options against the stated 
objectives and design criteria a final solution is agreed upon. In the creation of a refined 
final solution the results of latter stages are fed back into some of the former stages so as to 
help modify the objectives and design criteria and thus create an optimally refined and 
more mature entity. System safety and therefore safety cases should be treated as an 
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integral component of systems engineering which is a current and common practice within 
the defence industry (Leveson, 2002). 
 
1.7   Thesis Structure. 
This thesis has been divided into nine chapters in order to effectively, and progressively, 
lead the reader through its development and to reflect the logical and systematic method in 
which a systems approach has been applied to the problem.  
 
Due to the quite specialised environment of aerospace T&E, especially within the field of 
end to end weapon testing and UAV proving, the author has included a chapter  (chapter 
two) to explain the operating environment in detail. The chapter also provides essential 
peripheral information to the reader and therefore provides much needed context. As with 
many other specialised and discrete working environments there is a specific and quite 
indigenous culture and language presence; the chapter helps to clarify any such 
occurrences. 
 
Chapter two provides the reader with an overview of the history of the T&E Range 
capabilities, a comprehensive description of their technical and operational facilities and 
also constructively identifies some of their weaknesses within the context of the 21st 
century. This chapter also sets the scene for the concept of a more integrated operation 
across the two prime Air Range capabilities and the requirement to create a consolidated 
safety argument (safety case) for such an arrangement. 
 
Chapter three introduces the reader to the world of both civil and military UAVs. It 
highlights the prime regulatory differences between both types and focuses upon the virtual 
absence of any formal and in-depth regulations for controlling the airworthiness of civil 
UAVs which have a mass of less than 150kg. The chapter also introduces the role of the 
Large Model Association and the part that it plays as the regulating body for recreational 
civil UAVs within the 20kg to 150kg limitations. 
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The chapter also introduces the reader to the market opportunities and potential for growth 
as technology advances. Whilst the demand for smaller scale civil UAVs is growing there 
is a clear identification of a need to create a  formal regulatory framework to support it. 
 
Chapter four consists of a thorough review of the academic, regulatory and industry related 
documentation related to the production, application and use of safety cases. This chapter 
looks at the need for safety cases and how they have evolved into most modern safety-
related industries, especially those where hazards could have potentially catastrophic results 
(e.g. nuclear power, mining, and weapons proving). A comprehensive review of the 
structure of a safety argument is discussed in addition to the numerous methods and tools 
available to its author(s) including Risk Identification, Risk Assessment, Risk Reduction, 
Risk Management and ultimately, Risk Acceptance.  
 
Of relative importance is the need to differentiate and clarify between the terms Risk and 
Hazard; two terms which are used interchangeably (colloquially) in an incorrect manner; 
chapter four clearly explains these differences. This chapter also provides the foundational 
underpinning for pursuing the research question. 
 
Chapter five is a high level study of the need to remotely command and control the 
Hebrides Air Range Capability from the Aberporth site. The chapter demonstrates to the 
reader that the requirement must be considered as a whole entity, encapsulating a full 
‘systems’ approach rather than a series of discrete work packages. By adopting a systems 
approach the concept must include not only the ‘hard’ engineering requirements such as 
data highways and equipment but operational processes, security and integrity, regulatory 
requirements, business drivers and overall system safety. 
 
Due to the sheer size of the proposed project this chapter will focus ultimately upon the 
creation of a suitable preliminary safety case using some of the tools and concepts 
identified within chapter three. This chapter not only identifies and lists some of the typical 
issues and problems which may be encountered within the project but also attempts to offer 
forms of mitigation which may be utilised if the project is fully realised within the author’s 
host company. 
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One of the prime concepts carried forward from the preceding is that of a need to create a 
safety case which must be inherently intertwined and matured as the project grows. It is 
imperative that the safety case is treated as a living document and as a constructive tool for 
an effective safe delivery rather than an isolated ‘bolt-on’ for project path and/or regulatory 
compliance.  
 
This chapter concludes by raising the issue of organisational culture and the pivotal role 
that it plays in delivering compliance to a safety case. Organisational culture is identified 
by the author as fundamental in maintaining and implementing those control measures and 
mitigations raised and documented within the safety case. Without cognisance of, and due 
diligence to, these facets of an organisation, the whole safety process becomes stale and 
somewhat defunct. 
 
Chapter six takes its cue from the preceding chapter’s introduction to organisational 
culture. This chapter constitutes a thorough review of the academic and industrial literature 
related to the study of safety climate and safety culture within organisations. It begins with 
an introduction from JAC Brown’s ‘The Social Psychology of Industry’ which sets a 
context to the attitudes and beliefs of industrial organisations. 
 
The chapter proceeds to delve into various industries, predominantly those of off-shore oil 
and gas, nuclear energy and mining; all of whom are renowned for their high risk activities, 
catastrophic accident consequences and strong insular sub-cultures. From a global 
perspective the author notes that some of the ‘lesser’ regulated nations, predominantly third 
world countries, are now adopting a more refined and stringent policy towards safety 
management, especially if they fall under the operating umbrella of a multi-national 
company. In such environments the cost of near-misses, incidents and fatalities are seen to 
limit turnover and erode profit. Though equipment down time and the cost of training new 
personnel remains a prime driver for this change in mindset, globalisation and the reality 
that investors are more selective over image (branding) is starting to apply even more 
leverage to this facet of business. The chapter concludes by highlighting the importance of 
safety culture for a continued and effective safe operation. 
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Chapter seven reviews the deficiencies and lessons learnt within chapter five and discusses 
them within the context of the theory of safety cases (chapter four) and safety culture 
(chapter six). The discussion is delivered from a systems perspective and identifies how a 
safety case cannot be argued to be effective or robust unless the ‘people’ element of the 
project is appropriately engaged. 
 
The chapter proceeds into the civil UAV arena and the requirement to create suitable safety 
cases for their operation. Extant guidelines for the creation of a safety case for civil light 
UAVs is extremely limited; the accepted and general approach is that based upon large 
model aircraft which are used for recreational purposes. The chapter concludes by critically 
examining the CAA’s light UAV policy and its lack of formality and rigour when applied 
to the construction, maintenance and operation of commercial civil light UAVs. 
Observations and recommendations emerge from this work which lead into the following 
chapter.  
 
Chapter eight picks up on the preceding chapter’s observations and recommendations to 
create an effective yet simple method of analysing a light UAV’s operation. The chapter 
introduces the concept of a ‘Safety Case Elicitation Tool’ (SCET) where a time and effort 
efficient safety case may be relatively quickly created to support those civil UAV 
operations which fall within the CAA’s light UAV class. The SCET is configured as a 
guideline document which offers specific socio-technical cues for use by both the 
operator/constructor and any regulatory party. Each sub-heading within the SCET is 
accompanied by an explanatory text which explains to the user what approaches could be 
considered during its application to a new system. The SCET is qualified by a peer review 
of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from within the field of T&E. The chapter strengthens 
the observations and relationships between the theoretical and academic safety cases of 
chapter four with that of the concept discussed within chapter seven.  
 
Chapter nine subjects the SCET concept to a critical peer review by a number of internal 
(QinetiQ)T&E SMEs to both judge and qualify its construct and potential for use. One of 
the key issues identified during such an evaluation was that of the competency of the 
accepting or regulatory body; the peer review, conducted as a workshop facilitated by the 
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author, identified by gap analysis that this new model for conveying the safety of a light 
UAV demands additional competencies and skills within those individuals and/or teams 
who are the receptors of the information. Traditional and long standing safety engineers 
rely upon a very quantitative and ‘hard’ engineering based competency upon which to 
make judgements on any safety integrity argument. What evolves from this qualification 
workshop is that here is a need to augment these traditional engineering skills with those of 
‘soft’ skills such as social science and/or psychology. 
 
The chapter concludes the thesis through discussion, critical analysis and the provision of 
recommendations for the future; it also identifies how the work offers an original 
contribution to knowledge.  
 
1.8   Summary. 
System complexity continues to increase as technology advances; within the UAV 
environment it is becoming more evident that there is a need to embrace systems of systems 
thinking which must include both the hard engineering trades (e.g. mechanical engineering, 
software engineering, aeronautical engineering, et al,) as well as the soft engineering 
environments of culture and socio-technical interfacing. 
 
This thesis attempts to provide a simple, ‘fit for purpose’ and relatively bespoke method of 
assessing the safety components within a small, lightweight, yet complete, civil UAV 
system. The output allows the operator and/or an independent body to attain a degree of 
confidence that its operation is safe, to a relatively high degree of integrity and practicality, 
and is justified in accordance with the Health & Safety Executive’s (HSE’s) model of risk 
management. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Introducing the T&E Environment 
 
2.1   QinetiQ’s role in the management of Ranges. 
Since its formation in 2001, QinetiQ has been managing and providing many T&E and 
training facilities for the MoD across the whole of the UK; its ability to deliver such a 
specialised service is underpinned by a 25-year Long Term Partnering Agreement (LTPA) 
with the MoD. Amongst its portfolio of bespoke facilities are the four Air Range 
capabilities sited across England, Scotland and Wales. QinetiQ’s management team works 
in partnership with the MoD in the co-ordination, management and execution of various 
activities at the four sites. In alphabetical order these sites consist of; 
 
• MoD Aberporth, Cardigan Bay, West Wales, 
• MoD Hebrides, Benbecula, Western Isles, North West Scotland, 
• MoD Larkhill, Salisbury Plain, South East England, 
• MoD West Freugh, Wigtownshire, South West Scotland 
 
All four sites are steeped in decades of history combined with a strong sense of pride, 
professionalism and experience. Their capabilities were primarily formed as a response to 
the outbreak of the Second World War whilst subsequent additional facilities were added 
and evolved as the Cold War took its hold, predominantly in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The Ranges themselves have been involved in many specialised in-service practice and 
T&E activities for more than 60 years. Such a rich background in safe methods of working 
have laid the foundations of what is regarded today as a premier service for the safe, 
professional and competent delivery of aircraft, weapons and UAV testing in the world. 
Though UAVs are a relatively new concept for the majority of the aerospace industry, these 
Ranges were actively flying and managing such platforms on an experimental and aerial 
target basis since the 1950s.  From the early days of surface to air weapons such as 
Bloodhound and Sea Slug through to modern day weapons such as Stormshadow, 
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ASRAAM, and Starstreak (HVM), all of these Ranges have performed an essential part in 
their development and testing. 
 
2.2   History of the T&E Ranges.  
The MoD Air Range sites at Aberporth, Larkhill and West Freugh were created between 
the 1910s and the mid to late 1940s and have evolved through various guises within the 
MoD for in excess of 90 years. At inception the sites were operated through many 
departments of the government until they were finally aggregated within the Procurement 
Executive under the banner of the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE). As the European 
space programme grew stronger and the Ranges’ facilities were used to support such 
activities then so the Ranges were renamed as Royal Aerospace Establishments (RAeE) in 
the early 1990s. Finally, in response to the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) agenda of the 
1980s the  Ranges went through numerous transitions in the lead-up to the formation of 
QinetiQ in 2001. 
 
The Hebrides Range at Benbecula was established in 1957 by the Royal Artillery (RA) as  
a Guided Weapons Range primarily for the incoming Corporal missile system which was 
delivered in 1959. Since this period and up until 2001 the site had been managed by the 
British Army though it attained agency status in 1998 as it joined the T&E Ranges under 
the Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA). During the 1970s, Ground Based Air 
Defence Missile Practice Camps (GBAD MPCs) in the guise of Rapier missile firings were 
introduced and have formed its core business activity until the present day. Such activities 
involved its inner Range Danger Area (RDA) and the flying of small scale UAVs as 
training targets. During the same timeframe the Range was involved in a number of large 
exercises which allowed surface, subsurface and air assets to be co-operatively deployed 
within large and multi-disciplined exercises.  
 
Figure 2.1 gives a geographical overview of the Aberporth and Hebrides sites and an 
indication of the physical dimensions of the danger areas afforded for the conduct of in-
service practice and T&E activities at each Range. These two larger Air Ranges, and the 
ability to integrate their operations, will be discussed further within this thesis. 
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Figure 2.1 - Geographical overview of MoD Aberporth and MoD Hebrides. 
 
2.2.1   The Aberporth Range. 
Aberporth Range in West Wales covers virtually all of the sea area of Cardigan Bay, and 
extends north-west beyond the Lleyn Peninsula; a detailed geographical map of the Range 
is included at Appendix A. It is comprised of the airspace contained within the permanent 
Danger Areas of D201 and D201A, together with the associated Danger Areas of D201B, 
D201C and D201D which may be activated by issuing an appropriate NOTice to AirMen 
(NOTAM). Each component part of the Danger Area complex, when active, offers an 
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unlimited operating height combined with a Danger Area Crossing Service (DACS) for any 
traffic which may require transit through the environment. The Range covers a surface area 
of 5,900km² (D201) which is extendable to 6,200km² (by NOTAM action) and offers  a 
maximum linear dimension of 120km. 
 
The Range’s trials experience covers air to sea, air to air, surface to air and surface to 
surface guided and unguided weapon activities. Trialled systems include rocketry, artillery, 
missiles, UAVs, laser designators and many non weapon activities such as airborne 
instrumentation verification and satellite tracking.  
 
Due to its relatively concave geographical location on the coast of Cardigan Bay the main 
Aberporth Rangehead site is supported by many coastal observation posts both to the north 
and to the south. These observation posts host many radar, communication and optical data 
gathering instruments which provide not only surveillance information but also behavioural 
data on any platform or store activity. 
 
2.2.2   The Hebrides Range. 
QinetiQ’s most Northern Air Range is located in the Western Isles, off the north-west of 
Scotland. Based on Benbecula, it is supported by installations on the North and South Uists 
as well as Hirta, the main island in the St Kilda group, which is 70km north-west of 
Benbecula; a detailed geographical map of the Range is included at Appendix B. 
 
The Range comprises of two main components; the Inner Range and the Outer Range. The 
former comprises of  the airspace contained within Danger Area D701 which is primarily 
used for surface to air missile firings (GBAD) and UAV flying. The Outer Range conforms 
to the airspace contained within D701A, B, C, D & E and extends into the Atlantic Ocean, 
including St Kilda, and is used primarily for high energy missile engagements. 
 
When fully activated the complete complex offers the largest Air Danger Area in the 
United Kingdom offering maximum linear dimensions of 260km by 140km. Operating 
heights are controlled and operated in accordance with customer requirements.  
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The Range’s experience is primarily in the live weapon engagement of aerial targets by 
GBAD missile batteries. Other activities include a limited number of state of the art high 
energy air to air missile engagements of subsonic and supersonic aerial targets in support of 
the MoD's procurement programme. The high energy air to air engagements executed at the 
Hebrides cannot be executed at any other Range facility within the UK due to the 
requirement for a large volume of airspace which must be sanitised prior to a safe weapon 
release. This large airspace requirement is predominantly a function of the high velocities 
and agilities demonstrated by third generation weapon systems; it is also reinforced by the 
current doctrine applied to air to air engagements where many of the flight profiles demand 
supersonic launch speeds and medium to high altitudes for weapon release. 
 
2.3   Future Requirements for Ranges. 
During the 1990’s questions were raised regarding the continued use of the UK’s Air 
Range capabilities. The majority of the UK’s current air launched weaponry is procured 
from the USA and can be regarded in general terms as Commercial Off-The Shelf (COTS) 
items. The T&E activity on such procurement programmes is generally limited to safe 
separation and interfacing to the UK’s launch platforms. This in turn limits the work carried 
out upon the UK’s T&E capabilities resulting in an utilisation downturn of expensive and 
often bespoke T&E assets. When this procurement approach is coupled to multi-national 
collaborative ventures and a need to demonstrate profitability under the PPP rationale a 
question over the sustainability and future requirement of such facilities is raised 
periodically. The argument over maintaining these facilities is largely driven by the 
political arena and is outside the scope of this thesis; it is raised here to purely provide 
additional context. 
 
Though modelling and simulation has replaced the greater part of T&E there is still a need 
to verify the theory or to replicate and understand any deviations from the ideal. 
Environments such as the near field turbulence around airframes are difficult to predict and 
model so real-world separation trials must be executed to ensure the safety of the airframe 
and correct functioning of the separation mechanism. Furthermore, aircrew are being asked 
to serve in many theatres around the world and it is only through live weapon practices at 
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the Ranges that they develop tactics and hone their skills to minimise collateral damage and 
optimise the probability of achieving their mission objectives. 
 
In addition to offering specific T&E services the Ranges are developing further capabilities 
alongside the needs of the customer base. A more synergised approach to the operational 
management of the sites and the customer base allows the creation of battle space 
environments using both combined forces and multi-national deployments. To further 
augment the training afforded to the country’s military, and to deliver a ‘value added’ facet 
to what the Ranges can deliver QinetiQ are developing methods of combining data from 
both real and synthetic sources. The resulting picture offers battle space commanders with 
an augmented picture of all possible deployable assets combined with the ability to develop 
new strategies in a relatively benign environment. Such battle spaces can be augmented 
with state of the art electronic warfare, UAVs and UCAVs where participants can practice 
in a carefully controlled, monitored, but relatively realistic, environment. 
 
2.4   Integrating the Air Ranges. 
Though QinetiQ has a 25 year contract (LTPA) to manage the Range facilities on behalf of 
MoD it is subject to clauses designed to ensure that the capabilities and facilities are 
evolved and morphed to maintain alignment with technology advancement, defence 
doctrine, and of course, effective cost management. 
 
Many practices in use on the Ranges today are the result of a bygone era which include, but 
are not limited to, archaic technologies and military protocols. Though essential during the 
formative years of weapon research and development, these systems now appear candidly 
onerous, arduous, illogical and even Herculean when compared to the modern lean way of 
thinking and executing business. The signing of the LTPA in 2003 acted as a catalyst for 
many business visions within both the investment and cost saving arenas. Given the 
relatively low individual utilisation of the Ranges the creation of an integrated Air Range 
operation would deliver business benefits to both the MoD and QinetiQ. 
 
As weapon systems have become more intelligent and energetic, and battlefield operations 
have evolved to require a multi disciplined environment, then the concept of discrete and 
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individualistic Ranges has its limitations. Adopting a synergised and integrated approach to 
the operation of the Air Ranges would provide the UK with a greater capability not only for 
the military environment but also for any potential civil users. 
 
The task of attaining a synergised operation is essentially one of ‘change management’ and 
demands concepts for implementing change not only at a technical level but at a personal 
level for the individuals concerned and the teams that they serve within. The author was 
appointed as the Synergy Delivery Manager for the QinetiQ operated Air Ranges in April 
2006, a role aimed primarily at aligning the processes and practices across the four sites. 
Having established that the business orientated facets of the operation were controlled and 
managed by corporate and regulatory processes (e.g. financial reporting, human resource 
management, procurement, etc.) the author turned his attention to the operational and safety 
related parts of the business. 
 
2.5   The Foundations for an Integrated Air Range Operation. 
Effective change management requires planning combined with relatively sensitive 
implementation; above all it requires consultation and involvement of the people affected 
by the changes. The change needs to be understood and managed in a way that people can 
cope effectively with it; it cannot be ‘sold’ or forced upon them as this will often cause 
problems. Change in the majority is very unsettling; most staff find that change in itself 
creates insecurities and they find it deeply disturbing and threatening (Mullins, 2007).  
 
Certain industries and disciplines have a high concentration of staff which require, or 
attract, highly reliable and/or dependable personality profiles. Ranges, as an ex-civil service 
department, are a classic example of such an entity. People with strong, reliable and 
dependable character profiles tend to find change very difficult to absorb whilst the change 
welcomers are generally not the best at carrying out work in a reliable and process led 
fashion. Additionally, it is often observed that a strong resistance to change is often rooted 
in deeply conditioned or historically reinforced cultures. 
 
Whilst managing the Synergy project the author adopted an approach which involved and 
informed staff as progress was attained. The creation of small focus teams and the use of 
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informal workshops enabled wide participation in the planning of any changes and created 
a sense of ownership  and familiarity amongst those affected, right from the beginning. The 
workshops helped develop a collective understanding and was used as a springboard to 
further new ideas and solutions which were developed from within the affected areas. 
 
2.6   Benefits from an aligned Air Range Operation. 
To achieve both an effective and long term alignment of a pan-site trials management 
system all process owners, process users and stakeholders must play a constructive role in 
its evolution. The alignment of processes as a deliverable from within the Synergy project 
was seen as the first step in gaining true operational integration, i.e. in creating a positive 
interaction and co-operation from two or more sites which would produce a business 
enhancement. 
 
A truly synergised approach to Air Range operations allows business objectives such as 
cost savings and resilience to be optimised. Under cost savings the business may benefit 
from the matching of staff numbers to activity requirements through the use of deployable, 
flexible and multi-skilled teams providing much needed resilience and facilitating the 
natural migration of best practices across the sites. Such an approach helps minimise the 
impact of staff turnover, especially within the more specialised roles, which are trials 
participative and demand real time skills. Lead times to recruitment may also be better 
managed under such a networked and harmonised environment.  
 
In addition to the benefits delivered to QinetiQ and the MoD on the financial and business 
resilience axes, customers will benefit from an aligned approach. The ability to engage with 
identical structures, protocols and trials methodologies across the four sites will ease 
congestion, minimise lead times and avoid the current problem of varying standards of  
documentation submission from site to site. The use of common roles, titles and structures 
would clearly minimise customer burdens such as the need to familiarise themselves with 
any local protocols and/or nuances. 
 
 25 
2.7   Previous Attempts at Alignment. 
One of the key stumbling blocks met during the execution of the Synergy project was that 
of apathy and negativity which was caused predominantly by the failure of a previous and 
remotely similar project called Ranges Harmonisation. This project was created in 2001 
and quickly became a formidable task which grew beyond all sensible boundaries in the 
development and support of change across the sites. Whilst the Synergy project of  2006/07 
was focussed upon the four Air Ranges, the 2001 project included the Air, Land and Sea 
environments; a total of 22 sites across three disciplines. The project failed miserably due 
to the fact that the facilitating team at the time lacked commitment, technical experience 
and any focus upon reality. The author was especially cognisant of maintaining a degree of 
realism whilst delivering the Synergy requirements.  
 
2.8   Real and Tangible Synergy. 
The prime and long term objective of the Synergy project was to deliver the foundations of 
a wider reaching change management project. The final output was the creation of a single 
document (The Air Ranges Handbook) complemented by an established working group 
which had eroded most of the long standing issues relating to the lack of communications 
and networking across the Air Ranges. The author is proud to say that the final outcome 
was a tangible document combined with a more congenial community which did much to 
aid the daily delivery of trials conduct. 
 
The changes that have been initiated through the Synergy  project have affected not only 
decades of processes and methodologies but also the work culture of all of the Air Ranges. 
The current condition of process alignment and the delivery of a truly synergised Air Range 
capability is far from ideal but the most difficult part of change, the initiation, has begun. It 
is now for the management team at all levels to maintain the momentum created. 
 
Having demonstrated through the Synergy project that many of the cultural boundaries 
could be relatively quickly broken down an opportunity arose to capitalise upon a technical 
investment which was being delivered at Aberporth. Both MoD and QinetiQ were 
conscious of the £9 Million investment in the Aberporth Trials Control System (TCS) 
during a period when the Air Ranges were suffering a downturn in demand. The author 
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believes that the utilisation of Aberporth is circa 50% whilst the Hebrides is around 40% 
(based upon a professional, personal and qualitative judgement in 2008). Such low 
utilisations combined with the fact that both Ranges conduct more or less the same activity 
and that some alignment in process had been achieved through the Synergy project led 
naturally to the thought of controlling one Range from another. By gathering the prime data 
from the instrumentation at the Hebrides and transmitting it to the new Aberporth TCS an 
integrated operation could be developed which could potentially deliver many operational 
and financial benefits. 
 
2.9   A Fully Integrated Air Range Operation. 
During early 2008 the MoD announced that QinetiQ should investigate all opportunities to 
integrate the trial conduct activities across its Air Ranges. Given the relatively low cost 
base of MoD West Freugh, combined with its resident small team of staff and relatively 
high utilisation, the site was removed from the investigative study. MoD Larkhill, given its 
geographical closeness to MoD Boscombe Down and low trials utilisation was naturally 
targeted as a site which could be campaigned, on an ad-hoc basis, from the latter as 
demanded by the customer. QinetiQ are in the process of finalising their proposals for an 
integrated Air Range operation which considers using the new TCS based at Aberporth to 
control trial activities at the Hebrides. This study was submitted to the MoD during the 
Spring of 2009. 
 
The author has been involved in the development of the foundational safety argument for 
such an integrated Air Range operation. Whilst he has facilitated the early ‘Brainstorming’ 
and ‘HAZOP’ workshops in order to help identify areas of risk or technical concern, he has 
not been engaged by the integration project team on a daily basis. This system of working 
has allowed the author to maintain a degree of independency and offers opportunities to 
objectively peer review ideas and to constructively challenge any developments from 
within the project team. 
 
The reality of the situation is that an integrated Air Range operation would have been very 
difficult to deliver if the Synergy project had not started the process of ‘change 
management’, especially within the socio-technical and cultural areas of the business. In 
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direct comparison to the movement of a heavy flywheel, overcoming the initial static state 
of inertia is the most difficult part of the exercise. Once change is commenced its 
perpetuation is relatively easier (Mullins, 2007). 
 
2.10   The Author’s Evolving Mindset. 
The author was trained and qualified as an electronic engineer with relatively rigid ideas on 
what constituted ‘real’ engineering; predominantly those skills and components which fall 
easily into domains such as electrical & electronic engineering, civil engineering, 
aeronautical engineering and even chemical engineering to name but a few. The experience 
of managing a project such as Synergy brought a completely different perspective to his 
view of safety management in both specific and holistic terms. Safety management is very 
often pigeon-holed as a series of defining instructions or prescriptive and specific entities 
which are predominantly treated in isolation to the social or cultural interferences that they 
may be subjected to in both their immediate and wider environments. This new way (to the 
author) of thinking was spawned during the Synergy project but was greatly enhanced 
during latter studies within the Systems Engineering arena of his doctorate.  
 
The following chapter looks in depth at safety cases and their construct from carefully 
defined guidelines which focus so much upon a rigid, predominantly mathematical, 
perspective which is so revered by the ‘dyed-in-the-wool’ engineers who so often produce 
them. What is clearly missing from the literature review on safety cases is a specific 
requirement to consider the human element of the system under scrutiny. Other activities 
that the author has been involved within over the past five years have included the UAV 
activities at ParcAberporth in West Wales. Civil manned aviation has included the human 
factors component for decades but it is still relatively weak within the UAV environment. It 
is only in recent years, and then only within the military (defence) environment, that some 
diligence has been given to the competence of operators and maintainers. Relatively recent 
safety cases for military UAVs used as targets within the author’s working environment do 
demonstrate some awareness to competence and training but do not look at the complete 
process safety aspects of the system. It is this latter vacuum that has triggered the author to 
pursue the more systemic role that safety culture has to play in the maintained delivery of a 
safe operation irrespective of how robust the technical element of the safety case is.  
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Having ignorantly, though quite innocently, reviewed many safety cases as part of his 
working role within Ranges over the past decade, the author has reflected on how weak the 
overall safety argument has been due to the lack of demonstrable cognisance to the human 
environment and the wider system components. Experience, during his latter years, in 
UAVs (especially in the development of ParcAberporth) has provoked many ideas on the 
need to include components which convey the system’s underpinning safety culture within 
any deliverable safety case.  
 
The following chapters illustrate how the author has evolved his safety management 
thinking to include the cultural and human side within safety cases. His early thoughts and 
reflections upon what is required to underpin the integrated Air Range operation is 
contained within chapter five. Having reviewed the literature available on safety culture 
within chapter six the author discusses and reflects upon some of the key lessons learnt 
from the preceding chapters within chapter seven. 
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CHAPTER 3 
An Introduction to the UAV Industry 
 
3.1   Introduction. 
Even a fleeting dip into today’s current affairs will probably lead to either hearing or 
reading about military missions within Afghanistan or Pakistan which involve the 
deployment and use of UAVs. Within these environments they have been used for many 
years to identify and hunt down senior members of al-Qaeda and/or other alleged members 
of terrorist groups (Richards, 2009). Such highly technical platforms, with names like 
Predator and Reaper, are predominantly controlled, not by personnel in relative proximity 
of the activity zone, but by personnel located in America. Such vast and inter-continental 
operations rely heavily on satellite communication links and onboard sensors to locate, 
identify and even to engage targets from a varied arsenal of weaponry including Precision 
Guided Munitions (PGMs). Reports from varied intelligence sources suggest that some of 
the alleged terrorist organisations have been forced to replace their casualties with men who 
they have never seen due to the colossal and very effective ways by which these machines 
have impacted upon the battle grounds (Richards, 2009). 
 
The underpinning logic of using such platforms is very clear. It is predominantly due to the 
absence of onboard human life. Without such an arguably weak component the platforms 
may fly long endurance flights, often across continents, without concern if they crash or are 
engaged by enemy forces. If a ‘fatal’ engagement occurs or the platform is subject to a 
critical failure there are no inhabitants aboard to either lose life or to be captured and used 
as political tools in any follow-up scenario. From a financial and purely material 
perspective the downing of an UAV is considered to cost a fraction of that involved in 
losing a modern manned military aircraft. 
 
It should be noted that UAVs are not only optimally suited for the dangerous tasks of war 
but are also well suited for many civilian tasks where the activity may be seen as 
hazardous, monotonous, dull and even dirty; a sector which will become increasingly more 
important within the next few years (Richards, 2009). Though the military have quite a 
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long-established, extensive and varied requirement for UAVs the potential for their use 
within the civil sector is vast and almost holds no bounds. Civil applications may include 
geological surveying, crop spraying, border controls, pollution monitoring, maintenance 
and fault identification of power lines, remote monitoring of gas lines and even providing 
real-time situational awareness to incident commanders in the rescue services. 
 
Given the aforementioned, the consensus of opinion from within the civil UAV industry 
suggests that the only limitations to their use is in the designers’ imagination (Richards, 
2009). Also of note is the fact that within this emerging market there are equal 
opportunities for both small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the large companies 
that dominate the present military UAV market (Richards, 2009). 
 
3.2   Civil and Military UAVs. 
Whilst there is a potentially massive market out there the ability to fly UAVs above our 
towns and cities is still not feasible. Whilst military UAVs are operated under many 
specialised government authorities and are justified by those authorities as being just, 
(predominantly as they are ‘at war’) the consequences of any unsafe activities, such as 
crashing on innocent bystanders, is deemed to be acceptable. In a non-war type scenario, 
such as over-flying a town on a simple pollution monitoring activity, any inadvertent 
occurrence such as a crash, which injures or kills an innocent third party, may be 
considered unacceptable, depending upon the tolerability of risk associated with the 
activity. The prime focus for any military UAV is that of accomplishing its mission; within 
the civil sector primacy falls almost uniquely to that of safety. Currently, the risk of any 
crash from a civil UAV must be as low as the probability of a crash from a manned aircraft 
(Richards, 2009). Within the UK, the control and command systems for a civil UAV 
currently needs to comply with CAA regulations and must demonstrate that it is sufficiently 
safe to operate; this therefore suggests that the platform must contain in-built redundancies 
such as the quadruplex systems utilised within modern fly-by-wire manned aircraft 
(Richards, 2009). 
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3.3   Current Civil UAV Operations. 
UAVs have been flown in various environments across the world for many decades but 
never has the pressure to utilise them in a purely civilian and flexible role been greater. The 
success of recent military operations utilising UAVs has not only raised public awareness 
of their use but has offered excellent opportunities to prove their operational viability in 
both military and civilian applications. These opportunities have led to an increase in the 
demand to operate UAVs in a variety of applications, especially civilian, across the world. 
The current regulations for flying are purely focussed upon inhabited flight; there are no 
regulations in place which permit uninhabited flight in shared airspace within the UK.  
 
In researching this topic and during discussions with representatives from the various 
national regulatory bodies the author found minimal information on the operation of UAVs 
outside segregated airspace. In summary, any UAVs flown outside segregated airspace 
were done under special task clearances (one-off) from the host government (diplomatic 
approval) or under the auspices of an operational environment during periods of military 
conflict. One exception to the above are those UAV operations carried out by Israel though 
the author would argue that the Israeli circumstances are very close to that of an operational 
theatre. In the UK, an example of an UAV flight under a special clearance occurred during 
the summer of 2005 when a relatively large UAV (Hermes 450) operated out of 
ParcAberporth, West Wales in support of the WAG’s UAV public flying event. The 
operation entailed take-off and landing from ParcAberporth airfield, transiting through 
segregated airspace and further flying operations within the Aberporth RDA. This whole 
activity was sponsored under the auspices of a diplomatic clearance with the additional 
support of temporary operating instructions. 
 
During any major conflict the current western doctrine is to establish air superiority and 
thereby control the air traffic environment. The resultant low volume of air traffic helps to 
minimise the risks caused by UAVs to third parties, especially civilians; the consequences 
of any incidents occurring during such conflicts can be offset by the contextual argument of 
being at war; the lesser of two evils.  Such benign operational conditions create a somewhat 
false sense of security and optimism of the risks involved in the operation of an UAV 
system. This lack of information on the risks and consequences involved during UAV 
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operations has yet to be fed back to the greater part of society; especially those who are 
proactively driving their usage forward. The majority of UAV development has been 
conducted in the USA where such systems can operate over very large and sparsely 
populated land areas (predominantly deserts) where the risk to third parties is small enough 
to be tolerated. Due to the fact that UAV development has been virtually wholly driven by 
the military the wider reporting of any occurrences such as the loss of control or casualties 
resulting from incidents such as crashed landings are not freely available. Though there are 
many sources of information pertaining to current UAV flight operations they are either not 
pertinent to this thesis or do little to support the safety argument for civilian UAVs.  
 
Many articles are freely available which discuss the many and varied requirements for 
UAVs to have the ability to ‘sense and avoid’ and therefore carry out manoeuvres to 
maintain safe separation from other aircraft as currently demanded and exercised by the 
manned aircraft sector. This thesis will not discuss these requirements or abilities any 
further. Whilst the ‘sense and avoid’ issues are valid and an essential component of any 
UAV safety case the author does not plan to address such a massive component within this 
thesis; the requirement is known, according to the current thoughts on flying UAVs in 
unsegregated airspace, but is outside the boundary for this work. This thesis and its SCET 
is based upon creating an easier route for small UAV manufacturers and operators to 
achieve a positive response from a regulatory type body for flights within a segregated 
environment. Such a segregated environment is considered to be that of a restricted or 
prohibited volume of airspace predominantly assigned to the conduct of potentially 
hazardous flying activities such as a T&E Range. It is perfectly feasible to further develop 
the SCET for flights outside segregated airspace where any bespoke and/or discrete safety 
argument for the ‘sense and avoid’ component may be inputted at the appropriate point. 
The author believes that the first civil UAVs that will be flown in unsegregated airspace 
will probably use an extensive quantitative safety assessment very much along the lines of 
a military UAV as the risks of damaging the industry’s reputation, and therefore defer any 
advancements in the field, will be too great. The author also believes that the final decision 
on what approach will be taken will predominantly be a political one. 
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Flying has been extremely well regulated for decades but the fact that UAVs can be 
constructed and operated for a fraction of the cost of an inhabited air vehicle has drawn 
interest from civilian parties who are not familiar with the flying industry. Predominantly 
these parties are focussed upon business and the application of minimal cost, and therefore 
technology, to optimise financial gain. In direct contrast the formative years of UAV flying 
were virtually wholly driven by the military environment and the accompanying high level 
of regulatory and engineering methodologies with little or no concept of creating a cost 
effective solution. A complete step change in the approach to UAV development and 
operation is being forced by both the business environment and the market demands. 
 
3.4   Market Opportunities. 
A study by the Teal Group in September 2006 (Gerold, 2006) predicts that the world 
market for UAVs will exceed $54 billion (USD) (£28 billion) over the next 10 years. Prime 
examples of this market growth is illustrated through the following examples; the US Army 
alone is looking to increase its current UAV count from 1,200 to 10,000 by 2011 whilst the 
UK has embarked on its Watchkeeper UAV Network Enabled Capability (NEC) which is 
worth £800 Million (Thales, 2004).  
 
The CAA, in 2004, issued its policy for light UAV Systems (UAVS) where it predicted 
how the civil UAV market was to grow (CAA, 2004a). Within the document it highlighted 
three possible areas, identified in terms of mass and altitude capability. These were; 
 
• High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) operations; 
• Medium altitude applications primarily based upon extant military platforms such 
as Predator; 
• Local operations at low altitude using light UAVs for inspection and surveillance 
using miniature payloads. 
 
Out of these potential areas for development the least restrictive in terms of technological 
advancements was that of the light UAV applications where early platforms had already 
been developed by many organisations. A survey of existing UAVS worldwide indicated 
that a large proportion (79%) of those employed in purely civil, research, or combined 
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activities (military & civil) were focussed on this market. Indicators suggest that this trend 
is to continue well into the foreseeable future. 
 
The current aerospace industry market is worth circa £20 billion per annum to the UK  but 
a displacement of 5% into UAV systems over the next 5 to 10 years would create a new 
market worth in the region of £1 billion per annum (Clott, 2005). Specifically it is the 
emergence of a civil UAV market which will revitalise the UK’s aerospace industry as well 
as a variety of associated technology sectors including sensors and data links (La Franchi, 
2005). In 2004 the WDA invested £21 Million to create an UAV Centre of Excellence at 
ParcAberporth, adjacent to the MoD Aberporth Range capability (SBAC, 2005). The 50 
acre facility and infrastructure has the ability to support up to 1,000 jobs and aims to attract 
technology leaders for the development, testing and evaluation of both UAVs and UCAVs 
in both unrestricted and restricted airspace (e.g. Range Danger Areas). 
 
All military registered UAVs must follow a very robust and well recognised regulatory and 
airworthiness route which has been in operation for many years. The civil regulation of 
UAVs is yet to be established. Work carried out at ParcAberporth in recent years has 
established who the key shareholders are and has identified some of the principal areas, 
predominantly regulatory, which must be satisfied before a formal regulatory and licensing 
route can be established. Herein lies an opportunity for the SCET of this doctoral project to 
be used to support and facilitate the operation of civil UAVs. 
 
The author is not suggesting that the SCET will in itself be the answer to all safety case 
problems but will offer opportunities and direction for potential UAV systems to be 
assessed in an holistic manner by taking a more systematic approach. Many low cost and 
low technology UAVs are currently being developed and it is these smaller companies 
which need support at the early stages of safety case design. These organisations are 
predominantly low business scale/low budget organisations who cannot afford to conduct a 
full scale safety assessment and analysis of their vehicles. Quite often, such systems use 
COTS component parts which have a limited engineering integrity and would be extremely 
difficult to qualify using quantitative safety tools. The author’s experience of such 
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approaches would suggest that safety engineers are easily drawn to err on the side of 
optimism in assigning failure modes and probabilities to such low integrity components. 
 
3.5   The Author’s Involvement With Civil UAVs. 
The author has many years experience of working with military UAVs used as targets and 
aerial laboratories within the T&E environment. In more recent times the author has  
participated, in part, as an operational, regulatory and safety advisor on a working group at 
ParcAberporth. This role has been primarily focussed on supporting the WWUAVC with 
establishing an effective airspace management policy which conforms to the regulatory 
requirements of both MoD and the CAA.  
 
The author was involved in the creation of the first ever civil sponsored segregated airspace 
environment during 2007. This has personally engendered a great deal of interest in the 
safety management of those UAVs which do not fall under the auspices of any clearly 
identifiable regulated management system; these are almost exclusively those civil UAV 
systems which fall within the 150kg class. 
 
3.6   Civil UAV Regulations and Certification. 
One of the prime problems that many of the working groups and industry leaders are 
stumbling over is the regulatory side of civil unmanned flight. Whilst the regulations 
require the UAV’s system to be “as good as a pilot” there are no clearly identifiable 
specifications for what this means, and how to replicate it with electronics (Richards, 
2009). This statement by Richards (2009) directly relates to the CAA’s civil UAV 
airworthiness certification standards guideline paper (CAA, 2002a) which suggests that 
civil UAVs will be required to qualify for certificates of airworthiness through 
demonstrating compliance with extant airworthiness standards derived from those applied 
to civil manned aircraft (CAA, 2002a). The CAA has chosen this stance in order to provide 
the public with the confidence that civil UAVs will present no greater hazard to third 
parties than manned aircraft (CAA, 2002a). 
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Whilst the UAV designers, manufacturers and operators must understand the requirements 
of the regulators the regulations themselves have been written, and evolved, for manned 
flight. There are currently no UAV-specific regulations in place, especially for crucial 
events such as last-moment collision avoidance which is required of manned systems 
(Richards, 2009). In manned systems this functionality is performed by the on-board 
human sensor who will take a pro-active approach to collision avoidance; this is linked to 
the primeval action of self-preservation. 
 
Some guidance is offered to the environment through publications such as the CAA’s  CAP 
722 where regulatory judgements may be made on a case-by-case basis. Whilst being 
relatively basic, these guidelines are subject to constant scrutiny and evolution as various 
learned working groups and research programmes agree and sign-up to any advances which 
may bring about some mandatory and more specific regulations. 
 
In addition to the regulatory regime that must be created to allow UAVs to fly there is a 
need, as per manned flight, for the vehicles themselves to be certified as fit for purpose. In 
a similar manner to the regulatory issues, unmanned air vehicle certification is subject to 
the same degree of pitfalls and lack of formality. Whilst the CAA have issued some 
guidance in the guise of CAP 722 the generalised approach for any UAV which has a mass 
less than 150kg is for it to be treated as a recreational model aircraft. It is this gap within 
the industry which acted as one of the prime catalysts for the author to pursue the research 
question and therefore the creation of a SCET. It should be duly noted that the author has 
not explicitly consulted with the small and medium enterprises, who are actively involved 
with UAV development, manufacture and operations, during this research. The following 
text details the extant legal considerations and certification for small UAV operations. 
 
3.7   Legal Considerations. 
As a signatory to the Chicago Convention and a member of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), the UK undertakes to comply with the provisions of the convention 
and the standards within its annexes; with the exception of any differences that it has filed 
to those standards (CAA, 2004b). 
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3.7.1   Policy. 
Article 8 of the Convention states that no aircraft which is capable of flying without a pilot 
shall be flown, without a pilot, over the territory of a Contracting State without special 
authorisation by that State (CAA, 2004b). 
 
3.7.2   Law. 
European Country (EC) regulation has established the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) and makes provision for implementing the rules that deal with aircraft 
airworthiness certification, including continued airworthiness. Detailed requirements for 
these provisions are identified within two Implementing Rules. Certain categories of civil 
aircraft are exempt from the need to comply with the EASA Regulation and its 
Implementing Rules (CAA, 2004b). The exemptions which are of direct relevance to UAV 
activities are; 
 
• Aircraft specifically designed or modified for research, experimental or scientific 
purposes and likely to be produced in very limited numbers. 
• Aircraft whose initial design was intended for military purposes. 
• Unmanned aircraft with an operating mass of less than 150kg. 
 
3.7.3   UK Specific Regulations. 
Within the UK there are two regulatory regimes, these being the military and the civil. 
Military registered aircraft, as specified by the Secretary of State for Defence, fall 
completely within the MoD’s regulatory regime.  
 
All other aircraft not classified as military, must, in accordance with the UK’s aviation 
safety legislation, comply with its civil aviation requirements. There are no special 
provisions for those aircraft registered and/or operated by the police, customs & excise, or 
other similar services (CAA, 2004b). 
 
The main civil aviation requirements are laid out in the Air Navigation Order (ANO) and 
the Rules of the Air Regulations. The provisions contained within these two documents 
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relate to many specifics such as operational rules, licensing and aerodrome regulations and 
are directly applicable to all non-military aircraft, organisations, individuals and facilities. 
However, whilst they are national requirements for certification and airworthiness they 
only apply to those aircraft which are exempt from the need to comply with the EASA 
regulations and rules. A non-military aircraft registered within the UK which is exempt 
from the EASA regulation and rules must have a certificate of airworthiness or a permit to 
fly issued by the CAA under the ANO (CAA, 2004b). 
 
The ANO includes exceptions for ‘small aircraft’; these ‘small aircraft’ are defined within 
the ANO as any unmanned aircraft weighing not more than 20 kg. Within this classification 
of aircraft, none of the preceding requirements are applicable; instead, a set of conditions 
are included at Article 87 of the ANO which allows flights to be conducted without 
complying to airworthiness, crew licensing or Rules of the Air. These conditions also 
include a prohibition on flight within controlled airspace or within aerodrome traffic zones 
unless permission has been granted by the air traffic control unit and that flights are limited 
to 400ft in height. Other conditions also apply for aerial work (commercial use) activities. 
It should be noted that these flying rules for ‘small aircraft’ have been predominantly 
developed for the purposes of regulating recreational model aircraft activities. 
 
3.8   Exemptions for Civil UAV Flights. 
An UAV which weighs more than 20kg, according to the ANO, is not classified as a ‘small 
aircraft’ and therefore all of the requirements highlighted in the preceding paragraphs must 
be complied with. If an UAV cannot comply with all of these requirements then the CAA 
may be prepared to issue an exemption under Article 127 of the ANO. To operate an UAV 
which weighs less than 20kg but more than 7kg for aerial work purposes requires specific 
CAA permission. 
 
3.9   Certification of Civil UAVs. 
Whilst it has already been stated that UAVs with an operating mass of less than 150 kg are 
excluded from the EASA regulatory and certification process the CAA, as the UK’s 
national authority on aviation, has developed policies for general UAV activities. These 
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policies apply to general UAVs, and cover their certification and standards. In addition to 
the aforementioned the CAA have issued a policy which predominantly addresses light 
UAV systems; these are predominantly line-of-sight activities and are restricted to flying 
within visual distance (500m) of the operator and at a maximum altitude of typically 400ft. 
 
3.10   The Light UAV Policy. 
This policy offers an alternative route for the CAA to grant exemptions to the ANO 
regulations as long as the UAVS meets certain specific criteria and is operated within those 
limitations stipulated by the CAA. Any intent to operate outside of these limitations must 
be formally discussed with the CAA. 
 
Light UAVS exhibit many parallels to model aircraft used for recreational purposes. By 
reviewing the model aircraft world’s safety record and their operating practices the CAA 
have concluded that a similar level of regulation may be applied to UAVS, provided that 
they exhibit no greater capability than the majority of the existing model aircraft fleet and 
are subjected to the same procedures and limitations applied to model aircraft (CAA, 
2004b). 
 
UAVS that are specifically designed or modified such as not to exceed the defined 
maximum speed and kinetic energy levels which are representative of the existing model 
aircraft fleet may be exempted from compliance under certain conditions. The applicable 
operating conditions and classifications are discussed in the following text. 
 
3.11   Civil UAV Classifications. 
Within the context of the CAA, and indeed for this thesis, an UAV is defined as; 
 
‘An aircraft which is designed to operate with no human pilot on board’ 
         (CAA, 2004b) 
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There are several different types of UAV and subsequently various forms of classifications 
used by various organisations to identify them. The following two classifications are the 
most widely and formally applied; 
 
3.11.1   By Airspace Requirements. 
For the purposes of airspace management the CAA and the MoD, through Joint Service 
Publication (JSP) 550 use the following classifications; 
 
• Group 1 - Those intended to be flown in permanent or temporarily segregated 
airspace (e.g. Danger Areas) over an unpopulated surface (normally the sea 
following a ‘Clear Range’ procedure). 
• Group 2 - Those intended to be flown in permanent or temporarily segregated 
airspace (e.g. Danger Areas) over a surface that may be permanently or temporarily 
inhabited by humans. 
• Group 3 - Those intended to be flown outside controlled airspace (Class F&G) 
within the United Kingdom’s Flight Information Region (UK FIR). 
• Group 4 - Those intended to be flown inside controlled airspace (Class A – E) 
within the UK FIR and the United Kingdom Upper Information Region (UK UIR). 
• Group 5 - Those intended to be flown in all airspace classifications. 
 
Whilst the above classifications are not used by the author within this thesis, the 
classifications have been included to provide additional context to the field of UAV 
operations. The topic of ‘sense and avoid’ was briefly discussed in preceding parts of this 
chapter and whilst it is not to be further pursued here it is noteworthy to point out that all 
related issues on the subject will need to be finalised before flights within Groups 3,4 and 5 
are considered appropriate. Whilst the author is experienced with UAV flying activities 
within Group 1 he is of the considered opinion that the work of other bodies, and that of 
this thesis, would act as fundamental building blocks to allow UAV flying activities to 
occur within Group 2. 
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3.11.2   By Operating Mass. 
The following classifications, based upon the air vehicle’s mass, is directly related to the 
CAA’s Light UAV policy and the focus of this thesis; table 3.1 summarises these 
categories. This approach identifies 4 distinct categories; 
 
• Small aircraft (< 7kg mass). These fall within the ‘Small Aircraft’ definition of the 
ANO and are exempt from most regulatory provisions. 
• Small aircraft (7kg - 20kg mass). These again fall within the ‘Small Aircraft’ 
definition of the ANO and are excluded from the majority of regulatory provisions 
provided the operator does not act in a negligent or reckless manner so as to 
endanger person or property. This class of small aircraft has some additional 
operational constraints which are imposed to ensure adequate safety. 
• Small aircraft (20kg – 150kg mass). For the ‘Small Aircraft’ which fall into this 
category the CAA have recommended that the Large Model Association (LMA) are 
engaged for their expertise. The CAA recommend that the LMA inspect and satisfy 
themselves that this classification of UAV has been designed and built to a 
representative and acceptable good practice. Following the granting of a CAA 
‘exemption for flight testing’ the LMA will oversee a programme of demonstration 
of ‘function & reliability’ flight trials. Following a successful series of trials the 
LMA will recommend to the CAA that a renewable exemption is issued for 
operational flights. 
• Small aircraft ( > 150kg mass). The Light UAV policy does not apply to any 
‘Small Aircraft’ which have a mass greater than 150kg. 
 
3.12   Applying the Light UAV Policy. 
Whilst it has already been stated that the Light UAV policy is limited to civil UAVs which 
have no greater capability than the existing model aircraft fleet there is a need to effectively 
bound this requirement. Safety standards for model aircraft are established to address the 
risks to both third parties on the ground and also to other airspace users. The former is 
measured in terms of the UAV’s kinetic energy upon impact whilst the latter is controlled 
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through compliance to the Rules-of-the-Air and the procedural avoidance of aerial 
collisions. 
 
 Recreational Use Commercial Use (Aerial Work) 
< 7kg ‘Small Aircraft’ under ANO Art 129 
• Minimum operational constraints. 
• No airworthiness standards. 
‘Small Aircraft’ under ANO Art 129 
• Minimum operational 
constraints. 
• No airworthiness standards 
7 – 20kg ‘Small Aircraft’ under ANO Art 129 
• Operational constraints required by 
ANO Art 87. 
• No airworthiness standards 
‘Small Aircraft’ under ANO Art 129 
• Operational constraints required 
by ANO Art 87. 
• CAA permission required  under 
ANO Art 87 subject to and 
additional CAA limitations. 
• No airworthiness standards 
20 -150kg • Exemption required against ANO 
incorporating limitations from 
CAA. 
• LMA recommendation (or 
equivalent) in lieu of airworthiness 
standards. 
• Exemption required including  
limitations from CAA. 
• Impact kinetic energy must be 
no more than 95kJ. 
• Airworthiness recommendation 
from an accredited body. 
> 150kg Not Applicable Use of national operating rules or 
application of EASA airworthiness 
standards. 
 
Table 3.1 – Summary of CAA policy for UAVS flying in UK airspace (CAA, 2004b). 
 
3.12.1   Kinetic Energy Limitations for Light UAVs. 
An UAV system eligible for consideration under the Light UAV policy must consist of a 
vehicle whose maximum kinetic energy upon impact on the ground does not exceed 95kJ. 
To attain rigid control over these energy limitations a maximum take-off mass of 150kg 
must not be exceeded whilst the vehicle’s maximum sustainable speed, in level flight, 
should not exceed 70kts. These conditions have been chosen to maintain a degree of 
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equivalence with the model aircraft fleet and are based upon philosophies developed and 
discussed within the CAA paper ‘Aircraft Airworthiness Certification Standards for Civil 
UAVs’ (CAA, 2002a). 
 
The aforementioned paper presented research from a wide range of aircraft varying from 
small scale platforms up to and including major commercial airliners. The research was 
predominantly based upon two scenarios; the first looked at an emergency landing under 
control whilst the latter looked at a complete loss of control. In the specific case of light 
UAVs, which are limited to an operating height of 400ft, it was deemed appropriate to 
select two scenarios; the first was a free-fall from maximum height (400ft) whilst the 
second would accommodate UAVs which could attain a relatively high forward velocity. 
For all fixed-wing aircraft a maximum impact speed of 1.4 times the maximum operating 
speed was chosen for the calculated kinetic energy limitations (CAA, 2004a). 
 
The first scenario is akin to a ‘free-fall’ scenario and is designed to take account of an 
aircraft which has suffered a primary structure failure such as a fractured wing spa in the 
case of a fixed wing platform. In the context of a rotary wing platform the scenario covers 
the complete loss of power or separation of the main rotor. Additionally, in the case of a 
lighter-than-air platform the scenario encapsulates the possibility of a burst or detached gas 
envelope. The latter scenario takes into account the loss of control mid-flight such as flying 
out of radio control and achieving an optimal final terminal velocity at ground impact 
generated from maximum applied power and a gravitational component. 
 
For an aircraft of mass 75kg which can attain a maximum level speed (Vmax) of 70kts the 
calculated kinetic energy level at impact is 95kJ, using the 1.4 x Vmax application. To 
ensure that a consistent application of hazard management was applied to all possible 
scenarios this maximum kinetic energy figure is also applied to the free-fall condition. The 
result is that a single maximum kinetic energy limit (95kJ) was published by the CAA 
which all Light UAVs must comply with (CAA, 2004a).  
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One of the benefits offered by stipulating a maximum kinetic energy level is that slower 
platforms, which are limited in speed, may be allowed to fly with a mass greater than 75kg. 
A mass of 80kg, if dropped from 400ft, exhibiting negligible aerodynamic drag will strike 
the ground at a terminal velocity of 95kts giving a calculated kinetic energy at impact, of 
95kJ. Clearly, any object which exhibits a significant degree of aerodynamic drag, without 
reliance upon any in-built arrestor system, will have a reduced impact velocity and 
therefore comparable increases in mass may be allowed as long as the 95kJ impact energy 
maxima is not breached. 
 
The following tables (Table 3.2 & Table 3.3), extracted from the CAA’s Light UAV 
systems policy (2004a), show the relationships between mass, maximum operating speed 
and aerodynamic drag characteristics applied within the light UAV policy. 
 
 
Mass of 
UAV in kg. 
Maximum velocity in 
level flight (Vmax.) in 
Kts. 
Maximum impact 
velocity (1.4 x Vmax.) in 
ms-1. 
Kinetic energy at 
maximum impact 
velocity in kJ. 
60 70 50 76 
70 70 50 89 
75 70 50 95 
80 68 49 95 
90 64 46 95 
100 60 44 95 
110 58 42 95 
120 55 40 95 
130 53 38 95 
140 51 37 95 
150 49 36 95 
 
Table 3.2 – Maximum permissible mass & velocity to maintain the 95kJ limit. 
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Mass of body in Kg. 
Cross-sectional area of 
bluff body in m2. 
Kinetic energy at impact in kJ. 
80 0 (Negligible Drag) 95 
115 0.5 95 
130 1.0 95 
150 1.5 95 
 
Table 3.3 – Relationship between the mass & cross-sectional area of a bluff body (with a 
non-dimensional drag co-efficient of circa 0.9) arising from the 95kJ limit. 
 
3.12.2   Procedural Limitations to Avoid Aerial Collisions. 
The previous text effectively describes, within the context of a quantitative analysis, why 
the operational limit on height is set at 400ft. From a qualitative, and probably more deep 
rooted perspective, the prime reason for opting for this operating ceiling is that of 
minimising any opportunities to cause conflict with other aircraft, predominantly manned. 
By restricting the lateral distances of flight to 500 metres the operator may perform the ‘see 
and avoid’ function and ensure correct handling of the aircraft at all times (CAA, 2004a). 
 
For UAVs which are above 20kg, and within the 150kg limit (the third category), the CAA 
rely heavily upon the UK’s LMA design and build standards; an organisation recognised by 
the CAA as being capable of providing expertise in the area. 
 
3.13   Airworthiness and the Large Model Association. 
The LMA have advised the CAA that it exists purely for the benefit of recreational model 
aircraft flying and does not offer any technical support to commercial UAV operations. 
Consequently, as a result of this declaration by the LMA, there is clearly a need to identify 
another competent body which will provide similar recommendations to the CAA on Light 
UAV systems. 
 
In the absence of such a recognised competent authority the CAA accepts assurances from 
other learned bodies with related expertise in aeronautical engineering such as commercial 
aerospace companies and university departments. Until such a recognised body is 
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established the CAA will continue to assess each application on an ad-hoc basis; upon each 
occurrence the CAA will take account of the experience and knowledge of the operator and 
make recommendations, as appropriate, provided it is assured that the standards applied are 
as vigorous and demanding as those applied by the LMA. 
 
3.14   The LMA Standards. 
The LMA website was interrogated by the author during 2008 and 2009 to gain an insight 
into the ‘regulatory’ regime which is applied by the organisation to support its position as a 
competent authority for large recreational model aircraft.  
 
The website is relatively specific in terms of the CAA’s regulatory requirements for model 
aircraft which have a mass of over 20kg; it also points the reader towards contacting a 
single individual within the LMA for the appropriate advice. The first stage in gaining 
approval for flying a recreational model aircraft with mass exceeding 20kg is to ensure that 
an approved inspector is appointed to oversee the construction of the model. Information 
gathered during construction is used to facilitate the issue of a Certificate of Design and 
Construction by the LMA’s Chief Examiner and Safety Officer (CE&SO). The issue of 
such a certificate allows the CAA to issue an exemption thus allowing the aircraft to be 
flown for test purposes in the presence of an LMA examiner or other approved person. 
During this exemption phase, which predominantly runs for one year, the aircraft will be 
flown by a named pilot and that all flights are to be recorded in a Flight Test Log. 
 
Whilst the author believes that the current modus operandi is sufficiently robust for 
recreational purposes the lack of any referenced formal engineering practices on the 
website suggests that they may not be suitable for commercial UAV activities. This 
completely aligns with the LMA’s stance but gives some cause for concern if the CAA 
believe that they are suitably competent for assessing non-recreational light UAVs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Safety Cases - A Literature Review 
 
4.1   Introduction. 
This chapter introduces the origins and requirements of a safety case, the prime legal 
drivers which are mandatory under government legislation and the application of typical 
rationales. This literature review also introduces and contrasts some of the established best 
practices which have been adopted by industries such as rail transport, aerospace, mining 
and nuclear power. 
 
4.2   Development of Safety Legislation. 
On the 16 January 1862 the main structural beam of a water pumping engine at New 
Hartley Colliery, near Newcastle-on-Tyne, Northumberland sheared and fell into the only 
mineshaft and means of ventilation for the “Low-Main” seam. Hundreds of men tried, over 
a period of seven days, to rescue those who were trapped underground. Five men were 
killed immediately by the machinery, rubble and wooden liners as it fell down into the shaft 
and through their lift as they ascended to the surface. Another 199 individuals slowly 
suffocated from the lack of oxygen and the build up of gas over the coming days as the 
obstruction proved too heavy and awkward to move (Seymour, 2008). In total, 204 men 
and boys died. As a direct consequence of this accident new mining legislation was 
introduced in 1864 which stipulated that every seam, at every mine, should have a 
minimum of two access/egress points (Cullen, 1996). A comment from the Illustrated 
London News, 25th January 1862 sums up the impact that this event had upon the nation at 
the time; 
 
‘So dire a misfortune attended by such horror of circumstance is not recorded in the history 
of mining.’ (McCutcheon, 1963). 
 
At about 4:53 p.m. on Saturday 1st June 1974 a large cloud of a cyclohexane mixture 
ignited causing extensive damage and numerous fires at the Nypro (UK) chemical plant at 
Flixborough, Lincolnshire (HSE, 1975). Twenty-eight workers were killed on-site and 
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another 36 were injured off-site as a result of a badly designed maintenance modification 
and subsequent operational implementation to the plant’s processing facility. Eighteen of 
the fatalities occurred within the control room where the roof collapsed and the windows 
shattered; not one individual escaped from it. The fires remained burning for many days 
and were still hampering rescue workers ten days after the initial event. The whole 
installation was severely damaged whilst a total of 1,821 houses, shops and factories were 
extensively damaged off-site. As a  direct result of the Flixborough disaster, the HSE 
assembled a body of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to study the control of major industrial 
hazards and to give advice on best practice adoption. This body was called the Advisory 
Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) (De Cort, 1994).  
 
In 1976 a major environmental disaster occurred in Seveso, Italy, when highly toxic 
substances from a major pesticide manufacturing plant were released and caused the 
contamination of circa 2,000 hectares (≈  5,000 acres) of land and the deaths of over 70,000 
animals (De Cort, 1994). The UK’s thoughts and policy were seen as major influencers on 
the direction taken by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) when it 
subsequently introduced a directive (Directive 82/501/EEC; The Seveso Directive) for the 
control of industrial major accidents after reviewing a series of other major (preceding) 
accidents within the European community. These included the 1966 Liquid Petroleum Gas 
(LPG) explosion at Feyzin, France where 18 people died and a further 81 were injured 
(Lees, 1996); as well as the 1975 propylene explosion at Beek, Holland where 14 perished 
and a total of 107 were injured (Lees, 1996). 
 
As awareness of the need to effectively manage the safety of major industrial operations 
with the potential for catastrophic failures grew then so did the maturity applied to the risk 
management process at both national and European levels. Both the Flixborough and 
Seveso incidents were deemed to be catalytic in the creation of various committees and 
subsequent directives which eventually resulted in the enactment of the Control of 
Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations issued in 1984 (later evolved 
(1999) into COMAH – Control Of Major Accident Hazards, (De Cort, 1994)). This 
regulation required manufacturers of products which used certain dangerous substances to 
prepare a safety case which had to be submitted to the HSE. The safety case was intended 
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to show that any potential major hazard had been effectively identified and assessed and 
that adequate controls were provided for any residual risks (Cullen, 1996). 
 
Though the Hartley Colliery accident outcome differed greatly from that of the Flixborough 
accident they can be used readily to illustrate how safety legislation has evolved and 
developed over the years. The colliery accident imposed a single, universal, but quite 
specific requirement upon mine owners to install a separate means of ventilation and 
emergency escape; the chemical plant outcome imposed a more general safety objective, 
the only specific condition related to the requirement for a safety case. Whilst the colliery 
outcome was decreed to be essential for every mine the chemical plant outcome indicated 
and recognised that major accidents are often the result of a series of coincidental events 
which have collectively realised their potential hazards (Cullen, 1996). Whilst “lightning 
never strikes twice” and “history is unlikely to repeat itself exactly” a need remained 
whereby any lessons learnt from such incidents could be used to mitigate and minimise the 
possibility of any future repeat occurrence. 
 
4.3   Health and Safety Law. 
The Robens report on “Safety and Health at Work” was published in June 1972 and still 
remains the basis for the majority of the UK’s extant Health and Safety legislation. Lord 
Robens was charged with the task of; 
 
 …reviewing the provision made for the safety and health of persons in the course of 
their employment (other than transport workers while directly engaged on transport 
operations and who are covered by other provisions) and to consider whether any changes 
are needed in; 
 
• the scope or nature of the major relevant enactments, or 
• the nature and extent of voluntary action concerned with these matters, and 
• to consider whether any further steps are required to safeguard members of the 
public from hazards, other than general environmental pollutions, arising in 
connection with activities in industrial and commercial premises and construction 
sites, and to make recommendations (Robens, 1972). 
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Following the publication of the Robens report in 1972 the government, in 1974, passed the 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act (HSW Act) and created both the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).  An additional and 
important component which was also created at the same time was a role for local 
authorities (LAs) to implement a new regulatory framework for workplace health and 
safety in Great Britain (HSE, 2004a). 
 
The Act, which largely reflected the recommendations of Robens’ report, introduced a non-
prescriptive model which advocated the principle that “those that create risk are best 
placed to manage it”. Up until the Act all of industry was managed through highly 
prescriptive and detailed regulations. A new era had dawned whereby a flexible system of 
goals, targets and principles, supported by codes of practice and guidance, would be used to 
deliver a proportionate, targeted and risk-based safety environment (HSE, 2004a). 
 
As stated previously, the HSW Act established two new bodies, the HSC and the HSE. 
Their prime role was to effectively implement the framework that had been identified by 
the Robens report and to realistically deliver the requirements of the Act. The HSC first 
met in 1974 and remains responsible for preserving the health, safety and welfare of 
workers and the public who may be affected by any work activities. The Commission is 
responsible for proposing new laws and standards, conducting and directing research and 
also providing advice and information to anybody who requests such support. The HSE 
assists and supports the HSC with its activities but has specific responsibilities of its own; 
together with the LAs, the HSE is predominantly tasked with enforcing health and safety 
law (HSE, 2004a). 
 
The new bodies offered an opportunity to amalgamate a largely fragmented array of 
policymakers and inspectorates to create an unified and wide-ranging health and safety 
entity. The future would now not only be focussed but would rely upon flexibility and 
“extensive consultation” (HSE, 2004a) to create legislation that was “fit for purpose” (HSE, 
2004a). The model created relied upon the fact that the HSW Act had established a 
regulatory framework and that the HSC and HSE would deal with the details. 
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4.4   Evolution of the HSC and HSE. 
Since the HSW Act was enacted in 1974 the structure of Britain’s industry has changed 
dramatically; manufacturing has taken a massive downturn whilst the service industry has 
risen greatly (HSE, 2004a). The number of small firms has continued to grow; 99% of all 
firms in 2003 were classified as small (< 50 employees) whilst 0.2% were classified as 
medium (50 to 250 employees) (HSE, 2004a). Small and medium sized firms now employ 
virtually 60% of Britain’s workforce whilst over 70% of business enterprises in Britain 
have no employees (HSE, 2004a). In addition to these changes in workforce structure there 
have been changes in the composition of the work force. During the 1970s part-time 
workers made up a sixth of the total workforce whilst in the early 2000s they were reported 
as constituting a quarter of it. Women now make up 50% of the workforce whilst in the 
1970s the female element of the workforce was less than 40%; the adoption by industry of  
the employment of temporary and contract staff, as well as more flexible working hours, as 
driven by the modern economy, has encouraged many of these changes. The change in 
work patterns and the increased use of migrant workers has also helped to catalyse and 
accelerate such changes (HSE, 2004a). 
 
Prior to the HSW Act large numbers of British workers were excluded from the relatively  
limited safety offered by the sector-specific regulations; areas such as the self-employed, 
local government establishments, hospitals, schools and other sectors now fell under the 
control of the HSC. An immediate effect of the HSW Act was that a further 8 million 
employees were afforded health and safety protection overnight. Shock and disbelief 
reverberated through industry as the self-employed, designers, manufacturers, “anyone 
affected by work activities”, had duties of care placed upon them; they now had to take 
ownership for their actions and/or ignorance. In summary, they now had criminal liability 
added to their extant civil liability culpability. 
 
As time has progressed the responsibilities of the HSC have expanded into various new 
arenas as it has been obliged to deal with new issues and/or to investigate major incidents 
such as the Piper Alpha oil installation accident, the Clapham train crash and the King’s 
Cross fire. Following such incidents the regulatory aspects of the specific areas were 
transferred from the various government departments (e.g. Department of Energy (DoE), 
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Department of Transport (DoT)) to the HSC. These changes were driven not only by the 
need for regulatory independence but also by changes in the work environment, the 
emergence of new risks, advancements in technology (e.g. nanotechnology) and also a step 
change in society’s perceptions and demands of risk acceptance (HSE, 2004a). 
 
The public’s attitude to the regulation of risk has changed considerably since the HSW Act 
was passed in 1974. In the past there was a degree of fatalistic acceptance of accident 
causation whereas today many who are caught up in the occurrences, even in the periphery, 
call for inquiry, accountability (blame) and even financial recompense. Additionally, the 
aggrieved show an element of distrust in the opinions of SMEs and demand a consolidation 
of assurances that any control mechanisms are robust and ‘fit for purpose’. The HSE’s long 
term view is for health and safety to be developed and acknowledged as a “cornerstone of a 
civilised society” by encouraging the HSC, the HSE and the LAs to work in unison (HSE, 
2004a). Such an approach would help to nurture, establish and maintain an effective and 
realistic safety culture so that both the employer and the worker would take complete 
ownership of the issues raised. The Robens Report is about managing risks in a practical, 
realistic and reasonable manner and not to try and remove them completely; to maintain 
such an outlook on safety it is the individuals who work within the environment who are 
best placed to manage and control those risks. 
 
In April 2008 the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) announced that the HSC and 
the HSE would merge to form a single national regulatory body, responsible for promoting 
the cause of better health and safety at work. The merged body would be called the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) and would provide greater clarity and transparency whilst 
maintaining its public accountability (HSE, 2008b). 
 
4.5   Introduction to Safety Cases. 
Modern systems, especially safety related systems, are continually evolving in complexity 
as technology both allows and demands more integration; as sub-systems are integrated to 
create more intricate structures then so the intra- and inter-dependencies grow. This 
approach is also bolstered by established “systems thinking” (Hitchins, 1992) whereby 
every sub-component or sub-system must be designed and operated to link holistically into 
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both the immediate and extended environment. Whilst such safety related systems are 
developing in one direction the environment of regulation and standards is growing in 
another; such highly integrated, complex and often critical systems require much more 
detailed, comprehensive and exhaustive analysis. With this in mind it is clear to see how 
the task of creating a modern safety case for an integrated system (of sub-systems) is 
becoming very onerous; they are becoming time consuming to produce, costly and very 
difficult to manage. From personal experience with the reviewing of safety cases related to 
weapon systems, UAV systems and major capabilities (T&E Range Safety Case) the author 
would suggest that as the complexity and magnitude rises then the ability to understand the 
causal paths and any reactionary effects of any changes from the base condition diminishes. 
The “beast” can become unmanageable.  
 
Safety cases usually form a component part of a larger and holistic Safety Management 
System (SMS) (MoD, 2004) which address elements of a major project such as (non-
exhaustive); 
 
• The overall strategy for managing safety within the project. 
• The definition, allocation, identification and responsibilities of key safety related 
components including final ‘sign-off’ authority. 
• The interfacing engagements with any other SMS or sub-systems. 
• Training and/or competency requirements of any key personnel involved with 
ensuring delivery and/or compliancy. 
• Arranging for feedback, in various forms such as incident reports and near miss 
occurrences, to be appropriately and effectively managed and acted upon to ensure 
continuously safe operations. (Such feedback would use the extant Safety 
Committee, part of the overall SMS, as a formal conduit for continuous safety 
monitoring.) 
 
Another important pre-requisite of a robust safety case is that of a ‘systems’ approach 
(Hitchins, 1992, p255 and Sage, 1992) where safety must be considered as an intrinsic part 
of the overall project and not as a separate entity (MoD, 2004). This is especially so within 
large and complicated projects where poor safety ma
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significant risks to the project’s final delivery. An omission of cognisance and/or 
compliance to safety during the project’s conceptual phase may not be easily recognised 
until very much later when key and costly decisions have been made and implemented. 
Applying corrective actions at such a late stage may be costly, embarrassing and even 
impossible in some highly regulated and safety critical industries. The author cites an 
example from within his industry to illustrate such an issue. 
 
During the 1990’s a decision was made by a UK defence related project office to opt for a 
financially cheaper Flight Termination System (FTS) to be integrated within a new surface 
to air missile system for use by the UK military. This decision was based not only upon 
delivering cost savings but upon a limited amount of safety related information offered by 
one small part of the project team. This safety information was appropriate for the early 
developmental stage of the project as it was to be trialled at an European T&E capability. 
As the project matured and more extensive T&E trials were to be conducted at UK 
locations then so the limited and inappropriate safety system was embarrassingly 
uncovered; the project had developed and matured so much that re-engineering its FTS was 
considered to be too costly. In a wider context and with much embarrassment, having been 
delivered to the UK’s military, the system could not be fully exercised during peacetime 
within its own UK-based capabilities. Hence, any doctrinal requirements and practices 
afforded to the new weapon system would now have to be conducted in an un-instrumented 
part of the world (wasteful and un-productive) or in a foreign nation’s test facility. 
 
4.6   Purpose of Safety Cases. 
The raison d’etre of a safety case is to identify, assess and mitigate serious risk (Haddon-
Cave, 2009, p259). A safety case (generically) is a thorough and proficiently assembled 
argument, supported by a body of suitable evidence, that a system is acceptably safe (safe 
enough when compared against a definition or notion of tolerable risk) to operate within a 
particular context or environment (Despotou & Kelly, 2004). Safety cases have been 
adopted across many industries, especially those where risks (and subsequent 
consequences) are predominantly greater and the argument for safe operation cannot be 
wholly argued by a simplistic quantitative approach. Examples of industries which 
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currently utilise safety cases in a similar context include railways, aerospace, defence, 
nuclear energy and offshore oil & gas. 
 
Safety cases should be seen as an effective means for communicating concepts, 
methodologies and information to third parties such as the general public and regulatory 
bodies. It should be noted that having created a safety case the author(s) may be required to 
justify the safety argument, often within a court of law, if an incident subsequently occurs. 
The body of work underpinning the safety case on these occasions may need to be defended 
and the rationale explained. The safety case concept may refer to or include anything from 
software configurations or physical items of engineering through to a series of work 
instructions or even strict operating procedures.  
 
Safety case reports are predominantly large and complicated pieces of work (Kelly, 2001) 
which convey to the reader how a complex system, quite often covering many disciplines, 
is argued to be safe. From both research and personal experience such safety cases are 
seldom created by single individuals; they are predominantly assembled by a team of 
specialists, each bringing a different and valued perspective to the overall output. Quite 
often such teams may not be co-located or work within the same organisation. 
 
4.7   Definitions.  
There is no recognised or definitive statement of what a safety case should be composed of 
but there are many variations across many industries of how a safety case should be 
presented and what components should be included within it. (Wilson et al, 1995). Though 
safety case definitions differ slightly from one environment to another the fundamental 
concept remains the same;  
 
“…a safety case should communicate a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that 
a system is acceptably safe to operate in a particular context.”  (Despotou & Kelly, 2004, 
and Kelly, 1998). 
 
This rather generalised definition reinforces some of the key issues that must be considered 
when creating any safety argument for a system; the emphasis should be placed on the fact 
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that it is to be used to effectively convey an argument. It is used to demonstrate how an 
individual (or body of individuals) can reasonably conclude that a system is acceptably safe 
from the evidence presented. 
 
4.8   Contents of Safety Cases. 
A safety case should consist of three principal elements (Despotou & Kelly, 2004); 
 
• Safety Evidence. 
• Safety Argument. 
• Safety Requirements & Objectives. 
 
Evidence is any information which indicates whether a belief or proposition is true or valid 
(facts). These could be based upon established scientific principles and/or prior research. In 
the context of safety cases, evidence may be in the form of assumptions which are 
necessary to bound a condition and to facilitate the creation of an argument. 
 
An argument will communicate the relationship and rationale between the assembled body 
of evidence and the overall objectives of the safety case. An argument without any 
supporting evidence is unfounded and is therefore not convincing; in a similar manner, 
evidence which has no supporting argument is unexplained and therefore may not convey 
that the safety objectives have been met. It can therefore be appreciated that both the 
evidence presented and the argument must be aligned for credible delivery against a safety 
requirement.  
 
The actual form of the argument and any inferences made in the causal links can vary as a 
function of the system’s design and/or safety case strategy (Bishop & Bloomfield, 1995). 
Arguments may be delivered in many ways, the following documents four different 
industry established and acceptable methods. 
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4.8.1   Deterministic. 
The evidence offered may be in the form of axioms where an accepted statement is 
regarded as being self-evidently true. The inference mechanism on such occasions relies 
upon the rules of predicate logic whilst the argument is a function of using those rules. An 
example from the author’s working environment is where a missile has insufficient energy 
(e.g. fuel, height, launch airspeed, aerodynamic abilities) to breach a maximum energy 
boundary; hence proof of launch speed, aerodynamic modelling and rocket motor energy is 
required as evidence that an unplanned hazardous event is incredible. Such evidence may 
require explicit validation (especially those concerning modelling) or an independent 
review of the formalised argument. 
 
4.8.2   Probabilistic. 
The evidence offered may be based upon or adapted to a theory of probability; such an 
approach involves chance variations. The evidence could be in the form of a sub-system or 
component failure (e.g. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) calculations) and the 
inference mechanism for the argument would be the statistical analysis conducted to 
support the argument. 
 
A probabilistic argument often combines qualified estimates of a system’s parameters to 
support a high level event/goal such as a catastrophic event or dangerous occurrence. 
Statistical analysis in support of the argument may include Bayesian networks, basic 
statistical analysis, established approaches (human failure predictions) or stochastic models 
such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Probabilistic arguments not only look at the discrete 
sub-components of a safety case but also look at the underlying model of system behaviour 
and the intra-relationships which percolate between and across the various forms of 
evidence. 
 
One form of the probabilistic approach which is currently very much in vogue, certainly 
within the aerospace industry, is that of the Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA). QRA is a 
very valuable tool, especially when there are many uncertainties within the environment 
though the secret in its constructive and realistic use lies in striking a balance between it 
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and good engineering judgement (Wilkinson, 2002). QRA is further explained in more 
detail at 4.11. 
 
4.8.3    Qualitative. 
This approach can be very subjective as the evidence offered to support such an argument 
may be as intangible as stating that a certain standard has been adhered to or that expert 
guidance has been sought. The inference mechanism may be constructed from a form of 
validity or approval process agreed from such concepts and policies. 
 
Qualitative arguments are extremely important to safety cases; whilst many purists 
advocate the binary form of arguing safety through a quantitative approach the more 
subjective and often intangible qualitative approach also has its benefits. Qualitative 
assessments are often scored or categorised using terms such as “good”, “indifferent” or 
“bad” (Bishop & Bloomfield, 1995) by using expert judgement and/or peer review. If the 
system or sub-system being reviewed is to be subjected to, for example, a compliance 
regime or conformance to a certain standard then its acceptance can be binary in nature. 
The use of a “tick-list” to demonstrate  acceptability is a prime example of a binary 
qualitative argument and is especially valid if designed and constructed upon previous 
work which has a proven heritage for delivering the required level of safety (Bishop & 
Bloomfield, 1995). 
 
In reality it is extremely unlikely that a safety case will be constructed using an entirely 
deterministic or probabilistic approach. Overall, the safety case may consist of numerous 
arguments and claims relating to the many ‘sub-components’ of the total system but these 
may not necessarily be in the same approach. Additionally such deviations in the approach 
may be a function of the hierarchical order within the system as well as the most befitting 
or suitable argument to use for the sub-component (sub-claim) (Bishop & Bloomfield, 
1995). 
 
It is also important to recognise that safety cannot be argued to be acceptable or not without 
any consideration to the application of context (Despotou & Kelly, 2004). Any system may 
be considered as unsafe if applied to, or operated within, an unsuitable or inappropriate 
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context. One of the major tasks that befalls a safety case is that of the provision of context 
for the argument. It is quite self evident that any system may be accepted as being unsafe if 
used outside its design parameters or is used in an inappropriate manner; by explaining 
within the safety case how the system is to be operated the argument may be contextually 
bounded. 
 
As the safety case matures and evolves through its various lifecycle stages the safety 
argument is decomposed into smaller and clearer entities which reflect the author(s)’ 
understanding of the system(s) in question. During the preliminary stages of the project life 
cycle the argument may be extremely limited; this will therefore be reflected in the use of 
high-level objectives within the safety case yield. As progress is made and the project 
matures then so the level of safety knowledge grows allowing the argument to be expressed 
in ever increasing realistic and definitive terms. 
 
Safety cases should be clear, logical and free-flowing throughout. Quite often additional 
contextual information can be provided through the use of a more qualitative approach; the 
use of an extended textual account quite often provides the ‘mortar’ that holds the main 
quantitative ‘block work’ together. Without such a textual input much of the argument can 
be lost leaving third parties questioning if the objectives have been fully met or worse still 
that an argument is seen to be weak when challenged following an incident. One of the 
major requirements of a safety case, especially for projects which are complicated, emotive, 
and at the periphery of social acceptance such as those within the defence and aerospace 
environments, is that any textual content is clear and concise. It should be duly noted that in 
the event of an incident, especially one which involves a fatality, the safety case may be 
scrutinised by a court of law and the information contained therein will be reviewed by 
both other expert witnesses and a broad cross-section of the public. Delivering a clear, 
concise and unambiguous argument is therefore very important in such circumstances. 
 
The overall approach taken by the author(s) of a safety case must ensure that all parties are 
agreed on a common theme and route to achieve the final objective. Any misalignments 
will create inefficiencies and ultimately a weakened safety case which cannot stand up to a 
rigorous and bona fide challenge. One of the most difficult issues to overcome in the 
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creation of any safety case is that of ensuring that all stakeholders involved in the process 
have a similar understanding of the overall safety argument (Despotou & Kelly, 2004). In 
the absence of such a consolidated and shared approach the management of the safety case 
becomes quite onerous and ownership of any safety issue may become diluted. Various 
tools have been utilised by many industries to help define, express, present and manage 
safety arguments. These are further discussed within this chapter. 
 
4.8.4   Established Good Practice. 
In addition to the use of quantitative and qualitative tools (as discussed in the preceding 
text) it is also acceptable to apply relevant and established good practice in the 
demonstration of risk management and its reduction to the required level (HSE, 2006a). 
Good practice may change over time due to increased understanding or changes in 
technology and the criteria for such approaches and the application of such evolutions is set 
out within the HSE’s guidance upon the concept of ‘As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable’ 
(ALARP). ALARP is further discussed within this chapter. In situations which are 
considered to be unusual, exceptional and appropriate, such as that of the T&E Ranges, the 
use of authoritative good practice can be considered to set the risk benchmark. Whilst good 
practice informs, it does not constrain or substitute the need for professional judgement. In 
the case of this project the author has had access to many safety and operational subject 
matter experts which have given opportunities to create a safety case which can be 
assembled not only upon quantitative foundations but also utilises a professional qualitative 
approach, drawing upon professional judgement in a truly holistic and systematic manner. 
This approach draws upon many of the principles which are so vigorously advocated in 
today’s systems engineering environment.  
 
4.9   Communicating the Argument. 
Existing approaches to convey safety arguments are varied; like other environments there is 
a need to pick the most appropriate tool for the task. This section of the chapter investigates 
those approaches which have been utilised for communicating the safety argument; it 
concludes with a relative in-depth look at Goal Structured Notation (GSN) which is 
currently heavily used in the author’s industry. 
Formatted: Bullets and
Numbering
Formatted: Bullets and
Numbering
 61 
4.9.1   Free Text. 
Early safety cases, predominantly for relatively uncomplicated organisations and/or 
projects, relied heavily upon the use of textual narratives to convey the safety argument to 
the reader. The approach relies upon the use of clear, concise and well structured English 
language to convey how a safety requirement is interpreted and achieved within a system 
(Kelly, 1998). When correctly used it will not only describe the higher level safety 
requirement but will effectively reference the supporting evidence which underpins it. Such 
an approach for expressing safety arguments may be very effective but can show its 
limitations when applied within certain environments. 
 
Safety cases are predominantly written by engineers who, by default and circumstance, 
tend not to be highly polished in the use of the written word; (though the author accepts that 
there are exceptions to this subjective and rhetorical view). For this reason, the meaning of 
any text, and therefore the structure of the safety argument may be confused and appear 
irrational. Another limitation of the free text approach which is prevalent and valid at the 
current time is that due to the creation of highly complicated “systems of systems” which 
are created as a result of technology growth and integration. As the number of supporting 
evidential elements grow within the more complicated scenarios then the number of cross-
references within the text become more awkward to the point that the flow of the argument 
becomes disjointed and disrupted. 
 
4.9.2   Tabular Presentations. 
Kelly (1998) highlights the fact that tabular methods were first used within the Safety of 
Hazardous Industrial Processes (SHIP) project (An European Union (EU) Environment 
Programme to define an approach to assuring safety despite the presence of design faults). 
The approach relies upon the creation of a table of three columns (Kelly, 1998); 
 
• Claim    (The overall objective of the argument) 
• Argument   (Descriptor of argument given in support of   
    the claim) 
• Evidence / Assumptions (Evidence or Assumption to support the argument) 
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From a positive perspective this form of structuring a safety argument is extremely simple 
and, when compared to free text, is easy to demonstrate the argument in its decomposed 
state. It is this simplistic method which ultimately limits the use of tabular structures to the 
uncomplicated arguments; i.e. tabular structures make it possible for just two steps to be 
recorded in the decomposition of any argument; 
 
‘Claim’ → ‘Argument’ → ‘Evidence’ / ‘Assumptions’ 
 
Where arguments are complex and/or when a single ‘Claim’ is supported by many strands 
of ‘Evidence’ or ‘Assumptions’ the text within the ‘Argument’ column must be expanded to 
allow the argument to be communicated fully. Another option is that of breaking the 
argument down into smaller sub-components and further decomposing them in other tables. 
Despite attempts to use good argument descriptors or cross referencing techniques both 
options can lead to a rather disjointed argument which suffers from a lack of clarity and 
flow. Despite much research by the author there is minimal guidance available on how to 
formally approach and document the information for tabular safety arguments. 
 
4.9.3   Claim Structures. 
Claim structures are constructed by fusing together a number of argument claims through 
the use of AND and/or OR gates; where OR gates are used to indicate an independent form 
of argument. The overall claim for the system under scrutiny is decomposed by using a 
hierarchical technique until foundational or undeveloped claims are reached. The 
foundational (or base) claims are supported by evidence though their role is not shown 
diagrammatically within the structure. 
 
Claim structures have been used by the MoD to present process safety arguments in the 
development of processes such as the Ship Helicopter Operating Limit Instrumentation 
System (SHOLIS) project (Kelly, 1998 & MoD, 1997b). 
 
There seem to be some synergies between the use of claim structures and goal structures; 
Kelly (1998) suggests that there is evidence that GSN has had an influence on the claim 
structures methodology. Claim structures are typically abridged versions of GSN which do 
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not express the arguments of the over-riding strategy in any enrichened form; they rely 
wholly upon the binary outputs of the AND & OR gate methodologies. By using such a 
simplistic and stark approach their arguments often suffer from a lack of context, reasoning 
and justification. Again, despite much research by the author, there is minimal guidance 
available on how to construct and apply this form of safety argument. 
 
4.9.4   Bayesian Belief Networks. 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) provide a means to communicate claim intra-
relationships within a safety argument (Kelly, 1998). BBNs do not explicitly present the 
claims, they communicate the safety argument implicitly; the ‘belief’ in the argument is 
created by the conditional probabilities associated with the information contained within 
nodes and the arcs which join them. BBNs are also known by other terms such as; 
Probabilistic Cause-Effect Models, Probabilistic Causal Path Models, etc. BBNs, when 
applied to safety arguments, are graphical diagrams which help to communicate the 
probabilistic causal relationships which exist between the argument’s variables. Nodes, 
which contain text represent variables whilst arcs between the nodes indicate a causal 
dependency between the variables. Conditional Bayesian probabilities are used to express 
the beliefs in dependency between the differing variables. Figure 4.1 shows an example of 
a BBN. Within the example a relationship is revealed between the ability of a tracking 
radar’s operator to track a missile in flight and his competency & training, the weapon’s 
flight profile and the equipment’s tracking capability. 
 
BBNs are very good in constructing a safety argument by allowing causal relationships to 
be identified between both qualitative and quantitative safety elements. In a similar manner 
to fault tree analysis they yield and contain important evidence which can be used to 
qualify a quantitative claim within an argument. This quantitative derivation offered by 
BBNs is extremely useful when trying to predict the value of variables based upon 
uncertain or unqualified data such as human error and/or equipment functional failure (in 
the absence of technical data). As with many other predictive type approaches, one of 
BBNs weaknesses lies in the derivation of the conditional probabilities and its use to reveal 
the degree of causal interference between the different variables. From the author’s 
experience of developing Range Safety Cases using causal path analysis identifying the 
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probabilities can become very subjective and arduous, especially when the forum is formed 
from a varied background. In the case of the more subjective variables the BBN model can 
be re-visited periodically if and when qualified data becomes available (true further 
technical analysis and/or historic trend analysis) and the overall conditional probabilities 
improved to align with reality. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.1 - Example BBN of a Range’s missile tracking abilities. 
 
4.9.5   Goal Structuring Notation. 
Kelly (1998) states that Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was first developed for the 
presentation of safety arguments within the ASAM-II project. The original ASAM (A 
Safety Argument Manager) project was led by the University of York to investigate and 
develop a system for structuring the rationale applied to safety cases.  
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The project approached the problem by adopting the concept of structuring arguments in 
the Toulmin form (Toulmin, 1958) whereby the concept of typed premises and patterns of 
an argument are inserted to augment the use of Govier notation (Govier, 1992). It should be 
noted that both Govier’s and Toulmin’s notation may be used to convey any argument as 
they have been devised to be fully universal and do not explicitly record safety related 
concepts. GSN builds upon this typed argument framework to create a notation which is 
ideally suited to the safety justification domain (Kelly, 1998). A prototype Safety 
Argument Management (SAM) tool was borne out of the initial ASAM project which 
facilitated the management of sub-arguments so that they could effectively be assembled to 
construct the overall safety argument. Despite such encouraging results the project 
identified a number of critical areas which required more research. Of the criticisms raised 
the dominant two were; 
 
• That the Toulmin approach was deemed to be very restrictive and did not readily 
support the forms of safety case argument commonly found within the real world. 
• And that the tool should support the supporting evidence of a safety case and not 
just the high level argument. 
 
The ASAM-II project, a collaborative DTI-EPSRC funded project with industry was 
initiated to address these issues. The project focussed on two prime concepts; 
 
• The development of a goal based notation for structuring the high level argument of 
a safety case, and… 
• The management of the inter-relationships that occur within the most common 
safety analysis techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA). 
 
The project ended in 1996 with the issue of a prototype tool SAM 3.25, published later by 
Kelly (1998). Minimal further development allowed the SAM tool to be offered as a 
commercial tool for the management of safety cases. In 1997 a consortium of European 
commercial companies who were involved in the development of safety-critical systems 
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created the ‘SAM Club’. Version four (SAM 4) of the SAM tool was issued in 1999 (Kelly, 
1998). 
 
GSN is a graphical argumentation notation which can explicitly represent the individual 
elements of any safety argument such as the requirements, claims, evidence and context 
(Despotou & Kelly, 2004). Of possibly greater importance is the fact that GSN can 
represent the relationships between these discrete elements such as how requirements are 
supported by specific claims or how the claims are supported by evidence. Furthermore, 
GSN can specify and/or define contextual information which is extremely important to 
real-world applications.  
 
GSN currently utilises twelve principal elements which are linked together in a network to 
describe a goal structure (Kelly, 2003). The principal purpose of the goal structure is to 
demonstrate how claims about the overall system (goals) can be decomposed into various 
sub-goals until a point has been reached where they may be directly substantiated by clear 
and definitive evidence (solutions). Through the use of GSN in this decomposition phase it 
is possible to communicate the context (overall system application or the prescribed 
operational state), the strategies (quantitative or qualitative approach) and rationale of any 
argument (Kelly, 2003).  
 
Succinctly, GSN has been designed to facilitate hierarchical structuring of the large amount 
of information which must be recorded and managed in the process of constructing a safety 
case. Primarily, GSN is used to capture high level arguments, including corresponding 
linkages, to any supporting evidence; it is also used to capture process descriptions 
including any relevant links to contextual information regarding the processes and/or 
solutions produced. In the application of GSN the system safety requirements are expressed 
as Goals. Through the use of decomposition (sub-goals/sub-requirements) or through direct 
appeal to supporting evidence (e.g. results of individual component analysis) these primal 
level goals may be shown to have been met. GSN notation, predominantly through 
evolution, has developed into a very useful and rich ‘language’ allowing assumptions, 
justifications, general proof and even rationale to be effectively captured and 
communicated.  
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Entity Symbol Description 
Goal 
 
A statement of a requirement/target to be met by a system/item. 
Or some activity to be performed. 
Strategy 
 
A statement of how to break down a set of parent goals into a 
set of sub-goals. 
Choice 
 
A decision strategy for selecting between alternative strategies. 
Solution 
 
A solution to a goal. This can be almost any kind of technical 
data, such as a Fault Tree, Argument, FMEA, design reference 
etc. 
Model 
 
A representation of the system, sub-systems, or environment 
over which other goal structuring elements are articulated. 
Context 
 
Context provides the inputs or background information that a 
goal or other goal structuring element requires for it to be 
understood, amplified, or carried out. 
Justification 
J 
A statement justifying the use of a goal, strategy, choice, 
constraint, criteria, solution or model. 
The name indicates the file name where the details of the 
justification are stored in a separate file. 
Assumption 
A 
An assertion that some element of the goal structure has to rely 
upon in order for it to be satisfiable. It may relate to the 
environment, system, or be a theoretical. 
Problem 
 
A fact about the environment or system which may be 
expected to cause a problem in the solution of a particular goal, 
strategy or some other GSN element 
 
Fig 4.2 - GSN entities, symbols and brief description of use (non-exhaustive). 
 
The overall approach of creating a safety case using GSN starts with the construction of a 
High Level Argument (HLA) to which more discrete components of evidence, arguments 
and computations are attached; ultimately, a logical mass of data which supports the HLA 
is formed. The elements of GSN can be sub-divided into two main categories (Garman, 
2007); 
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• Spinal - Goals, Strategies, Choices, Solution. 
• Contextual - Models, Contexts, Stakeholders, Criteria, Constraints, Assumptions, 
Justifications, Problems. 
 
Figure 4.2 lists (non-exhaustively) some GSN entities, their symbols and gives a brief 
description of their appropriate use. An example of a typical goal structure is shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
Fig 4.3 - Example GSN taken from Kelly & McDermid (1995). 
 
GSN has been widely accepted by many safety-critical industries (e.g. aerospace, rail 
travel, defence) for the development and presentation of safety related arguments within 
safety cases over the past decade. The author’s own industry of aerospace and weapon 
system development/evaluation has adopted GSN as the prime tool for safety argument 
development, especially in the field of UAV operations. It should be noted that the concept 
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of goal decomposition is not limited to the field of safety argumentation; in fact the 
approach of breaking down a primary element into its constituent elements has been 
employed within the requirements engineering and systems engineering industries. 
 
4.10   Safety Case Development Lifecycle. 
It is certainly recognised within the author’s industry that the development of a safety case 
cannot be left until the latter part of a system’s lifecycle and that its creation for an already 
operational system can be very limited in value if the system already ‘appears’ to be safe. 
 
In the case of the latter, and from experience, the author recalls how safety cases were 
constructed in direct response to changes in the regulatory regime of the T&E Ranges 
(MoD, 1997a). The creation of these somewhat immature safety cases should not be wholly 
denigrated but should be seen as the first few steps of an evolutionary and edifying process; 
certainly the extant safety cases within the author’s business environment appear adequate. 
Nevertheless, constructing a safety case for an existing system (an application of the 
reverse engineering concept) is extremely limited and basically results in a formal report 
which documents the systems’ activities under many assumptions. This is predominantly 
cogent for long-established systems where sub-system reliability and functional 
understanding is very limited. Assumptions for such safety cases are often made due to a 
lack of design evidence or large changes in technology and/or regulation; 
electromechanical and early software systems are prime examples of such systems. 
Approaches often used by safety case authors in the creation of a safety case for an extant 
operational system include “proof through usage” (analysis of historical data such as 
MTBF) or the apportioning of standard human failure and/or error probabilities from 
regulatory guidelines. 
 
From the former’s perspective, many problems have been experienced when the 
development of a safety case has been left until a project has been designed, implemented 
and is about to become operational (Kelly, 2003). These problems include the following 
(non-exhaustive) causes; 
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Costly and demanding re-design of some, or all aspects, of the system due to the late 
recognition that an adequate safety argument cannot be constructed. Quite often, a project 
will be initiated and driven forward by a business requirement underpinned by engineering 
or scientific SMEs. In the absence of a suitable safety engineer (safety case author) at the 
outset the project quickly grows and decisions are made to commit resources (e.g. financial, 
contractual, human) which may be both difficult and expensive to re-direct without loss of 
money, professional standing and time. 
 
By omitting the safety case author from the early conceptual and developmental stage of 
the project the safety argument has to be constructed from a fait accompli rather than as an 
integral component which has evolved innately and inherently from within the project. 
Such an approach does not give the author an opportunity to influence the project’s design 
in a way which could improve both its operational safety and its safety argument. Often in 
such circumstances the argument conveyed is weak and less convincing due to, for 
example, the use of more probabilistic components within the structure rather than the more 
plausible and definitive deterministic components. 
 
Quite often the decisions and assumptions made on how to approach a problem in a 
particular way (justification, context and boundary conditions) are not recorded in any 
detail at the time. This is exacerbated if the decisions are made in the absence of a safety 
engineer. By opting to capture such important contextual information at such a late stage 
there is a real risk that some of the safety related information may be omitted to the 
detriment of the overall final safety argument. 
 
An effective and robust safety case cannot be created as a singular event within the 
lifecycle of a system or project; it is an iterative and evolutionary process which 
commences at the conceptual stage of the project. It is developed and refined as the project 
matures. Many industries such as the MoD, the CAA, the UK’s rail transport and the 
nuclear energy industries now require a safety case that is evolved and developed as part of 
an integrated approach when embarking upon any new project. For example, Defence 
Standard 00-56 (MoD, 2004) states the following; 
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“The safety case should be initiated at the earliest possible stage in the Safety Programme 
so that hazards are identified and dealt with while the opportunities for their exclusion 
exist.” 
 
Whilst the HSE’s Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities (HSE, 2006b) states 
that; 
 
“For each life-cycle stage, control of radiological hazards should be demonstrated by a 
valid safety case that takes into account the implications from previous stages and for 
future stages. 
 
The safety case for each stage should take account of other life-cycle stages, i.e. it should 
build on the safety case for previous stages and show that the safety intent for subsequent 
stages can be achieved. The specific content and depth of information in a safety case will 
vary from stage to stage, and should be commensurate with the nature of a particular stage 
and interrelationships with other stages. For example, in the early stages (e.g. design 
concept) the safety case will be more a statement of future intent and principles, whereas a 
safety case for the operational stage will contain far more detail and analysis.” 
 
4.11   A Staged Approach to Creating a Safety Case. 
Defence Standard 00-56 (MoD, 2004) provides further advice on the development of safety 
cases. Though it suggests using a three stage approach for the creation of a robust safety 
case when dealing specifically with software the author considers that it should be adopted 
as good practice for the development of virtually all safety cases ;  
 
• A Preliminary Safety Case (PSC) should be created upon defining and reviewing 
the system requirement specification. 
• A further Interim Safety Case (ISC) may be created upon completion of a 
proposed system design and the successful conduct of some preliminary 
verification and validation exercises. 
• A full and final Operational Safety Case (OSC) should be constructed prior to the 
period by which the system is to be operational. Such a safety case will include 
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evidence which corroborates any earlier assumptions and/or models which may 
have been used to bound the original conceptual stage. The evidence will not only 
support the user requirement but will be used to satisfy the requirements of any 
third parties such as Independent Safety Assessors (ISAs) and regulators such as the 
HSE, MoD and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
 
Operational safety cases present an argument that a system is acceptably safe in a given 
context (McDermid & Kelly, 2005). Operational safety cases differ somewhat from the 
more isolated or independent type of safety case which is often created for a piece of 
equipment or a system of sub-systems. Special considerations should be applied when 
developing and managing operational safety cases such as considering lessons which have 
been identified from major accidents or incidents where causation may have been attributed 
to operational sources. Specifically, operational aspects include elements such as the 
external environment, culture, human factors, competence and even procedures as they are 
all holistically linked into the way that the system is operated and managed (McDermid & 
Kelly, 2005). Operational safety cases may often have many operational omissions, 
especially if the equipment has been built and the overall context or strategy of how and 
when it will be used has not been finalised. It should be noted that civilian and military 
operational safety cases may have both similar and different elements within their 
operational safety cases; examples may include contingencies for terrorist attack, sabotage, 
commercial gain, etc. 
 
Though the safety case requirements of various industries differ, predominantly due to 
regulatory dissimilitude, the overall approach of creating a final safety case from a number 
of evolutionary phases is increasingly being accepted as a principal concept across most 
disciplines (Kelly, 2003). Figure 4.4 depicts graphically how the evolutionary safety case 
concept (Safety Case Lifecycle) aligns with established methodologies for project 
engineering (Design Lifecycle). 
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Figure 4.4 - Illustration of the alignment of Design and Safety Case Lifecycles (Based 
upon Kelly, 2003). 
 
Core to the evolutionary safety case concept is the developing safety argument and its 
ability to clearly demonstrate how an initial concept consisting of foundational elements 
has been developed into a mature, well structured and consistent argument. The evolution 
and maturity is demonstrated through the revisiting of any pre-worked argument 
components with new knowledge gleaned as the project progresses. As the final operational 
phase is approached then data and evidence may be gathered from test-runs, site acceptance 
checks or commissioning work to further validate any models or to qualify even the most 
fundamental of engineering calculations. From both an engineering and business 
perspective this form of approaching the final stages of a project is logical and very 
effective for de-risking and verification prior to becoming fully operational. 
 
The ability or opportunity to introduce a safety engineer into a safety-related project at its 
inception (PSC phase) is paramount if the project is to achieve an optimal balance between 
its engineering solution and safety related certification. Quite often the early identification 
of safety objectives allows the final design to be influenced to allow a more compelling 
safety argument to be established. 
 
Many decisions are made at the earliest of stages whilst discussing various solutions. Even 
at the conceptual phase, decisions, often unconsciously, are made which bias the mindset 
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being applied to create a solution to the problem. Immediately after a relatively minor 
conceptual decision is made certain key assumptions will register in the minds of those 
present which will drive the project along a particular route. It is again re-emphasised that 
the presence of a safety engineer at such an early point in the project’s lifecycle will help to 
both focus and keep a perspective on the final deliverable as well as improving its 
efficiency. The ability to ‘weed out’ any extraneous technical notions or to minimise any 
ill-educated safety assumptions plays an important part in the creation of an optimised and 
cost-effective timeline. Such an approach can help to reduce or remove nugatory 
developmental activities which may be expensive in both materials and time as well as 
demanding on labour. Misdirected or needless effort in any business is not only damaging 
to the profit margin but can be very injurious internally to a company’s staff morale; 
additionally, if the wasted effort is made public then its professional reputation may suffer. 
 
It is therefore suggested that the preliminary phase is one of the most important stages in 
the safety case lifecycle. Kelly (2003) suggests that the following activities will have been 
conducted prior to, and in preparation for, the Preliminary Safety Case; 
 
• Production of a Safety Management Plan which will define the key safety 
processes, roles and responsibilities to be enacted during the system development 
(author’s comment - this would be created as part of the adopted Safety 
Management System). 
• An Identification of Required Safety Properties including identification of any 
applicable safety standards and their application to the system under development. 
This activity would also involve the customer, if applicable, and ensure that the 
system met their safety related requirements. 
• A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) which looks to identify all of the possible 
system hazards by conducting a thorough systematic review of the system’s high-
level design. Such an approach has been used extensively within the author’s 
environment in the development of safety and operational procedures in support of 
Civil UAV Operations at West Wales UAV Centre (Parc Aberporth), the creation 
of the Ranges’ Safety Cases and the development of new facilities such as the 
Mirach aerial target facility at MoD Aberporth. One of the most useful tools used in 
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identifying the potential hazards within a project is that of performing a Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP). A HAZOP is a proven technique which utilises 
concepts such as structured brainstorming, zonal analysis, causal path analysis and 
even check lists to identify and record the possible hazards which may be 
associated with the development and operation of a system. Any hazards identified 
will be recorded in a hazard log together with a qualitative and/or quantitative 
estimate of risk. The topic of hazard identification and the use of HAZOP is 
discussed further within 4.12.2.1. 
• Risk Estimation. Having identified the hazards and logged them appropriately 
there is a need to apportion risk to each hazardous component. Risk is usually 
estimated (or calculated if appropriate) through the use of severity and likelihood 
distributions; both quantitative and qualitative approaches may be  used. Risk is 
specifically defined and discussed within 4.12. 
• The Identification of Failure Rates (or Modes) and Integrity Levels Required. 
Having assigned the risks there is a key requirement to ensure that  the project is 
developed and delivered according to the integrity levels identified within the 
previous exercise. 
 
It should be reiterated that the PSC is predominantly constructed before any definitive or 
detailed system design has been created and therefore the amount of information at this 
time may be extremely scant or nebulous. Despite such a lack of information the creation of 
an early safety approach offers the following positive contributions to the project’s 
lifecycle; 
 
• Focussing the minds of the whole project delivery team to not only look at the 
business aspects such as investment, depreciation and/or marketing opportunities 
but to holistically understand the legal and/or regulatory obligations and 
boundaries. 
• Supporting the definition of scope for both the final safety case and the final project 
deliverable (Kelly, 2003). 
• By conducting an early hazard analysis (PHA) the key safety issues and objectives 
are easily identified and focussed upon (Kelly, 2003). Quite often within major 
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projects the output of a PHA is paramount to the decision making process in order 
to understand what path to take in the developmental and evolutionary stages. 
Customers will at times request an article to be developed which may not be 
aligned with extant industry safety policies or regulatory guidelines. Such requests 
are often driven by existing operational systems where the customer merely wants a 
‘like for like’ replacement; both technology and legal requirements may have 
changed significantly during the life span of the existing article and therefore an ‘up 
to date’ approach may be required which will need interfacing with the existing 
system(s). By adopting a systems thinking approach any project team would 
instantly recognise that conducting a PHA is completely aligned with the concept of 
‘unpacking’ a customer (or user) requirement into its foundational components. The 
author is extremely supportive of utilising a systems approach with any project as it 
helps to define and refine all aspects of the requirements, safety engineering being a 
prime component. 
• The PHA offers the project team an early view of the strategy being taken to enable 
an optimised safety argument to be developed; it also highlights some of the 
techniques, tools and supporting evidence which will need to be made available to 
support it. 
• Whilst preliminary safety information can help to evolve a relatively safe 
engineering solution there will be occasions when the final solution for operational 
safety will be heavily reliant upon developed safety procedures. Such procedural 
safety dependencies may simply augment the designed-in safety mechanisms or 
may in fact be part of the fundamental requirements to attain the designed-in safety 
targets. These procedural prerequisites may be formally highlighted to the ultimate 
operators of the system in the form of work instructions such as procedures and 
operational protocols. By evolving the work instructions from early developmental 
activities conducted as part of the de-risking phase benefits may be delivered in 
both the business and safety environments (e.g. near misses and/or accidents which 
occurred during laboratory work). From a safety perspective the work instructions 
may be more closely aligned with the residual risks within the system and therefore 
mitigate the risks in a more apt and specific manner. From a business perspective 
the evolved work instructions will take less time and effort to initially document 
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and put in place. Additionally, the business will benefit from having the more 
appropriate and intelligent work instruction in place as it will minimise the potential 
for accidents within the workplace which can affect production. 
 
4.11.1   The Preliminary Safety Argument. 
Whilst the PSC reviews many elements of the safety argument within the early stage of a 
project’s life one of its prime objectives is to gain a mutual understanding between the 
customer and the safety engineer(s) as to what is an agreeable approach for the project’s 
safety argument. 
 
Distilling the project’s requirements into discrete, yet inter-related, elements is an 
extremely strong and important part of this phase. One tool which is heavily utilised within 
the author’s working environment for interpreting safety requirements and documenting the 
possible paths that may be followed to demonstrate such claims is that of GSN. Kelly 
(2003) also suggests that GSN is an useful means of mapping out such primary and 
emergent safety arguments. In his example Kelly (2003) demonstrates how a preliminary 
safety argument for a new braking system is developed which consists of three threads; a 
conventional hazard mitigation argument, a compliance with standards argument, and a 
comparative argument claiming improved safety over existing systems.  
 
Having adopted GSN as a tool to allow for the development of complicated safety 
arguments the overarching need to define context becomes even more accentuated (Kelly, 
2003). The author, from his work within the T&E environment supports this view very 
strongly. One of the key pieces of information required within any safety related text such 
as a safety case or even a safety instruction is that of context. Without context any 
information or instruction loses its ability to provide a just means of control; context 
provides a host of both conscious and unconscious constraints which are realised both 
physically and psychologically in the subject’s mind. Context provides a frame of reference 
and forms many of the engagement conditions for an activity; it is further discussed and 
analysed in depth in following chapters of this thesis. 
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4.12    Risk. 
No review of safety cases would be complete without a discussion on the topic of risk. All 
safety cases are based upon the identification of and subsequent management of risk.  
 
The terms hazard and risk are used interchangeably in our every day life though the HSE 
have made a formal conceptual distinction between both (HSE, 2001a). A hazard is 
described by the HSE (2001a) as “the potential for harm arising from an intrinsic property 
or disposition of something to cause detriment”, whilst risk is described as “the chance that 
someone or something that is valued will be adversely affected in a stipulated way by the 
hazard”. The HSE, from a health, safety and welfare of people perspective, frequently 
utilise the aforementioned conceptual distinctions in any guidance offered by requiring that 
hazards are identified, the risks that they create are assessed and appropriate controls are 
introduced to address the risks (HSE, 2001a). This concept, when applied to everyday life, 
reflects the fact that for most instances due diligence should be taken of occurrences where 
people and management systems interact with a hazard (HSE, 2001a). 
 
When describing or managing hazards it is often possible to regard any hazard as having 
remote and/or indirect origins which themselves constitute a ‘real hazard’. An example of 
such an event is the storage of an explosive material such as ammunition. It may be argued 
that the storage per se is not the hazard but rather it is the intrinsic properties of the material 
being stored (HSE, 2001a). Despite this argument, it is generally considered to make sense 
to consider the storage as the basis for the estimation of risk since such an approach will be 
the most appropriate for identifying the practical control measures necessary for managing 
the risks efficiently. The outcome of such an approach may identify that (i) the material 
should not be stored at all, (ii) should be stored in smaller quantities, (iii) should be 
replaced for a safer variant of material, or, (iv) the storage facilities may have to be 
upgraded. 
 
The HSW Act does not contain the term ‘hazard’ (HSE, 2001a). Since the Act was created 
the law courts have ruled that (with reference to Section 3 of the Act) ‘risk’ means 
‘possibility of danger’ rather than ‘actual danger’. Therefore, from this concept, the HSE 
regards anything presenting the ‘possibility of danger’ as a ‘hazard’. So as not to place an 
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excessive and pointless burden upon any duty holder for the management of all possible 
hazards within the workplace, the HSE does not expect any hazards, “other than those 
which are reasonably foreseeable causes of harm, taking account of reasonably 
foreseeable events and behaviours”, to be addressed. Whether a reasonably foreseeable but 
unlikely event (such as an earthquake) should be considered depends upon the 
consequences for health and safety following such an event (HSE, 2001a). 
 
One of the fundamental principles which underpins the HSW Act is that those who create 
risks from any of their activities are responsible for protecting both their workers and the 
general public from any consequences. The HSW Act therefore “places specific 
responsibilities on employers, the self-employed, employees, designers, manufacturers, 
importers, suppliers and people in charge of premises.” (HSE, 2001a). Additionally, 
supporting and associated legislation is levelled at owners, occupiers, licensees and 
managers.  
 
Regulations have also been introduced to help clarify many of the responsibilities now 
impressed upon so many, such as requiring employers and the self-employed to assess risks 
and to base their control measures on those assessments. When the consequences forecasted 
are relatively insignificant or inconsequential then basic written risk assessments (generic 
risk assessments) and/or method statements are sufficiently robust enough to capture the 
process and to provide context for the whole process. Where hazards which may result in 
severe consequences are highlighted, the industry trend over recent years has been to focus 
upon and amplify those duties and to request the creation of more specific safety cases. 
Such an approach requires duty holders to both document and submit their extant or 
proposed control measures to the HSE to demonstrate their ability to meet their legal 
obligations and ensure safe and healthy systems of work (HSE, 2001a). This system of 
HSE ‘moderation’ ensures that duty holders understand the hazards associated with their 
work activities and how to control them; additionally, it allows the HSE an insight into the 
duty holders’ management of health and safety. 
 
Since the passing of the HSW Act (1974) the model for managing risk at work has been to 
align and consolidate the authoritative bodies responsible for occupational health and safety 
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and to further clarify those responsibilities within criminal law for managing risks. Of 
particular note is the inception of regulatory regimes where “broad general duties” are 
explicitly put on those who are best placed to act in the prevention or control of risks. In 
such circumstances the foundational broad duties are often augmented by more specific and 
specialised regulations (HSE, 2001a). A clear example of the application of more stringent 
and specific regulations, in addition to the creation of a specialised regulatory body, lies 
within the UK’s nuclear energy industry. The process may also place stringent and absolute 
duties on specific (and named) duty holders. 
 
In other arenas where the broad general duties are not augmented by supportive, 
specialised and/or explicit regulations the guiding principle for managing risk at work is 
qualified by expressions such as “so far as is reasonably practicable” (SFAIRP). Such an 
approach evades the need to impose duties upon duty holders that are virtually impossible 
for anyone to actualise; absolute safety cannot be guaranteed (HSE, 2001a). The SFAIRP 
approach ensures that the preventive and protective actions taken are commensurate with 
the risks involved. In addition to the SFAIRP qualification there are other similar 
qualifications such as “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) and “as low as 
reasonably achievable” (ALARA). 
 
4.12.1   HSE’s Risk Criteria. 
Whilst the assessment of risk may be conducted against a wide range of criteria (e.g. 
financial loss, national security etc.) the convention used to assess the risk of industrial 
accidents and/or their potential to injure members of the public is to assess the risk of death. 
This approach includes the risk of death to both members of the public as well as workers. 
In practice the actual fatality rate for workers in even the most hazardous of industries is 
usually well below the upper limit of a risk of death to any individual of 1 in 1,000 per 
annum for workers and of 1 in 10,000 per annum for the public who have a risk imposed 
upon them ‘in the wider interest of society’ (HSE, 2001a). 
 
The criteria used by the HSE for assessing risk, both in a qualitative and quantitative 
manner, are provided in their discussion document ‘Reducing risks, protecting people; 
HSE’s decision-making process’ (colloquially known as ‘R2P2’), (HSE, 2001a). Within it 
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the HSE explains and defines how it has adopted a framework, known as the tolerability of 
risk (TOR) model, to accommodate the three primal criteria used by their regulators in the 
decision management of risk. The criteria are “equity-based, utility-based and technology-
based”. Though the aforementioned ‘pure’ criteria work very well in most cases they do 
suffer from some disadvantages when attempts have been made to apply them in a more 
universal way (HSE, 2001a). In an attempt to provide a more wide reaching and holistic 
approach to the decision management of risk the HSE have stated that the criteria should 
not be applied as separate entities but rather as a mutually exclusive system (HSE, 2001a).   
 
The framework is illustrated in Figure 4.5 where the inverted triangle represents an 
increasing level of risk for a particular hazardous activity (measured by the individual risk 
and societal concerns it engenders) as we move from the bottom of the triangle (apex) 
upwards towards the top (or base) (HSE, 2001a). Though the HSE’s discussion document 
(HSE, 2001a) shows a single coloured, though vary-shaded triangle, the overall message 
conveyed remains the same. Figure 4.5 includes additional and appropriate data (risk of 
death to workers) for application within the author’s industry. These figures will be further 
discussed in the following text.  
 
        
Figure 4.5 - Framework for the tolerability of risk, based upon HSE (2001a). 
1.0e-4 per annum for public. 
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The red zone at the top represents an unacceptable or intolerable, region. This region is 
where the overall risk is deemed too high and completely unacceptable whatever the level 
of benefits that could be associated with the activity. Any activity or practice which 
generated risks falling into this region would, as a matter of principle, be removed unless it 
could be altered to minimise the level of risk or there were exceptional reasons for the 
activity or practice to remain (HSE, 2001a). This region, without many exceptions, is 
bounded by an upper limit of risk of death to an individual, in this case 1x10-3 per annum 
for workers and 1x10-4 for the general public. 
 
Within the green zone, or broadly acceptable region, risks falling into this category are 
usually regarded as less than those to which we may be exposed to in everyday life 
activities. Risks falling into this region are generally regarded as insignificant and are 
deemed to be adequately controlled (HSE, 2001a). This region is bounded by a lower limit 
of death to an individual (in this case, 1x 10-6) and any activities which lie below this limit 
do not require any additional investigation before the activity is allowed to proceed unless 
reasonably practicable measures are available (HSE, 2001a). The levels of risk within this 
region are comparable with those risks that people regard as trivial in their daily lives; 
typically they may be risks from non-hazardous activities or those from hazardous activities 
that can be, and are, readily controlled to produce very low risks (HSE, 2001a) such as re-
fuelling a motor car or driving heavy plant machinery. 
 
The yellow zone represents the tolerable region.  Risks within this category fall between 
the unacceptable and broadly acceptable regions. Risks falling within this category are 
typical of those risks raised by certain activities within which society (or individuals) is 
(are) prepared to tolerate in order to secure certain benefits (HSE, 2001a). It is expected 
though, that these benefits, will be delivered under risk with the expectation that; 
 
• “The nature and level of risks are properly assessed and the results used properly 
to determine control measures. The assessment of the risks needs to be based on the 
best available scientific evidence and, where evidence is lacking, on the best 
available scientific advice.” (HSE, 2001a). 
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• “The residual risks are not unduly high and kept as low as reasonably practicable 
(the ALARP principle).” (HSE, 2001a). The ALARP principle is further discussed 
in the following text. 
• “The risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet the ALARP 
criteria, for example, by ascertaining whether further or new control measures 
need to be introduced to take into account changes over time, such as new 
knowledge about the risk or the availability of new techniques for reducing or 
eliminating risks.” (HSE, 2001a). 
 
The tolerability of risk framework may, in principle, be applied to virtually all hazards. In 
determining reasonable and practicable control measures for any particular hazard, i.e. if 
the option chosen is sufficient and suitable, depends to some extent upon where the 
boundaries are drawn between the unacceptable, tolerable or broadly acceptable regions 
(HSE, 2001a). The final risk framework model adopted by a particular industry will be an 
output from extended negotiation and deliberation during the course of policy development 
and/or evolution. This developmental process will reflect the value preferences of all 
stakeholders and the practicality of all possible solutions, ultimately driving the figures at 
the aforementioned boundaries of the three regions. 
 
In practice the actual and real fatality rate for an individual, even in the most hazardous of 
industries, is usually well below the upper limit of a risk of death of 1 in 1000 (1x10-3) per 
annum for workers and 1 in 10,000 (1x10-4) per annum for members of the public who have 
a risk imposed upon them ‘in the wider interests of society’ (HSE, 2001a). Illustrative 
examples of annual fatality rates are issued by the HSE and help provide context to the 
concept of hazardous activity management and the consequential risks within various 
industries. The annual fatality rates quoted for 1999/2000 (HSE, 2001a) were; 
 
• Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (Sea Fishing excluded) - 1 in 12,984. 
• Construction - 1 in 21, 438. 
• Mining and Quarrying (including offshore oil and gas) - 1 in 14,564. 
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In other traditionally less hazardous industries the annual risk of a worker fatality is even 
lower. The example quoted in the HSE’s document ‘Reducing risks, protecting people: 
HSE’s decision-making process’ (HSE, 2001a) is that of the service sector where the figure 
was 1 in 388,565 during 1999/2000. Further and more explicit information can be sourced 
from the HSE’s publication ‘Health and Safety Statistics’ which is released annually and is 
available through Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO). 
 
The HSE believes that an individual risk of death of one in one million per annum for both 
workers and the public correlates to a very low level of risk and should be used as a guiding 
principle for the boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable regions of the 
tolerability of risk framework. With reference to Tables 4.1 and 4.2, society in general is 
exposed to an environment of appreciable risks of various types which contribute to a 
background level of risk (typically a risk of death of one in a hundred per year averaged 
over a lifetime) (HSE, 2001a). When compared with the background level of risk, the 
residual risk of one in a million, appears to be very small. It should be duly considered that 
many everyday activities such as using domestic gas and electricity or using air travel 
breach the residual level of risk identified by the HSE. 
 
Type of accident Risk Basis of risk 
Fairground accidents 1 in 2, 326, 000 rides UK (1996/7 - 1999/00) 
Road accidents 1 in 1, 432, 000 kms travelled GB (1995 - 1999) 
Rail travel 1 in 1, 533, 000 passenger journeys GB (1996/7 - 1999/00) 
Burn or scald in the home 1 in 610 UK (1995 - 1999) 
 
Table 4.1 - Average annual risk of injury as a consequence of an activity, (HSE, 2001a). 
 
The HSE do not give such clear and guiding principles for the boundary between the 
tolerable and unacceptable regions for individual risks entailing fatalities as they do for the 
boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable regions. This is predominantly due 
to the fact that the risks may be unacceptable on the grounds of high risk exposure to an 
exposed individual, or because of the repercussions of such an activity (or occurrence) on 
general society. Risk, being somewhat subjective and emotive, often generates higher 
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societal concerns, especially if it identifies higher levels of individual risk. Such concerns 
are usually driven by issues of fairness and/or equality in risk taking and in risk exposure. 
 
Activity associated with death Risk Basis of risk 
Maternal death in pregnancy 
(Direct or indirect causes) 
1 in 8, 200 maternities UK (1994 - 1996) 
Surgical anaesthesia 1 in 185, 000 operations GB (1987) 
Scuba diving 1 in 200, 000 dives UK (2000/01) 
Fairground rides 1 in 834, 000, 000 rides UK (1989/90 - 2000/01) 
Rock climbing 1 in 320, 000 climbs England & Wales (1995 - 
2000) 
Canoeing 1 in 750, 000 outings UK (1996 - 1999) 
Hang-gliding 1 in 116, 000 flights England & Wales (1997 - 
2000) 
Rail travel accidents 1 in 43, 000, 000 passenger 
journeys 
GB (1996/97 - 1999/00) 
Aircraft accidents 1 in 125, 000, 000 passenger 
journeys 
UK (1991 - 2000) 
 
Table 4.2 - Average annual risk of death as a consequence of an activity, (HSE, 2001a). 
 
Though the preceding text has considered averaged risks (e.g. per passenger journey, per 
flight, per operation, et al) to any single individual there is a need to consider aggregated or 
total risk for certain environments and climates. The socio-political responses to a 
particular event such as a railway disaster would find that the total risks to the affected 
populous completely unacceptable despite the relatively low individual risks calculated on 
a per person basis. Certainly within some specialised industries such as the nuclear power 
environment the HSE have suggested some guiding principles; they suggest that an 
individual risk of death of one in one thousand, per annum, should represent the boundary 
between what is just tolerable for any major category of worker and what is unacceptable 
for any but the fairly exceptional groups. For members of the public who have a risk 
imposed on them ‘in the wider interests of society’ this limit is increased by a factor of ten 
to one in ten thousand, per annum (HSE, 2001a). 
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Within the author’s industry the HSE agreed boundary between the unacceptable and 
tolerable regions is set at an individual risk of death of one in one thousand, per annum, for 
a worker on a QinetiQ managed site. The HSE recommendation for this boundary is one in 
ten thousand, per annum, for the death of a member of the public exposed to risks resulting 
from the work of a QinetiQ managed site. For both workers and the general public, the 
boundary between the broadly acceptable and tolerable regions is identical and is set at a 
risk of death of one in one million, per annum. 
 
Cognisance should be taken of the fact that workers within the QinetiQ site boundaries are 
further split into two distinct groups; those that are taking an active part in the trial activity 
and are exposed to the immediate hazards (e.g. handling, preparation and arming of 
explosive ordnance); and those who are not exposed to any immediate and real hazards and 
may be fulfilling a support role or one which is physically separated from the hazard (e.g. 
radar operator, air traffic control) (Garman, 2006). Both the HSE and QinetiQ management 
believe that there are no valid reasons for allowing the latter group of workers to be 
subjected to a higher degree of risk exposure than that deemed appropriate for the general 
public. To this end, the risk criteria used for this group of workers is aligned with that for 
the general public; additionally, those members of the public who have a requirement to 
access a QinetiQ managed site (e.g. delivery drivers, regulators) are included within the 
same risk criteria.  
 
Though the HSE have issued guiding principles to help identify and qualify the risk 
boundaries that should be used by industry they very rarely give business a difficult time. 
As hazard levels rise then so do the risks subjected to individuals increase which in turn 
raises societal concerns; it is often these latter concerns which play a deciding role in 
deciding if a risk is acceptable or not. Additionally, the limits issued by the HSE were 
evolved and derived with respect to activities which are very difficult to control and risk 
manage; the majority  reflect agreements drawn up at international level (HSE, 2001a). 
 
4.12.2   Managing Risk. 
Effective risk management is an activity which considers the risks emanating from any 
hazard presented by an activity, process or project. Within the context of this thesis, risk 
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management involves the identification, quantification and management of both initial  and 
residual risks. The whole activity can be broken down into the following key elements 
(MoD, 2004); 
 
• Hazard Identification. 
• Hazard Analysis. 
• Risk Estimation. 
• Risk & As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Evaluation. 
• Risk Reduction. 
• Risk Acceptance. 
 
This six stage process should be conducted as an iterative process with the aim of achieving 
continual risk management (risk reduction if appropriate) through the life of the activity. 
 
4.12.2.1 Risk Identification. 
Risks may be identified using a number of methods though they all rely predominantly 
upon the experience and knowledge of a broad, varied and numerous collection of 
individuals. Though different techniques exist, the principal and most important component 
which is common to all is that of the body of intelligence assembled. The assembled group 
which is performing the hazard identification must have a total knowledge base which is 
likely to encompass all of the possible hazards that may manifest themselves during 
subsequent operations. Any deficiencies within the group’s knowledge base will appear as 
weaknesses in the hazard log; the danger being that those unidentified potential hazards 
may remain dormant for some period of time. This is of particular importance when an 
activity or project is considered to have potentially catastrophic outcomes and the 
development and/or operational period is relatively lengthy. During the dormant period the 
hazard identification group and related management team may be drawn into making 
decisive decisions in relation to an activity’s direction and will have committed resources 
(e.g. financial); a false sense of security and blissful ignorance may often descend upon the 
whole organisation during this period only to be shattered by the occurrence of a hazard 
which was not foreseen and highlighted in the first instance. As discussed earlier within this 
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chapter, it is important, after creating a PHA, to critically revisit the work periodically and 
maintain a living document. 
 
The tangible output of this type of exercise will be a tabulated list of hazards identified 
(Hazard Log) which will record the hazard details, descriptive texts and any comments 
relating to its status and management. Hazard logs may quickly become quite onerous to 
manage when trying to identify potential hazards within a large and complex system or 
system of sub-systems. For such eventualities hazard tables which are cross-referenced to 
repositories may be used, especially when dealing with complicated or confidential 
(emotive) methods of risk management. The overall hazard log may still be used as the 
definitive tool to demonstrate hazard management though the information recorded may 
only be high-level in nature. 
 
One method of identifying hazards is that of brainstorming where a group of experienced 
and knowledgeable individuals produce ideas and/or solve problems from spontaneous 
discussions. In the context of hazard identification the use of brainstorming encourages 
participants to propose, probable or improbable mechanisms by which hazards may be 
present (MoD, 2004). During such a session, the hazard mechanisms uncovered are not 
synthesised or explored, this being done at a later stage. The focus during the session is to 
allow free flowing thought though the overall context and boundary conditions must be 
carefully managed by a facilitator. 
 
In preparation of a brainstorming session for hazard identification the facilitator should 
have a relatively deep understanding of the general hazard environment but not necessarily 
the specific and deeply specialised elements of the planned activity. The facilitator should 
be willing to explore the environment with a typical ‘soft systems’ mindset (Checkland, 
1981) where many of the unidentified risks may lie in the nebulous and/or intangible 
regions of the activity. As systems grow in complexity there is a need to not only look at 
the traditional engineering components but to take serious cognisance of the ‘social 
systems’ concepts which are so interwoven into modern systems. 
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During the brainstorming session the facilitator usually writes down the ideas and threads 
which are raised and discussed and may start to link then together as a form of early mind-
map or causal link pattern. Humour and light hearted debate is useful to allow the more 
reserved or junior individual to feel comfortable within the environment; many key hazards 
are often sparked by discussions which were originally quite obscure and tangential in 
nature when compared with the overarching topic. In situations where the activity or 
project is complicated there may be a requirement to facilitate more than one session. 
 
Once the brainstorming process is deemed to be exhausted then the suggested hazards may 
be grouped into a relatively logical manner (e.g. reliance on processes, related to the 
environment, etc.). Due diligence should be considered before rejecting some of the ideas 
raised; a peer assessment by a number of experts may be considered useful before rejecting 
any suggestions. Once the final list of identified hazards has been agreed then so they can 
be analysed in the next stage. 
 
Whilst conducting a brainstorming exercise or any other hazard identification process the 
facilitator may decide to use various tools to help structure and focus the activity. One 
simple tool that is often used is that of a checklist where a list of potential hazards is peer 
reviewed by the group session; basically the list operates as an aide-memoir where each 
component of a system is considered for its hazards and inter-relationships with other 
components.  
 
Caution should be applied when using checklists as they can limit the degree of freedom 
available within the brainstorming session; by default, the checklist will narrow the field of 
thought within the session as it will have been constructed by an individual (or small team 
of individuals) with a pre-determined mindset. Through inference the group’s output will 
not have been free-thinking and will have been skewed by some of the conditions 
introduced by the checklist(s). 
 
A further development of the checklist method is that of the Structured What-If Technique 
(SWIFT) where open ended questions about the system are asked which will identify the 
hazards within. Such questions cannot be answered with a simplistic “No” or “Yes”; they 
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will typically begin with words such as “What?”, “How?”, “Who?”, “When?” etc. In a 
similar manner to brainstorming, the exercise requires the involvement of an appropriately 
experienced and well informed group of individuals.  
 
The specific checklist(s) used for these exercise(s) may be derived from a more generic list 
of hazards such as those in Table 4.3 (non-exhaustive). As the group carefully considers the 
consequences of the hazards in each part of the system the mitigations and control 
mechanisms are carefully noted in a Hazard Log. The information recorded will include 
any safeguards and protective measures which are either in place or require installation to 
either prevent the event from occurring or to help minimise any consequential hazardous 
output. 
 
A more structured method for identifying hazards within a system is offered by conducting 
a HAZOP analysis. This is a systematic method of methodically producing a set of possible 
outcomes and identifying those that are undesirable (Hollnagel, 2004, p183). The HAZOP 
approach was developed by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the UK during the early 
1960s to try to identify all possible aberrations from a system’s designed and expected 
operation and to record all potential hazards associated with them. The most critical and 
fundamental part of any HAZOP exercise is to interrogate and analyse each step in a 
process or procedure using a set of HAZOP guidewords which represent the following 
conditions; ‘negation, quantitative increase and decrease, qualitative increase and 
decrease, logical opposite, and substitution’ (Hollnagel, 2004, p184). The whole concept 
behind the process is to simply combine each step of the system with the list of guidewords 
and to consider whether something could happen other than what was intended. A typical 
example set of guide words to support a HAZOP activity is shown in Table 4.4. 
 
For example, if a capacitor supplying power to a laser emitter is to be charged by a high 
voltage power supply, the HAZOP guidewords will force the analysts to consider possible 
scenarios such as, no applied voltage, too low a voltage is applied, too high a voltage is 
applied or a voltage is applied at an incorrect time in sequence. 
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Hazard Location Potential Source of Hazard 
Hazardous Components Lasers 
 Explosives 
 Asphyxiants, Toxic or Corrosive Substances 
 Pressure Systems 
 Electrical Systems 
 Ionising or Non-ionising radiation sources 
 Flammable Substances 
 Hydraulic Arms or Rotating Machinery 
 Passive Obstacles 
 Cut and puncture Projections 
Safety Related Interfaces between Sub-systems Material Incompatibilities 
 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and 
Compatibility (EMC) 
 Inadvertent Activation 
 Fire and Explosion Initiation and Propagation 
 Hardware and Software Controls 
            Factors Due to the Operating Domain Drop 
Shock and Vibration 
Extreme Temperatures, Pressures and Climatic 
Conditions 
Noise 
Exposure to Toxic and/or Corrosive Substances 
Fire or Explosion 
Operating, Test, Maintenance and Emergency 
Procedures 
Human Factors Consideration, User Errors, 
 Life Support Systems 
Damage Control Measures Damage and Hazard Containment 
 Egress, Rescue and Survival 
Facilities Training 
 Provisions for Proof Testing, Storage and 
Assembly of Hazardous Material 
Defences against Common Mode Failures Fail Safe Designs 
 Interlocks, System Redundancy and Diversity 
Threats to Programmable Electronic Systems Security Breaches, Virus Susceptibility 
 
Table 4.3 - Non-exhaustive list of generic hazards (Garman, 2006). 
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Guideword Meaning 
No This is the complete negation of the design intention. No part of the intention is 
achieved and nothing else happens. 
More This is a quantitative increase. 
Less This is a quantitative decrease. 
As Well As All of the design intention is achieved together with additions. 
Part Of Only some of the design intention is achieved. 
Reverse The logical opposite of the intention is achieved. 
Other Than Complete substitution, where no part of the original intention is achieved but 
something quite different happens. 
Early Something happens earlier than expected relative to clock time. 
Late Something happens later than expected relative to clock time. 
Before Something happens before it is expected, relating to order or sequence. 
After Something happens after it is expected, relating to order or sequence. 
 
Table 4.4 - Non-exhaustive and illustrative list of HAZOP guidewords (Garman, 2006). 
 
The principle of combining guidewords with textual descriptors of an activity in order to 
explore all possible potential hazard combinations is not unique to risk analysis; the 
concept has been used at least since the 1940s (Hollnagel, 2004, p184). Though the 
HAZOP guidewords were originally developed for the risk analysis and hazard prediction 
of technical systems they may be used somewhat loosely for socio-technical systems. In 
more specific social or human failure applications there may be a requirement to revise the 
guidewords somewhat; more detailed information for such applications is available through 
more specialist sources such as Duncker (1945). 
 
It should be noted that the use of HAZOP, or any other systematic list of failure modes, is 
not a magic bullet to identify all possible failure modes. The approach is simply one 
method of trying to ensure that each and every possible combination has been considered 
by using the guidewords as useful catalysts or aide memoirs as the whole system is 
unravelled. The guidewords are helpful but cannot and should not be seen as a substitute 
for human reasoning and/or imagination; their purpose is to improve the requisite 
imagination of those who are participative in the activity (Hollnagel, 2004, p184). 
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In practice a typical HAZOP exercise commences with a simple block diagram of the 
system under scrutiny. The diagram may be a block diagram of the system’s components 
where the linking pathways are shown or it may be in the form of a flow chart of processes 
within the system. Each block or process is systematically considered to determine its 
attributes such as operator action, output signal, input signal etc. Each individual attribute 
of the system is then scrutinised and challenged using the guidewords in order to establish 
what could happen if that particular block or process was to not function as planned. In 
each case, consideration is taken of any hazard(s) that may occur by the action of applying 
a guideword. Note that due consideration must be taken of multiple faults and hazards 
being generated from a challenge by a single guideword. The output of each discussion 
should be recorded in an appropriate log showing what part of the system was being 
reviewed, the attribute identified, the guideword which was applied and the nature of any 
hazards identified. Additionally, and of great importance, are the reason(s) behind the study 
group’s identification of the hazard, which should also be recorded within the log. The 
author believes that this final piece of information is extremely useful when it comes to 
revisiting the log as part of a review process or in determining the root cause of a hazard 
occurrence which may have been omitted from the initial HAZOP exercise. In the case of 
an inquiry into a serious occurrence or death the textual descriptions within the reasoning 
help to understand and convey the mindset of the study group to an investigative panel. 
 
4.12.2.2 Analysing Hazards. 
Having identified the potential hazards within a system there is a need to determine if each 
one of them is realistic and feasible. It is often found during this detailed, and frequently in-
depth analysis, that some of the hazards cannot be realised due to the fundamental design 
concept of the system. When such hazards are identified they may be closed down within 
the Hazard Log together with the reasons for such an action. For hazards which have a form 
of mitigation within the system design they should be appropriately described and recorded 
within the Hazard Log. It is important that such hazards have their mitigations recorded so 
that any subsequent changes to the system, or its components, do not undermine the 
mitigations and allow these hazards to become real. The remaining hazards which appear to 
be realisable and realistic should remain open and valid within the Hazard Log. The author 
suggests that caution and due diligence should be applied at all times when sentencing 
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hazards and/or reviewing their mitigation mechanisms; it is extremely easy for those who 
have been heavily involved in the creation of the initial Hazard List to make erroneous, 
simplistic and unconscious assumptions during this phase of hazard sentencing. A form of 
independent peer review or the use of an accredited professional such as an ISA is 
recommended (IET, 2008a). 
 
Having completed the initial review of the identified hazards the remaining hazards within 
the Hazard Log require categorising according to their risk level. This activity determines 
the likelihood of a hazard resulting in an incident and the severity of an injury or damage 
resulting from the occurrence. The process used in such an approach is identical to that 
used in the qualitative assessment of risk which is described in the following bullet points. 
The process of qualitative risk assessment is often used to eliminate those hazards that 
represent negligible or acceptably low risk conditions from any further analysis. 
 
Having classified the risks from the identified hazards, the classification data should be 
entered within the Hazard Log accompanied by the predicted outcome of the occurrence. 
Note that it is possible for more than one outcome to result from a single hazard and that 
more than one hazard could have the same outcome. Garman (2006) states the example that 
the outcome of an engine failure in an aircraft could be that the aircraft crashes to the 
ground yet other hazards may cause a similar outcome such as a catastrophic structural 
failure. Another outcome could be a forced landing with an implied lower severity. 
 
Those risks which are classified (see following text on qualitative risk assessments) as 
trivial or broadly acceptable require no further action and may be formally recorded as such 
within the Hazard Log. Risks which are classified as trivial or broadly acceptable should 
not be duly forgotten or ignored; if there are further simple and relatively cheap methods of 
further reducing the residual risk then further risk mitigation should be implemented though 
they are considered of lower importance. 
 
If, during the risk analysis activity, any risks within the system have been classified as 
higher than (worse than) trivial or broadly acceptable then further analysis should be 
conducted to enable a more detailed understanding of the likelihood and consequences to 
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be developed. Further analysis often requires a quantitative approach and the use of more 
refined tools which are discussed in the following text. 
 
4.12.2.3 Quantitative Risk Estimation. 
Estimates of the likelihood that a hazard will be realised are often qualitative rather than 
quantitative, and generally speaking, duty holders under the occupational health and safety 
legislation should adopt authoritative good practice to address any significant hazards 
which may arise from such activities (HSE, 2001a). Before we can effectively move ahead 
with a discussion on either the quantitative or qualitative risk assessment arena there is a 
need to understand some of the foundational concepts applied to risk management. 
 
Risk assessment and risk management procedures employ a number of safeguards which 
ensure that the applied approaches are inherently precautionary and are in line with the 
precautionary principle (HSE, 2001a). This principle has been defined, for example, by the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 as; 
 
“where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to 
prevent degradation” (HSE, 2001a). 
 
This example, though originally conceived to support the environment, (in particular those 
of a ‘global’ context such as ozone depletion and climate change), helps to illustrate the 
precautionary principle. The principle describes a philosophy that should be adopted for 
addressing hazards which are a subject of high scientific uncertainty and dismisses the lack 
of scientific knowledge as a reason for not taking preventive action (HSE, 2001a).  
 
Many sectors of industry, especially those where the potential consequences are serious 
(e.g. Nuclear Power, Aerospace), have used quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as part of 
their routine safety management system for many years. QRA is a powerful tool for 
demonstrating the relationship between and within different sub-systems and the intra-
dependencies within context of the whole system. Though QRA is frequently used to both 
demonstrate and support safety arguments care is required to avoid some of the pitfalls that 
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can be suffered (HSE, 2001a). For example, when estimating the likelihood of an event by 
analysing historical incident data, caution should be taken when selecting, the sample, the 
time period and/or the statistical method employed for analysis. The use of an inappropriate 
data set or data manipulation tool may give rise to a false set of conclusions and 
recommendations which may result in a misaligned risk management strategy. 
 
Despite the potential for such pitfalls, the process of QRA can lead to a much better 
understanding of the prime components which contribute to the weaknesses within a 
system as well as allowing a mathematical estimation of the inherent and residual risk(s) to 
be derived. The standard of the data, its manipulation and its interpretation can grossly 
affect the numerical output and must be borne in mind when being used to underpin a risk 
management decision. The HSE states that the use of numerical estimates of risk by 
themselves can, for many reasons including those listed above, be misleading and cause 
decisions to be made which do not meet adequate levels of safety (HSE, 2001a). In general 
terms, the numerical estimates from QRA should be combined with qualitative learning and 
any other information available from engineering and operational analysis in order to make 
a more refined and matured overall risk management decision. 
 
Many tools are available to conduct a QRA. The following few paragraphs provides a brief 
overview of the prime tools used for QRA within the author’s work environment. This text 
is designed to provide the reader with a broader understanding of some of the techniques 
used. 
 
A QRA is most likely to be performed on a single occurrence of a particular event such as 
the launch of a weapon or operation of an emergency release valve. During such events, the 
risk to persons involved in the activity or sufficiently close to the event to be affected by it 
can be calculated by the methods (tools) suggested within the following paragraphs. 
Though there are many risk criteria available to be used as the top level event (e.g. minor 
injury, major injury, death etc.) the author has defaulted, where appropriate, to that of death 
in alignment with his working environment and thesis context. 
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a QRA tool which was developed by the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories for analysing the causes of hazard, not for the identification of hazards. Prior 
to commencing with an FTA approach it is necessary to identify and understand the top 
level event which requires analysis; this is predominantly done by the hazard identification 
and analysis process discussed previously in 4.12.2.1 and 4.12.2.2 respectively. The FTA 
approach is designed to link the top level event(s) to all of the basic hazards and causal 
components; in most cases the top level event(s) will have been identified and logged 
within the system’s Hazard Log. In reality, many of the intermediate steps which link the 
top level event to the bottom events (causes) may not exist; in the majority of cases they are 
created from the varying combinations of the individual causes and are used to help evolve 
and calculate the risk associated with the top level hazard. 
 
FTA is based primarily upon Boolean logic and is used to describe combinations of 
individual causes. A Boolean AND gate is used to link a number of individual events where 
all of the events must occur together if a hazardous outcome is to be attained; similarly, if 
any of the incoming events do not occur then a hazardous outcome is not attained. A 
Boolean OR gate is also used to link a number of individual events where, if at least one 
event occurs, a hazardous outcome will be attained. On occasion, a Boolean Exclusive-OR 
gate may be used where a hazardous outcome will be attained from the gate when one, and 
only one, of the incoming causal events occurs though this application is not common. 
 
Few people are comfortable working with Boolean algebra. FTA allows the use of a 
graphical method for applying Boole’s logic processes; it also allows for the effective 
decomposition of a top level event down to its root causes. Note that FTA is primarily a 
top-down construction technique which works down from a chosen top level hazard; the 
construction should not be confused for a time sequenced structure. Each level of an FTA 
should be viewed as a more detailed picture of the same top level hazard and therefore 
represents the same snapshot of the hazard decomposition at the same point in time. A 
typical example of an FTA is shown in Figure 4.6. The calculations associated with each 
type of gate can be simply stated. In the case of an OR gate, the probabilities of one or 
more of the events occurring is the sum of the incoming individual probabilities (ignoring 
conditions of mutual exclusivity). In the application of an AND gate, the probability of all 
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of the incoming events occurring together is their product (again ignoring conditions of 
mutual exclusivity).  
 
Further information on the features of FTA is available from other sources such as Vesely 
(1987). Whilst FTA allows a top level event to be decomposed down to its root causes it 
does introduce some limitations; FTA may only deal with timed sequences in an extremely 
limited manner.  
 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is based upon a generalised decision tree model which involves 
forward searching from an initiating event; in its simplest, and most common form, the 
initiating event is followed by a number of binary decisions. The various path outputs 
(usually two) from the binary decisions lead to one branch being a successful event and the 
other to an unsuccessful event. Probabilities may be applied to each branch where the sum 
of the probabilities, at each branch, is equal to one.  
 
ETA can become very complex, especially when applied to very large systems or when 
applied to a long sequence of events. ETA is extremely useful if applied to parts of a larger 
system where further analysis is required to effectively understand the hazards that may 
exist within a particular region. Further information on the features of ETA is available 
from other sources such as Skelton (1997). 
 
4.12.2.4 Qualitative Assessment of Risk. 
The qualitative assessment of risk, which was introduced in the previous section on hazard 
analysis, should be viewed upon as the foundational step in any assessment of risk. 
Estimates of risk are quite often qualitative in nature rather than quantitative, and they are 
often based upon a form of systematic observation (HSE, 2001a). 
 
The HSE in its publication ‘Reducing Risks, Protecting People’ (HSE, 2001a) uses the 
example of Pinner Fair on the north-west outskirts of London to illustrate the qualitative 
approach to assessing risk. In 1993 it observed how the whole event was set up, how it was 
run and how it was dismantled; they also analysed its safety management of 50,000 visitors 
amongst the relatively restricted streets of Pinner town. The hazards identified included 
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overcrowding during the fair and the presence of crowds during erection and dismantling 
activities. 
 
 
         
 
Figure 4.6 - Example of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), (Garman, 2006). 
 
By drawing comparisons with established codes of practice and guidance documents and 
by listening to the views of local residents, local authorities and the police a qualitative 
view of the whole event was created. By this method, established experts in safety 
management were able to show how some straightforward changes in the event’s 
organisation and layout could eliminate some hazards and substantially reduce the risks 
from others (HSE, 2001a). As an aid to establishing priorities the improvements were 
ranked qualitatively using a five point scale from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’.  
 
The findings of this qualitative risk assessment were discussed with several interested 
parties, including the local authority, the emergency services and the Showmen’s Guild of 
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Great Britain leading to an aligned adoption of improvement measures targeted towards 
crowd safety. A further follow up review of the fair was conducted the following year 
which highlighted some significant improvements. 
 
One of the underpinning and crucial factors of any qualitative risk assessment is that the 
determination of the likelihood and severity of any identified risk is a matter of judgement. 
Within the author’s highly regulated working environment access to both learned and 
experienced individuals, to conduct appropriate judgements, is relatively easy though it can 
be appreciated how such an approach to assessing risk can quickly degenerate into a diluted 
and even farcical affair in lesser environments. More specific guidance is offered by the 
HSE upon the use of qualitative risk assessment.  
 
The following text and tables demonstrate how the author’s environment manages the 
concept of qualitative risk assessments within the environment of T&E, specifically within 
the safe management of trial activities on the Ranges. The first steps of such an approach is 
to determine the likelihood that a hazard will cause an incident and, then, to determine the 
probable outcome of the incident.  
 
Accident 
Frequency 
Occurrence of 
Event 
Time based 
Frequency for 
single event 
Hour based 
frequency 
(approximate) 
Event based 
Frequency for 
single event 
Most Likely 
Will occur often 
during the trial 
activity. 
Up to 1 per 3 
months, or, 4 times 
per year. 
Up to 3.5 x 10-4 Up to 1 per 100 
Likely 
Will occur several 
times during the 
trial activity. 
Between 3 months 
and 3 years. 
Between 3.5 x 10-4 
and 3.5 x 10-5 
Between 1 per 
100 and 1 per 
1,000 
Unlikely 
Will occur some 
time during the 
trial activity. 
Between 1 per 3 
years and 1 per 30 
years. 
Between 3.5 x 10-5 
and 3.5 x 10-6 
Between 1 per 
1,000 and 1 per 
10,000 
Most 
Unlikely 
Will occur possibly 
during the trial 
activity. 
Less than 1 per 30 
years. 
Less than 3.5 x 10-6 
Less than 1 per 
10,000 
 
Table 4.5 - Risk Likelihood Categories, ( HSE, 2001a). 
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6 identify the criteria for qualitatively categorising both likelihood and 
severity respectively. Again, the author caveats this approach with the requirement to use 
experienced and varied judgement for this activity. It should be noted that if any doubt is 
raised as to which category a hazard falls within then the highest of the likelihood and/or 
severity ratings should be chosen. Having established the likelihood and severity of the 
hazard its overall risk classification must be determined. This is done by cross referencing 
the likelihood with the severity (the shaded columns); this is further illustrated in Table 4.7. 
 
 
Severity of 
Outcome 
Definition of Personal 
Injury 
Definition of 
Environmental Damage 
Definition of Damage 
to Valuable Asset 
Death Death 
Severe national or minor 
international environmental 
damage 
Loss of asset and put 
Company’s future at 
risk ≈ £100M 
Serious or 
Chronic Injury 
Single or multiple major 
trauma injuries or 
multiple severe 
occupational illness 
Severe regional or minor 
national environmental 
damage 
Loss of asset costing > 
£10M 
Slight Injury 
Single/multiple 3-day 
accidents or 
single/multiple 
occupational illnesses 
Severe Range-based or 
minor regional 
environmental damage 
Loss of asset costing > 
£1M 
Trivial 
Single/multiple minor or 
trivial injury or multiple 
minor occupational 
illness; or no measurable 
effects 
Minor Range-based 
environmental damage or no 
measurable effect 
Loss of asset absorbed 
within project budget or 
no measurable effect 
 
Table 4.6 - Risk Severity Categories, (HSE, 2001a). 
 
Additional information may be included during this activity such as applying weighting 
figures to assist in the identification of, or delineation between, certain specific risk 
boundaries. Such an approach may be used as default conditions by which certain risks are 
raised to more senior management for consideration. 
 
 102 
 Death 
Serious/Chronic 
Injury Slight Injury Trivial 
Most Likely A A B C 
Likely A B C C 
Unlikely B C C D 
Most Unlikely C C D D 
 
Table 4.7 - Risk Classification Table, (HSE, 2001a). 
 
The final classification of risks identified within Table 4.7 may be correlated and sentenced 
with the business’ daily operations according to the entries in Table 4.8. When all of the 
risks resulting from the identified hazards have been classified the information should be 
formally documented within the system’s Hazard Log together with all of the expected 
outcomes. As previously stated, any risks classified in the Trivial or Broadly Acceptable 
region (Class D) need not require any further in-depth analysis. 
 
Risk 
Classification 
Operational Risk Classification 
A 
High Risk 
Stop work activities and improve and/or increase controls immediately 
B 
Medium Risk 
Improve or increase control measures 
C 
Low Risk 
Monitor control measures for continued effectiveness 
D 
Trivial / Broadly Acceptable Risk 
Light Monitoring / No Further Action Required 
 
Table 4.8 - Operational Risk Classification Table, (HSE, 2001a). 
 
All risks identified as high (Class A) must be reduced; this entails identifying additional 
risk reduction measures and a further iteration of hazard identification, hazard analysis and 
risk classification  Such a complete and holistic iteration is required to guard against any 
new hazards which may be inadvertently introduced by the revised risk reduction measures. 
It should be noted, that for most industries and/or businesses that a task (risk) which cannot 
be down graded from a Class A to a Class B, or lower, cannot be executed. Once all 
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remaining risks are reduced to a Class B or lower it is necessary to determine if all of these 
risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). 
 
4.12.2.5 The ALARP and Disproportionality Argument. 
The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept is based upon the weighing of 
risk against the trouble, time and money needed to control it (HSE, 2008a). Thus, the 
ALARP principle describes the level to which we expect to see a workplace risk being 
controlled (HSE, 2008a). The HSE effectively describes ALARP by means of a diagram 
(Figure 4.5) whereby risks falling within the Tolerable Region (Class B and Class C risks) 
may be tolerated provided that they are aligned to the ALARP principle. Having identified, 
analysed and estimated the risk present in a system using some of the previously discussed 
methods there is a need to demonstrate that the residual risks to individuals, both for 
workers within the environment and the general public, have been reduced to the lowest 
level that is reasonably practicable (the ALARP demonstration) (MoD, 2004).  
 
The application of ‘reasonably practicable’ can be quite an onerous task, especially when 
dealing with individuals who have peripheral knowledge of the principle. From the author’s 
own experiences, many individuals try to use the ALARP argument in an inappropriate 
way, predominantly to underpin investment cases where the initial business case has been 
challenged or rejected.  
 
The test for risk reduction being in accordance with the concept of ALARP is determined to 
occur when the cost of any further risk reduction is not grossly disproportionate to the 
benefits accrued from the reduction (HSE, 2001a). One of the fundamental issues with this 
concept is to establish a common metric to measure benefit in the same units as the cost of 
further risk reduction. Within the context of the author’s working environment, Defence 
Standard 00-56 introduces the concept of undertaking a cost benefit analysis when deciding 
if risks have been mitigated to a level which can be justified as ALARP. In the case of this 
project the use of relevant Joint Services Publications (JSPs), in particular JSP 553 
(Military Airworthiness Regulations), and JSP 403 (Handbook of Defence Land Ranges 
Safety) will be used in any safety argument. Further guidance from the Civil Air 
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Publications (CAP) 670 and 722 will also be considered when developing any ALARP 
argument.  
 
When there are several risks which interact then there is a requirement to balance the 
controls to achieve the best overall solution. It should be noted that HSE guidance suggests 
that the ALARP case must be fit for purpose, i.e. if the risks are high then a more rigorous 
demonstration of ALARP is required. This degree of rigour must also depend upon the 
consequence level whilst further thought should be given to any assumptions or 
conclusions drawn from uncertain sources such as modelling. In the absence of similar 
technical papers within the Range’s environment the author has drawn much from the 
demonstration of ALARP from the Nuclear Safety Directorate (Vaughan, 2005) as well as 
other industries.  
 
It is normally considered appropriate, and aligned with ‘reasonably practicable’, to spend 
up to the value of the benefit delivered, at the Tolerable/Broadly Acceptable boundary. At 
the Intolerable/Tolerable boundary it may be appropriate to spend many times more than 
the value of the benefit delivered (HSE, 2001a). In any ALARP driven calculations, the 
cost of the whole life expectancy of the item generating the hazard should be considered. 
When contemplating the aforementioned in any business calculation for an operational year 
the argument must consider the likelihood that an accident will occur in that year. 
Correspondingly, the spend is reduced as the likelihood of an accident reduces. From a 
more holistic perspective, there are other peripheral business benefits from spending and 
therefore reducing residual risks such as higher staff morale, minimised lost time due to 
accidents and even lower staff turnover. Many of these peripheral benefits are linked to the 
social and cultural aspects of a safety climate; these are discussed at length in chapter six of 
this thesis. 
 
It should be noted that before any prolonged discussion is commenced on the concept of 
applying an ALARP argument to any situation it is presumed that the essential demands of 
the TOR and any Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) frameworks have been met. This means that 
suitable and appropriate safety measures are in place to ensure that no person is at an 
intolerable level of individual risk, and that all safety measures have been implemented for 
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which the safety benefits (B) are greater than or equal to the costs (C), estimated using the 
current values of preventing fatalities and injuries (Evans, 2005). Whilst the application of 
a simple CBA to identify the criteria for suitable safety measures may seem wholly 
sensible, i.e. safety measures should be implemented if B ≥ C, there are situations where 
such an approach may not be appropriate. Such situations may arise if the hazard is linked 
to industries where accidents may result in multiple deaths or wide reaching environmental 
damage. Other elements which may affect the use of a simple CBA evaluation for risk 
control may include societal pressure or even international ruling on certain industries. 
Such industries include, but are not limited to, defence, aerospace, nuclear power 
generation and the rail industry. To take the TOR and CBA frameworks further and to 
introduce additional constraints on any reluctance to spend to avert death or injury a 
disproportional factor (D) may be applied to the cost analysis; safety measures should 
therefore be implemented if DB ≥ C, where D is greater than 1. 
 
The adoption of a disproportion factor may or may not be a legal requirement and 
conceptually it is not really required given the current western world’s valuations to prevent 
fatalities (Evans, 2005, p20). Today’s ‘willingness to pay’ attitude of society is reflected in 
the following valuations for preventing fatalities. Typical values (normalised for 2003) for 
the transport industry (Roads) are shown in Table 4.9, they clearly show how road 
valuations of preventing fatalities have increased over the past five decades (Evans, 2005). 
The table is very useful in illustrating how the “value” of life can change as a function of 
societal opinion and/or culture.  
 
Year Value at Original Prices Value at 2003 Prices 
1952 £2,000 £36,380 
1963 £7,880 £104,360 
1971 £18,420 £164,760 
1978 £89,300 £323,800 
1987 £500,000 £889,600 
2003 £1,312,260 £1,312,260 
 
Table 4.9 - Road Valuations of Preventing Fatalities for Selected Years. 
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The figures used for road appraisal in the 1950s were not based upon public perceptions 
and willingness to pay; they were much lower, in real terms, than today’s values. In a 
similar manner, the awarding of compensation payable to dependants for accidental death  
at that time was also, and still remains, lower than the ‘willingness to pay’ based valuations 
to prevent fatalities (Evans, 2005). Based upon the aforementioned, it may be argued that 
there was a clear need to introduce the disproportionality factor given the low valuations 
for preventing fatalities which were being applied in 1949 when the term was introduced. 
Given today’s higher valuations for preventing fatalities the need to apply the factor outside 
the more specialised, high risk - high consequence, industries is minimal. 
 
Current guidance offered by the HSE (Nuclear Directorate) offers some advice on the 
application of gross disproportionality and the probability of seeking its application in the 
courts (HSE, 2009a). Part four of its Technical Assessment Guide (TAG) to provide 
nuclear directorate inspectors with guidance states that “the law does not recognise an 
acceptable region other than when ALARP has been met”. It also clearly states that “there 
is no precise legal factor or HSE algorithm for gross disproportion”. The TAG suggests 
that the evidence delivered by John Locke, the then Director General of the HSE, at the 
Public Inquiry of the Sizewell B incident should be used as a foundation for any application 
for disproportion. Whilst this approach may be considered as quite dated there has been no 
other event or inquiry since that time which has provided any alternative options or 
opposition. Locke suggested that a disproportion factor of up to three should be used for 
workers whilst a variable factor should be used for the general public which depended upon 
the level of risk that they were exposed to. For activities where the risks are relatively low 
the factor applied should be around two; as the consequence and/or likelihood rises then the 
disproportion factor will gradually increase towards ten.  
 
Further guidance on the application of a disproportion factor is given in Annex 1 of the 
HSE’s guidance document for ALARP decisions in the Control Of Major Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) (HSE, 2009b). The document suggests that “The necessary degree of 
disproportion is generally considered to be low near the negligible criterion, rising to in 
effect infinity at the maximum tolerable criterion”.  
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Basically what this points to is that within the tolerable region of the TOR framework (the 
inverted triangle) the degree of disproportion applied is inversely proportional to the level 
of relevant good practice and risk reduction measures that have been applied as the ALARP 
justification. A convincing and clearly demonstrable ALARP argument would be 
favourably received by the courts, resulting in a lower disproportion factor being applied. 
 
In summary the HSE may apply the concept of gross disproportionality to the justifiable 
costs of reducing a risk; this requires that for higher risks they shall only be considered to 
be aligned with ALARP if the cost of further risk reduction is grossly disproportionate to 
the improvement gained. At the lower end of the ALARP region (just above the broadly 
acceptable region) the gross disproportion factor, shall be 1. At the top of the region (just 
below the intolerable region) the factor shall be a figure much greater than 1, usually 
determined by a weak ALARP argument and even some degree of societal perspective. 
 
The actual level of gross disproportionality can be calculated as; 
 
  D = [ [ (X - A)  ⁄  (I - A) ] × 9 ] + 1 
 
Where; D = Gross Disproportionality Factor 
  X = Annual Risk of Fatality 
  A = Broadly Acceptable Accident Rate 
  I = Intolerable Accident Frequency 
 
The factor, D, can then be used to decide the practicable level of ALARP spend that could 
reasonably be expected to reduce the overall risk to the broadly acceptable level, this is 
shown by; 
 
  S = X × V × D 
 
Where; S = Reasonably practicable ALARP spend 
  V = Value of prevented fatality (VPF) 
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As each Class B and Class C risk is considered in turn to determine if any further risk 
reduction measures are feasible within the ALARP budget then an appropriate entry should 
be made in the Hazard Log and any Risk Assessment database. During such an exercise it 
is important to include a review team who are experienced and from a varied background to 
avoid inappropriate sentencing and the use of unconscious assumptions. The area of 
greatest concern is at the Intolerable/Tolerable boundary where societal views, often 
founded upon superstition and/or ignorance, may affect sentencing. 
 
4.12.2.6 Reducing the Risk and Accepting it. 
Many techniques are available to help reduce risk; the most important and most desirable 
are quite often relatively rudimentary in nature (HSE, 2006a). The four most common 
approaches are listed in Table 4.10. 
 
 
Risk Reduction Method Effect Upon Hazard 
Hazard Elimination. Complete removal of hazard thus eliminating any associated risk. 
Hazard Reduction. 
Reduction of a hazard occurrence.  
This may be achieved by minimising the number of occasions 
when a condition could lead to a hazard occurring. 
Hazard Control. 
Reducing the likelihood that a hazard will lead to an accident. 
This may be achieved by reducing the time duration for which a 
hazard is present or by minimising exposure to the hazard. 
Damage Minimisation. 
The consequences of an accident are reduced; its severity is 
reduced. 
 
Table 4.10 - Risk Reduction Methods. 
 
In reality, the risk reduction techniques identified within Table 4.10 may be used 
singularly, or as combinations, to achieve the desired effect of risk reduction. The author 
offers a relatively simple example from his working environment to illustrate risk reduction 
in the real world. When launching a surface to air weapon system the launch area (danger 
area) will be controlled to minimise exposure to people. Additionally, any workers actively 
involved in the activity, such as arming, will be under cover during the actual launch so that 
in the unlikely event of, for example, a premature explosion they will be protected from 
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blast and fragmentation effects. Any instrumentation deployed on the trial will either be 
outside the weapon’s potential debris boundary or be contained appropriately to reduce 
damage. 
 
With any application of risk reduction due diligence should be carried out on any adopted 
techniques, especially when applied after a lengthy analysis, to ensure that none of the 
employed methods have inadvertently introduced new risks. Any risk reduction employed 
must be appropriately documented in the system’s Hazard Log. 
 
Having conducted all of the preceding activities to identify any residual risks within the 
system they must be accepted by a body or individual as being appropriate for the business 
or environment. The risk acceptance process demands that the residual risk afforded by a 
system is compared with an agreed level of tolerability. Final and formal acceptance of the 
residual risks will be conducted by a person, or persons, defined within the system’s Safety 
Management Plan. In general, this will be conducted by independent review within the 
company and by agreement with a Duty Holder within the customer’s organisation. Some 
projects and systems, especially within the author’s working environment, will require 
review by an Independent Safety assessor (ISA) prior to formal sign-off. 
 
4.13   Limitations of Current Conventions. 
The benefits offered by the application of a structured and formal safety case are numerous; 
they provide not only an improved understanding of the hazards and risks involved in a 
system but an enhanced knowledge base of the technical and managerial controls required 
to manage them (Wilkinson, 2002). By adopting such a structured approach they allow 
ISAs and regulators with a better oversight that the system or operation, as a whole, is 
effectively and appropriately managed. When applied in a consolidated form they should 
lead to the principal goal of reducing the numbers of, and consequences of, all major 
accidents. 
 
The HSE and the industries which it regulates have experienced a number of difficulties in 
the application of safety cases including their sheer size and quite often, their complexity 
(Wilkinson, 2002). Of note are occurrences where safety cases have been created which 
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lack any usefulness to the workforce’s operations or the ‘stretching’ of probabilistic figures 
(QRA applications) beyond any reasonable usefulness (Wilkinson, 2002). In certain 
circumstances the HSE have found it difficult to explain to the public how these safety 
cases were accepted. 
 
The ultimate test for the success, or failure, of an approach which utilises safety cases is 
whether or not the frequency of major accidents is reduced or not. Fortunately within a 
modern and developed society occurrences in the latter are relatively rare. Does such an 
observation indicate that safety cases are improving our safety management process or has 
our socio-technical evolution taken us away from many of the more basic and riskier 
activities? More time is probably required to allow this question to be answered; the HSE is 
only just starting to receive safety data produced from the Control Of Major Accidents and 
Hazards (COMAH) legislation (Wilkinson, 2002). 
 
Wilkinson (2002) states that “the near universal opinion of managers and most of the 
workforce at hazardous installations is that safety cases have been very successful.” Whilst 
this statement is relatively general in its approach, Wilkinson does offer a supporting view 
from the HSE’s office. The HSE, from its experiences within the nuclear, onshore (major 
hazard), offshore (oil and gas) and rail industries heavily endorses the safety case regime; 
the inquiry into the Paddington train crash (Ladbroke Grove rail crash) in 1999 can be cited 
as an example endorsement. Aberdeen University conducted a study  to assess the costs and 
benefits from offshore safety cases which was published in 1995 (Aberdeen, 1995). The 
study highlighted both the problems and the benefits of safety case applications. In its 
conclusion it states that the Safety Case Regulations have had “a positive impact on safety 
in the offshore oil and gas industry, particularly…a heightened awareness of and more 
focussed attention on risk, improvements in the management of safety and the better 
targeting of safety related expenditure.” A further follow-up paper was published in 1999 
detailing the successes and failures from a more experienced perspective; this paper further 
corroborates the initial positive view of the application of safety cases (HSE, 2005). 
 
One of the major problems that the author has encountered with the majority of safety cases 
is that of sheer size. As technology advances and systems (and systems of systems) become 
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larger then so the level of complexity increases to the point that safety cases can become 
onerous to the point of undermining the top level argument. One of the fundamental tenets 
of a safety case is that of maintaining an overall picture of the system’s safety; in many 
cases, the sheer number of low level analytical threads combined with large amounts of 
supporting evidence can threaten clarity. 
 
Most safety cases are produced as a logical, systematic and linear piece of work where 
arguments and evidence must be cross-linked across various boundaries to ensure 
consistency and completeness. This is an extremely difficult task which is worsened by the 
need to use various qualitative and quantitative tools, to engage proficiently with various 
stakeholders and to ensure clarity when crossing various disciplines.  
 
Irrespective of any tool or process which is adopted to help manage the construction or 
maintenance of a safety case, it is predominantly people who hold the entity together. From 
the construction of a safety management system, through the various hazard identification 
processes to the effective safe operation of a completed system, the whole process is reliant 
upon key individuals. These individuals use their knowledge, their professional experiences 
and quite often their personal experiences to conduct design decisions throughout a 
system’s life. Not many safety cases document the assumptions and justifications in 
sufficient detail to allow an independent third party to understand the mindset and thought 
processes followed in creating some of the fundamental arguments which underpin a 
system’s safety. The author has experiences where he has strongly requested that additional 
contextual information is documented within both newly created, and extant safety cases, to 
ensure that the conditions of mind are recorded to allow subsequent analysis and 
understanding of the boundary conditions by an independent third party.  
 
The significant contribution of human error to operational safety within systems has been 
recognised for some time (NATS, 2008). Critical systems such as air traffic management 
must pay appropriate attention to the human element if safety assurance is to be maintained. 
National Air Traffic Services (NATS) provides the air traffic management service within 
the ‘controlled’ en-route airspace in the UK and at many of the UK’s largest airports 
(NATS, 2008). The organisation also provides air traffic management in the eastern 
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oceanic region of the North Atlantic and some flight information services to pilots flying 
outside controlled airspace. Being cognisant of the human error component to ongoing 
operational safety, NATS have been applying formalised and structured techniques for the 
analysis of human error. A relatively recent example of one of the techniques used is the 
human error reduction technique for evaluating systems (HERTES), which was applied to 
the recent implementation of a new control tower at London’s Heathrow airport. 
 
However it is also recognised that whilst human error assessment is a necessary component 
of human factors assurance, to use it in isolation is not appropriate. Human factors 
assurance is key to providing a holistic safety argument to any complex, human interactive, 
system. NATS are amongst a handful of large organisations who are now striding forward 
in the safety critical environment and incorporating human assurance techniques as part of 
the overarching system safety case. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned observations raised by the author, Kelly (2008) suggests 
that there are seven types of ‘traps’ that should be avoided when creating a safety case for a 
system or activity. These are; 
 
• The “Apologetic Safety Case”; which avoids the uncomfortable truths which may 
be economically and/or politically unacceptable. 
• The “Document-Centric View”; which is wholly focussed upon the production of a 
document rather than a ‘compelling safety argument’. Such a document often 
delivers no safety benefit. 
• The “Approximation to the Truth”; such safety cases ignore the “rough edges” and 
often avoid fully sentencing all of the identified hazards. 
• The “Prescriptive Safety Cases”; these are typically repetitive or routine tasks 
where a relatively high degree of detail is presented which appears on the surface to 
be convincing but does not deliver a compelling safety argument. 
• The “Shelf Ware”; such safety cases are merely left to gather dust on the office 
shelf where they cannot support daily operations. They are also forgotten in any 
subsequent evolution or revision of the system. 
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• An “Imbalance of Skills”; Skills which are required to not only create the safety 
case but to effectively challenge the assumptions made. 
• The “Illusion by Pictures”; The fact that people may be quickly “dazzled” by 
exciting and complex presentations using colour and even hyper-linked 
illustrations. The quality of the underlying argument is often hidden by stylish or 
fashionable presentations. 
 
These observations are extremely lucid. The author both agrees with and has experiences of 
safety case related activities which corroborate Kelly’s work. Haddon-Cave (2009, p538) 
strongly suggests (that) “this article should be compulsory reading for many of the current 
purveyors of Safety Cases.” 
 
One of the most difficult tasks when reflecting upon providing any additional contextual 
information is that of identifying any unconscious assumptions; though difficult to 
synthesise into a cognitive state it is these aspects which will provide a third party with a 
key to understanding how the safety case was assembled. A more detailed discussion on the 
limitations and problems faced within the application of safety cases, especially in relation 
to human interactions, is given by the author in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
4.14   The Maintenance of Safety Cases. 
One of the crucial aspects of safety case management is that of maintaining the safety 
argument throughout its life (Kelly & McDermid, 2001). The justification of a safe system 
is a naturally iterative process requiring a part of the system to be developed, analysed, 
adjusted accordingly and then fed back into the development stage. The process of change 
therefore forms an integral part of the development and justification process. Once 
commissioned into operational use, it is highly probable that a system will be subjected to 
further changes as a function of maintenance and/or ‘tweaks’ to overcome issues such as 
performance degradation or component obsolescence. In order to maintain the system’s 
safety argument or to improve its robustness such changes must be carefully fed back into 
the original safety case (Kelly and McDermid, 2001). In addition to the ever-changing 
requirements within the system’s immediate operating environment there may be additional 
and/or different challenges that require the safety case to be maintained; typical examples 
Formatted: Bullets and
Numbering
 114 
may include a change in the regulatory requirements or changes in technology. Such is the 
importance of maintaining a system’s safety case after commissioning that many safety 
standards now formally include it as a safety requirement.  
 
The concept of maintaining a safety case will not be discussed further within this thesis, the 
topic has been raised here to highlight to the reader that such a problem exists and that due 
diligence should be applied to any safety case throughout the life of its subject system. 
 
4.15   Future use of Safety Cases within Dependability Arguments. 
Whilst a safety case addresses only one key system attribute (safety), there has been 
increasing interest in their application to address wider issues, predominantly in the field of 
dependability (Despotou and Kelly, 2004). Dependability is a system property which 
consists of many system attributes including safety, security, reliability and maintainability. 
 
Whilst attempting to address all of the dependability issues could result in competing 
objectives there are opportunities to strike a balance between the dependability and safety 
elements. The idea of using a safety case to justify dependability is driven by the concept 
that providing an argument about a system’s dependability can increase the assurances 
offered to the developers and users of the system. Though logical in nature, caution should 
be applied as the focus shifts from the single attribute of safety to attempting to address all 
of the attributes within dependability. The two main obstacles according to Despotou and 
Kelly (2004) are the evolution of the argument, and the resolution of conflicts between the 
evolving attribute objectives. 
 
Whilst the idea of dependability cases is a relatively new and untested concept, the idea of 
developing such cases for system attributes, other than safety, is not new (Despotou and 
Kelly, 2004). The UK’s Ministry of Defence has required maintainability cases for many of 
its equipments for some years (Defence Standard 00-40). It is clear that the ability to 
efficiently and effectively manage any trade-offs as well as maintain a degree of 
practicality is key to taking such an holistic and multi-attributed case forward. Having 
already raised the issue of large and impractical safety cases in a previous discussion the 
author suggests that the ability to satisfy so many stakeholders with so many conflicting 
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agendas is going to be a large task to complete. Despite such a view, much work remains 
ongoing in trying to establish a development framework for dependability cases (Despotou 
and Kelly, 2004). 
 
4.16   Summary. 
This chapter has reviewed the background, creation and development of safety cases from 
many literature sources. By reviewing safety standards and published extant safety case 
practices the author has uncovered that there is a general lack of a published, formalised 
and specific structure for safety case creation and development.  
 
The author has experience of reviewing many safety arguments and safety cases in his core 
role within the T&E environment. It was observed that the majority of safety cases 
reviewed were presented in a rigid format resembling a scientific or engineering report 
style. Though this format of presenting the argument has its benefits (document structure, 
good referencing, demonstration of a logical order to maturity), there is often a disconnect 
within the structure. Many such safety cases fall foul of poor expression and unclear 
language as well as an inappropriate and excessive use of quantitative analysis in pursuit of 
a final deliverable. 
 
Of note for this paper is that the use of GSN and BBN techniques are being investigated by 
the Rail Safety & Standards Board (RSSB) with an aim to improve the overall efficiency of 
safety case development within the railway industry (Zhou & Weaver, 2003). Attendance at 
a workshop by railway safety stakeholders identified the following benefits and limitations 
offered by each method: 
 
• GSN – To be used in the presentation and development of large scale projects as it 
is easy to understand and allows for the early identification of objectives and 
requirements whilst being useful for capturing successful argument approaches. 
Limitations were seen to include concerns with methodology, argument 
understanding and general usage. 
• BBN – It was suggested that BBN was used to focus upon a specific obstacle within 
the safety case and to help identify the best solution. Limitations in its application 
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included issues with its development, predominantly with the use of Conditional 
Probability Tables (BBN model basis) and usage. 
 
Reviewed papers on UAVS concentrated on large systems which require great 
decomposition and by default are onerous and daunting. There is a clear need to develop a 
smaller scale approach for sub-systems or imports of such which plug into existing safety 
cases; examples include small scale UAVs which require an overall safety figure to 
effectively ‘plug’ into extant Range Safety Cases.  
 
Many of the safety cases reviewed suffered from limited resources (manpower, money, 
time etc) whilst there was a noticeable lack of contextual information to allow effective 
independent review and challenge. It was also observed that there was a need to strengthen 
the link between the technical attributes of the system with the ‘softer’ human factors 
element. Little, if any, reference was made to individual competency and training whilst no 
mention was made of the reliance upon the people side of the operation (the safety climate 
and safety culture). Though highlighted as being instrumental in delivering a safe operation 
they were not formally recorded as the basis of any argument. An in-depth review of safety 
culture is recorded in chapter six of this thesis. 
  
The research objective of creating a limited (short) form safety case for smaller and simpler 
activities seems to be well founded especially when human intervention and/or influence 
(e.g. operators, maintainers, fault rectification) are both critical and present for the duration 
of an operation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
An Integrated Air Range Operation 
 
5.1   Introduction. 
This chapter describes the author’s high level vision of how a centralised Air Range 
operation, based upon the new TCS investment at Aberporth, may be created. Whilst the 
project was formalised as a future business consideration by both MoD and QinetiQ within 
2008, the author had been tasked to consider the concept informally by the former Air 
Ranges Manager, Mr Bob Burrows, in 2004/2005.  
 
The following text describes how the author had envisaged the project would be 
considered; his approach considers all aspects of the requirement to command and control  
a major T&E capability from a remote site in a relatively simple but holistic manner. The 
initial text considers what the author believes are the five key components for such an 
operation. Whilst the first four components are only briefly described the final element, the 
preliminary safety case, is investigated in more detail. In addition to the technical and 
operational requirements of the project the author considers the economic benefits of 
minimising some of the costs which are so prevalent within the extant method  of operation 
and may be minimised through an efficient centralised operation. 
 
The safety case is initially discussed from the author’s early perspective and also in the 
context of his current work with the assigned project team. The chapter concludes by 
introducing and discussing the pivotal role that human factors, predominantly 
organisational culture, plays in delivering compliance and the assurance of robustness 
within any processes which underpin a safety case. 
 
5.2   The Author’s Centralised Air Range Vision. 
The idea of remotely controlling and commanding such a complex entity as a T&E Range 
capability naturally suggests that a ‘systems’ approach should be considered. The author’s 
initial (and premature) thoughts on the breakdown of tasks was heavily biased towards the 
provision of an engineering solution; subsequent systems thinking and reflection with 
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regulators and safety practitioners shifted this viewpoint somewhat. To allow the project  to 
be managed more effectively and to allow focus to be maintained upon essential regulatory 
compliances the author broke the overall requirement into five key components; 
 
• The business rationale; 
• The regulatory requirements for legal operations; 
• The engineering solution; 
• The security aspects of remote data transfer; 
• The preliminary safety case for the engineering solution. 
 
5.3   The Business Rationale. 
The business strategy for this project can be split into three main components. The first 
identifies cost savings available by reducing campaigning costs such as the travel expenses 
of detaching Air Traffic Control (ATC) staff from site to site. The second offers an 
opportunity to deliver broader cost savings by reducing the number of operational trials 
teams across the major sites from two to one. Finally an opportunity is created to allow an 
aligned model of trials conduct to be developed between Aberporth and the Hebrides; this 
latter element, whilst important, will occur largely through default by controlling both 
major sites from a single control and command environment. 
 
5.3.1   The Campaigning of Air Traffic Controllers. 
The majority of trials conducted across the Air Ranges are supported by Air Traffic Control 
Officers (ATCOs) supplied, through contract, by National Air Traffic Services (NATS). 
Upon being initially supplied by NATS to operate from a central pool of controllers, 
geographically based at Aberporth, they are further trained over a typical nine month  
period to gain additional and bespoke competencies in Range (T&E) specific tasks. It is 
only upon completion of this training that they become certified as Range Air Controllers 
(RACs), a role which is co-regulated between the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the 
MoD. It should be noted that the term RAC is used solely to describe the role of an ATCO 
when deployed within the UK Ranges environment. This descriptor helps to maintain the 
delineation between normal air traffic control competencies and the extended and more 
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specialised competencies that must be attained prior to being certified valid to operate upon 
the Ranges. Due to the bespoke nature of Range activities and the special tasks demanded 
of the RACs the MoD regulator acts as the single competent authority for certifying and 
licensing the RAC. 
 
The RAC pool is based at Aberporth and that is regarded as their parent site; during periods 
of low demand and utilisation they are sited there by default. An RAC scheduling tool is 
used to manage the requirements from the appropriate Ranges. This tool reacts with the 
same degree of priority and commitment to all of the Ranges unless otherwise advised by 
the Ranges management team. It should be emphasised that all of the RAC requirements 
for any Aberporth specific tasks must be requested through the appropriate scheduler. 
 
Whilst RACs are utilised across all four Air Range sites and support ad-hoc tasks at 
Shoeburyness from the London Air Control Centre (LACC) in Swanwick, this business 
rationale will focus specifically upon the predominant activities and detachments at 
Aberporth and the Hebrides. 
 
RACs are deployed to the Hebrides to support with the technical planning (attending trials 
planning meetings) and for the execution of trials; travelling and accommodation whilst on 
detachment are respectively time consuming and expensive. Travelling time, by regulation, 
for RACs is considered as ‘duty time’ and therefore requires a greater number of 
individuals to be deployed per unit time, predominantly units of weeks rather than single 
days, to allow for any T&E activities to be completed. This relatively high demand on such 
an expensive and specialised human resource is often exacerbated by the fact that the 
weather at the Hebrides is so inclement and changeable (causing programme slippages) and 
that the Range requires additional air assets to be deployed to support many of the Deep 
Range operations. 
 
Deep Range trials at the Hebrides include the higher energy activities which require the use 
of additional danger areas to the North, South and West of the Rangehead location on 
South Uist. The greater majority of Deep Range activities require support from bespoke 
and specialised third party assets. These assets may include an airborne sea surveillance 
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platform such as a Royal Air Force (RAF) Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) or a 
commercial platform which offers a suitable and comparable capability. Due to the 
geographic remoteness of the Range and the nature of T&E the majority of the activities 
require the attendance of air to air refuelling assets. The pressure on such assets within the 
current political environment, predominantly due to theatre operations, causes trial 
operations to be frequently postponed or delayed. Such operationally vagarious elements, 
when combined with the constraints of travelling and inclement weather, make the concept 
of a remotely controlled operation extremely attractive. Given all of the aforementioned 
potential for problems the ability of the business to schedule and conduct trials to an 
efficient and well planned schedule is extremely difficult. The problem is also magnified by 
today’s cost-conscious business environment as effective cost gathering and financial 
forecasting, especially in response to early bid work, is very difficult to bound. For 
example, having deployed RACs to support a task based upon a bid which was constructed 
on the basis that two RACs would deploy for a fortnight the business may find itself 
extending the deployment period to six weeks and incur increased accommodation and 
travelling costs to the order of three times that identified within the original bid. 
 
The Inner Range activities at the Hebrides require the use of its inner Danger Area (D701) 
which is utilised primarily by detachments of military units for live in-service practice of 
GBAD systems. This activity predominantly involves the engagement of  Falconet and/or 
Banshee aerial targets by live Rapier missiles. Sea surveillance for these relatively low 
energy in-service activities is provided by Range owned, land based, maritime surveillance 
radars; there is no requirement for any third party support for these activities. Due to the 
relatively short ranges of these engagements and the use of a relatively small and slow 
aerial target combined with low altitude geometries there is no requirement for an RAC to 
be present. Whilst air surveillance radar systems are operated during such activities the task 
of monitoring the Danger Area for air intruders is carried out by Range staff with special 
licenses administered and controlled by the MoD regulator. These licences are 
predominantly based upon ‘grandfather rights’ predicated by the site’s Royal Artillery 
history. 
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It could be argued that by basing a team of suitably competent RACs at the Hebrides the 
costs of deployments would be minimised and also provide additional flexibilities. Whilst 
this approach offers some superficial benefits it is undermined by the lack of operational 
utilisation at the site and therefore an inability to remain competent and current in 
accordance with the prescribed regulatory framework. It is formally accepted by the 
regulator and bound into the certification regime of the RACs that the extended variety and 
volume of activities carried out at Aberporth must be used to underpin the whole 
competency framework of RACs across all of the UK’s T&E capabilities. By basing RACs 
at the Hebrides costs would be incurred, probably at a higher frequency, in deploying them 
back to Aberporth for currency and continuity training; neither currency nor full 
competency in all aspects of the RAC role may be attained whilst solely based at the 
Hebrides. 
 
5.3.1.1 Reducing Campaign Costs. 
The author tasked a member of his former operational management team at Aberporth to 
conduct a preliminary investigation into the additional costs incurred for RAC deployments 
during 2005 and 2006 (Richards, 2006). The following summarises the report; 
 
Contracted cost of NATS staff   (Year 2004-05) £635,000 
Additional costs incurred  (Year 2004-05) £79,000 
Contracted cost of NATS staff   (Year 2005-06) £661,000 
Additional costs incurred  (Year 2005-06) £105,000 
 
*Note: Additional costs incurred include Car hire, Travel & Subsistence, Additional Hours 
(Overtime) and Additional Voluntary Attendance (Voluntary Non-rostered support). 
 
Another report (Harries, 2009) which provided a business argument for increasing the RAC 
pool of resources identified similar cost components for 2007, 2008 and the first quarter of 
2009.  
 
Contracted cost of NATS staff   (Year 2006-07) £686,000 
Additional costs incurred  (Year 2006-07) £120,000 
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Contracted cost of NATS staff   (Year 2007-08) £710,000 
Additional costs incurred  (Year 2005-06) £104,000 
Contracted cost of NATS staff   (Year 2008-09) £695,000 
Additional costs incurred  (Year 2008-09) £114,000 
 
*Note: Additional costs incurred include the use of a semi-retired RAC to support 
operations at Aberporth whilst the core pool was deployed on other Ranges. 
 
Whilst these figures may not be directly comparable, due to slight variances in what the 
cost constituents are, they give a good indication of the order of magnitude. For the five 
year period highlighted, the annual average additional costs incurred, which can be 
apportioned to the Hebrides, may be considered as £100,000. 
 
These aforementioned costs do not include the return airfare from/to a mainland airport 
(e.g. Bristol, Heathrow, etc.) to/from Benbecula, and an overnight stay in Glasgow. Due to 
the many variables which can affect trials conduct the RACs book ‘fully flexible’ tickets at 
an unit cost (2009 prices) of £650 per flight. Whilst the RACs are content to overnight in 
relatively cheap accommodation (e.g. Holiday Inn) at Glasgow airport, each nightly stay 
costs a  typical £100. 
 
The average number of RAC deployments to the Hebrides, per year, over the past 4 years 
may be considered as a conservative 25; this is a difficult figure to finalise given the nature 
of some of the trips and that a more efficient method of scheduling RACs has been adopted 
since 2008. For the purposes of this thesis the figure of 25 is fair and appropriate. It can 
therefore be seen that the typical annual costs of deploying RACs to support the Range 
activities at the Hebrides is made up from the following components costs; 
 
(Annual average additional costs incurred excluding flights & hotel) + (Annual cost of 
flights & Hotel accommodation); 
 
= (£100,000) + (£650 + £100)25 
= (£100,000) + (£18,750) = £118,750. 
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If all of the T&E activities currently being carried out in the Hebrides could be conducted 
between the other three Ranges then some reduction in manpower could be made but this is 
impossible due to the requirement for its larger danger area to accommodate the higher 
energy T&E activities. Moving the activities currently carried out at Aberporth to the other 
three Ranges is also not a realistic option given that the majority of Aberporth trials cannot 
be physically executed (hazard area size) at Larkhill or West Freugh. To migrate the 
Aberporth activities to the Hebrides would be extremely difficult given the excessive depth 
of water and climatic conditions (predominantly sea-state) for mooring any surface targets 
in support of air to surface or surface to surface weapon activities. Additionally, the cost to 
the customer of deploying to the Hebrides would be simply too onerous for many low 
budget projects. The dependence upon so many mission critical third parties and the level 
of such inclement weather would also impact upon the viability of conducting many 
activities at the Hebrides. 
 
An additional but very important intangible benefit of this review was to quantify the 
overall utilisation of such expensive assets as RACs. In investigating some of the RAC 
deployments to the Hebrides the author has identified that they are typically underutilised 
by circa 40%. This is largely due to the transit times, pre-trial preparatory periods and the 
slippages of trials activities due to inclement weather and/or third party support asset 
failures. In response to the RAF’s growing demands to exercise more third generation 
weapons (e.g. AMRAAM) the average deployment to the Hebrides involves 50% of the 
NATS resource pool. The under utilisation of the RACs may therefore be calculated in 
financial terms as 20% of the overall contract cost (40% x 50%) which is in the order of 
£130,000. When combined with the previously identified annual costs of deploying the 
RACs to the Hebrides (£118,750) we start to gather a much more refined figure of how 
much the deployments are costing in real terms to the business; i.e. £250,000 per annum. 
 
By transmitting the required data from the Hebrides to Aberporth a more cost effective and 
operationally dynamic method of Range management can be adopted. Any slippages in the 
ability to execute a trial at the Hebrides, either due to weather or un-serviceability of third 
party assets, can be met by a more tactical and flexible method of scheduling trials through 
the use of a common command & control system based at Aberporth. 
 124 
5.3.1.2 Aberporth as the Command & Control Base. 
Whilst the author has suggested that the location of the centralised system should be 
Aberporth this view is personal and wholly driven by the fact that the NATS resource pool 
is based at the site. From a ‘people perspective’ the author is aware that the NATS staff 
have settled their families within West Wales and are relatively content with their personal 
situations. No doubt there are opportunities, supported by sound business arguments, to 
locate the centralised system at another QinetiQ and/or MoD site within the UK. The author 
is cognisant of such thoughts and is supportive of them to some degree; however there are 
two prime issues which should be considered before taking any revised idea on relocating 
the command & control system forward. 
 
The first issue is very simplistic and is based upon the realisable cost savings as identified 
in the preceding paragraphs. If the control & command centre is relocated away from where 
the air traffickers live then the cost saving opportunities will be greatly reduced as they will 
be required to travel again to another location. Whilst the costs may not be as substantial as 
they are currently the volume will be greater; that is, travel will be required for all trial 
activities rather than for the ad-hoc deployments to the Hebrides. 
 
The second issue follows a more intangible and people-centric theme. The RACs hold very 
specialised competencies and are essential to the continued delivery of trials activities to 
the MoD in accordance with the LTPA contract. Whilst their service contract includes 
clauses to allow a professional handover to another supplier, the author believes that to lose 
their support would be detrimental to the competent delivery of trial activities. The world is 
currently struggling from a gross lack of air traffic controllers and in response to this 
demand their collective salaries have risen worldwide. The air traffickers employed on the 
Ranges are not paid as highly as those conducting mainstream civil air traffic duties but 
they remain relatively content to carry out Ranges activities due to its ‘exciting’, ‘niche’ 
and ‘elite’ job type. This contentment is galvanised by the lifestyle afforded by living in a 
rural environment, especially when infants and young children are part of the family. It is 
suggested by the author that any relocation of the control & command centre away from 
Aberporth may upset this status quo and initiate a team fragmentation where the NATS 
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team members may decide to rejoin mainstream air trafficking, with a corresponding 
substantial increase in salary.  
 
These latter people issues are simply raised here to provide context to the whole operation, 
in a true ‘systems’ application; they will not be discussed any further within this thesis. 
 
5.3.2   Broader Cost Savings. 
The development of a centralised trials command & control system would allow a degree 
of staff integration and rationalisation to be realised across both of the Aberporth and 
Hebrides sites. Whilst the RAC team would remain relatively unchanged the QinetiQ team 
of operational delivery staff at both sites would require consolidation. 
 
Though the aforementioned argument supports the need to locate the centralised system at 
Aberporth no inference should be taken that the operational staff at the Hebrides would be 
completely surplus to requirements. In any combined operation there are benefits to be 
gleaned from creating a new multi-skilled and multi-experienced team which would more 
effectively deal with any future customer requirements. The current operational delivery 
teams at both sites consist of typically a team of 20 individuals ranging from support staff 
all the way up to the Operations Controller. Due to the lack of restrictive caveats upon this 
thesis and the sensitivity of the topic the author provides a simplistic and generic business 
case for the additional cost savings, which could be delivered from a centralised system, in 
the following paragraph. 
 
The typical salaries of the operational staff are circa £22,000 but the real costs to the 
company approach £40,000 due to the overheads incurred through the provision of  
employee support such as welfare support, training, pensions etc. Simple arithmetic quickly 
identifies the potential to save a further £800,000 per year by creating a centralised 
command and control system. 
 
5.3.2.1 Typical Payback Timelines. 
The overall financial opportunities and savings that may be realised, in a conservative 
application, appears to be in the order of £1M. This figure may be used to create a business 
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rationale for investment in a centralised and integrated trials command & control centre. 
Typical payback periods for similar technical investments within the company are five or 
ten years. Whilst the former does not offer significant opportunities for investment the 
latter suggests that ten million pounds may be available for the investment. Whilst such a 
large and complicated project demands a more elaborate cost benefit analysis before any 
commitment, the author has identified a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) which may 
serve as a catalyst for further investigation. 
 
5.3.3   An Aligned Model Of Trials Conduct. 
Most, if not arguably all business climates focus very much upon the financial elements of 
any changes to their operating environment; QinetiQ is no different nor worse than any of 
its peers. The creation of a centralised command & control facility will no doubt deliver 
real cost savings to both the company and MoD but, in the view of the author, there are 
probably much stronger and longer term benefits to be realised. The concept of operational 
synergy was raised in chapter two where the author described his involvement with the 
Synergy project. 
 
Many of the issues raised and discussed during the Synergy project would be effectively 
and efficiently re-addressed if the centralised command & control project was realised. 
Having established a community which was capable of communicating, deliberating, 
challenging and changing within the Synergy project the author’s single and most 
demanding irritation was that of members reverting to type as soon as they returned to their 
home site. Such actions were not predominantly the fault of the individual concerned but a 
function of the static and prevalent culture at the site.  
 
“When I hear anyone talk of Culture, I reach for my revolver.” 
 
(Hermann Goering; 1893-1946) 
 
The ultimate achievement of creating a centralised Air Range operation can only be 
achieved by creating a centralised command & control centre which is staffed and managed 
under a co-ordinated and fully synergised multi-skilled team. Achieving a technical 
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solution is a prime consideration but to combine it with an integrated team of personnel will 
give it additional depth, strength and resilience. 
 
5.4   The Regulatory Requirements For Legal Operations. 
All activities carried out upon the UK’s T&E Range facilities are subject to regulatory 
compliance by one or more regulatory bodies; a non-exhaustive list of regulatory and 
statutory documentation for the T&E Air Range operations is included at Appendix C. The 
QinetiQ operated MoD Air Ranges are regulated through two primary bodies located at 
MoD Boscombe Down, Salisbury; 
 
• The Trials Evaluation Services & Targets (TEST) Integrated Project Team (IPT) 
through the office of the Range’s Safety Manager (RSM); and 
• Test & Evaluation Support Division (TESD) through the office of TESD, Airfields 
& Ranges (A&R). 
 
The RSM, as part of a management sub-set of the TEST IPT regulates all land based T&E 
activities executed on the Air Ranges. Compliance to the Handbook of Defence Land 
Ranges Safety, Joint Services Publication (JSP) 403 is mandatory. Authority to operate 
each individual Air Range site is at the discretion of the RSM and is achieved through the 
issue of a Range Certificate (MoD Form 904), on a tri-annual basis subject to a three day 
review of processes and inspection of facilities. Each site is visited and further inspected on 
an annual basis. However, these occasions are more cursory and advisory than regulatory. 
 
TESD (A&R) forms part of a wider organisation within TESD which inspects and regulates 
all airfields and airports where MoD registered T&E aircraft are operated. This mandate 
covers rotary wing, fixed wing and UAVs. Their remit includes elements such as safety 
compliance, (including fire fighting equipment), airfield & aerodrome standards, aircraft 
engineering management and regulatory compliance. The predominant document set for 
such compliance is the Military Aviation Regulatory Group document set, (JSP 550). 
 
TESD (A&R) has three distinct parts to his regulatory role. The first part is highlighted in 
the preceding paragraph and is basically a ‘systems’ compliancy regulator. The second part 
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of his role is that of co-regulating and licensing the Range’s Air-traffic Controllers (RACs) 
and ensuring the safety assurance of technical systems such as surveillance radars and 
communication systems which support the task of controlling aircraft. 
 
QinetiQ sub-contracts its Range ATC requirements to National Air Traffic Services 
(NATS). NATS is a commercial company who have their origins within the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA). The company’s current major shareholder (49%) is the UK government. 
All NATS staff deployed upon the Ranges are inspected and regulated by both MoD and 
civil regulators. The former is carried out through TESD (A&R)’s office whilst the Safety 
Regulatory Group (SRG) part of the CAA carries out the latter. CAA recognises its own 
lack of expertise and experience in dealing with these matters and formally delegate any 
regulatory requirements to TESD (A&R). 
 
The third part of the TESD (A&R) role requires the individual to act as the Ranges’ 
airspace sponsor. The Air Ranges rely upon the use of segregated airspace to allow 
potentially dangerous activities such as UAV operations and/or weapon firings to take 
place in a carefully controlled and sanitised (to third parties) air environment.  
 
The 21st century has experienced a global increase in air travel. The UK is seen very much 
as a major hub in air travel with many European countries as well as from further a field 
using its facilities as a staging post for trans-Atlantic and other international travel. This 
already large volume of usage is further worsened by the fact that many individuals in this 
current age rely upon domestic air travel to attend meetings and conferences on a daily or 
weekly basis. The result of so much air travel means that the availability of airspace is at a 
premium; every small piece of it must be bid for and managed effectively with as much due 
diligence as possible being applied to other potential user requirements. 
 
Compounding this issue of airspace use and/or ownership is the fact that the current general 
culture of the UK’s populous does not see the defence industry as sympathetically or as 
important as it did a few decades ago. MoD, like all other airspace users, must formally bid 
for, defend and manage its airspace requirements with a view that all flexibilities are 
afforded to other potential users. Large volumes of airspace required by MoD for the 
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conduct of T&E activities on Ranges such as Aberporth and the Hebrides are attracting 
increasingly larger interests and pressures from other airspace users, especially the civilian 
airline companies. It is within these forums that TESD (A&R) must defend the current air 
danger areas and bid for even larger volumes, if required, to accommodate the more 
energetic activities. TESD (A&R) directly represents the MoD’s T&E interests, and 
therefore QinetiQ’s business, on the Airspace Users Committee (AUC). Airspace within the 
UK is governed by the Director of Airspace Policy (DAP) who in turn has delegations 
directly from the Secretary of State for Transport. 
 
To maintain primacy for the current danger areas utilised across the Ranges the operational 
managers for each site must report the utilisation of airspace annually to TESD (A&R)’s 
office. These figures are used to effectively demonstrate not only utilisation but the flexible 
and tactical method of airspace management exercised on the sites. The author has worked 
with both the regulator and DAP’s office to create a model of best practice which is cited 
by DAP to other agencies when airspace ‘ownership’ is an issue. 
 
The centralised Air Range project will continue to allow the airspace at the Hebrides to be 
managed tactically, efficiently and succinctly. Discussions with the Ranges’ Senior Air 
Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) suggest that this project may offer further reduced 
timeframes in the tactical management of airspace at the Hebrides. 
 
The author discussed the concept of a centralised and integrated Air Range capability with 
both regulators in 2006 and was given their full and collective support for the concept to be 
evolved. Final approval for such operational conduct must be given by both regulators.  
 
5.5   The Engineering Solution. 
The proposed engineering solution for the project in its most basic form simply enables the 
real time picture of the sea surface and of the air traffic environment at the Hebrides to be 
monitored by the relevant operational staff at Aberporth. The concept relies upon giving the 
operations facility at Aberporth full situational awareness of the remote environment. 
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5.5.1   Linking the Hebrides to Aberporth. 
The engineering aspect of the project requires the application of an appropriate and robust 
conduit for conveying the required datasets between both sites. Due to the real-time 
functionality and interactive methodology utilised in the command and control of trial 
activities the data conduit requires a bidirectional capability; it should be noted that the 
level of data transmitted to the Hebrides is not as demanding in terms of bandwidth and 
propagation delays as that required for data transmitted from the Hebrides to Aberporth. 
The former predominantly requires voice transmissions and low data rates in support of 
simplistic commands such as those demanded for terminating erroneous missile and/or 
UAV flights. The latter requires a relatively higher conduit bandwidth to support the 
transmission of radar data (sea surveillance, air surveillance and tracking radar data 
streams) as well as a host of equipment mode and status information such as those to 
support Flight Termination Systems (FTS), telemetry, microwave link relay systems and 
UAV systems. By providing a multi-channelled and duplexed conduit within the solution a 
higher degree of reliability and robustness may be delivered thus minimising system 
outages and optimising any opportunities to conduct trial activities. Design concepts must 
take into account specific regulatory requirements, especially those mandated for 
communicating and controlling manned aircraft, such as access to ‘hot standby’ 
communication equipment.  
 
5.5.2   Minimising costs - A ‘fail-safe’ approach. 
The overall cost of the engineering solution may be minimised through the application of 
‘fail-safe’ technical and operational systems; this technique is already applied to the 
majority of UAVs and missile systems operated on the Ranges whereby an FTS system is 
incorporated into the platform. Such systems rely upon the fitting of an independent Radio 
Frequency (RF) receiver within the platform which has the ability to curtail flight when a 
transmitted ‘keep-alive’ signal is lost; flight termination is typically achieved by either 
initiating a small explosive charge on-board or driving the control surfaces to a 
predetermined configuration which will destabilise flight. Other less destructive methods of 
recovery such as deploying a parachute recovery system may be considered on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
 131 
5.5.3   Connecting to the Link. 
The TCS at Aberporth has already established a system for interfacing the Range’s 
instrumentation (e.g. Tracking Radars, Electro Optical Tracking Instruments etc.) to the 
main TCS hub. This system of interfacing utilises a purpose built hardware/software 
interface that accepts the serial data stream from the instrumentation source and re-
transmits the data in the required protocol onto a secure Local Area Network (LAN) 
connected to the main TCS hub. This interface unit has been termed as a Range Interface 
Unit (RIU) within the current TCS project and it is planned to utilise the same interfacing 
approach within this centralised Air Range project. 
 
By connecting the Range instrumentation at the Hebrides into its own local hub, using 
similar RIUs and data protocols, it becomes apparent that, with the exception of distance 
and any propagation delays incurred, the Hebridean data hub is merely an extension of the 
Aberporth secure LAN and therefore easily accessible by the new Aberporth TCS hub. This 
concept would allow the LANs at each site to be connected up to a Wide Area Network 
(WAN) configured from either a bespoke information conduit or a capability supplied by 
an infrastructure provider.  Whilst this approach may seem relatively basic, it can quickly 
be deduced that it is the link between the two sites, i.e. the conduit, which is critical to the 
concept. During the development of the final solution for data transfer the time delays 
incurred between both sites must be measured to allow a quantitative safety assessment to 
be carried out which would focus upon the inherent time delays. Such time delays, given 
the typical trial activities conducted at the Hebrides, must be quantified in terms of linear 
distance measurements to allow safety specialists to incorporate them within the 
appropriate trial safety boundaries. 
 
Fisli, (2005) describes and compares various techniques for creating corporate WANs 
based on Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology. VPN technology is seen as the 
overarching term for the techniques and technologies that may be used to connect remote 
sites and users together. VPNs can be differentiated from actual private networks which are 
created by a system of owned or leased dedicated lines. VPN offers benefits over private 
networks by having reduced running costs over dedicated lines and allows for future 
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expansion/contraction without weakening security. Fisli identifies that a combination of 
VPN technologies when applied to create a bespoke system is often the best solution.  
 
5.5.4   Air & Sea Surveillance Radar Data. 
In addition to the transmission of instrumentation data to obtain real-time positional 
information of the trial assets at the Hebrides there is a need to transmit data from the 
marine and air surveillance radar systems. This data allows both situational and positional 
awareness of all participative and non-participative targets to be established; this is the 
primary method of identifying clear areas for the execution of potentially dangerous trials 
activities.  
 
The marine radar systems are primary radar only; they are physically located at various 
sites on Benbecula and St Kilda and are wholly owned by QinetiQ. The air surveillance 
systems comprise of both Government Furnished Assets (GFA) and civilian National Air 
Traffic Systems (NATS) assets. The air surveillance radars provide both primary and 
secondary (transponder) air surveillance information to the RACs at the Ranges as well as 
any other third party air traffic units, both military and civilian, within the UK. The data 
outputs from such safety critical assets cannot be re-packeted without design authority 
(DA) approval. The transfer of air surveillance radar data across relatively long distances is 
not a new requirement; NATS and the military have extant systems and established data 
protocols for this application. The centralised Air Range project would look to use similar 
protocols to transmit surveillance radar data from the Hebrides. In a similar manner sea 
surveillance radar data is also transmitted from remote sites, in support of port and harbour 
operations, though the problems of data pack speed is much less due to the inherently lower 
speeds of the targets being tracked. 
 
5.5.5   Voice Communication. 
Of great importance to the interactive method of command and control are the voice 
communications links. Access to the operational Range intercom facility at the Hebrides 
requires the application of a full duplex link. To allow effective use of the RF Radio 
Telecommunication (RT) systems on the Hebrides the application may use either Duplex or 
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bi-directional Simplex systems. The final decision on what type of system is to be used 
may be taken after calculating the total bandwidth requirements from all data transmissions. 
 
Due to the nature of the activities conducted on the Ranges, predominantly manned aircraft 
operations, the overall voice communication solution must consider the appropriate safety 
and regulatory issues contained within the relevant Joint Service Publications (JSPs). 
 
5.5.6   Link Options. 
Investigations into the most appropriate conduit of data between both sites has identified 
two options; microwave data links and national private circuit links. Both types of data 
transmission systems are currently operated across the sites in support of varying 
requirements. 
 
5.5.6.1 Microwave Links. 
The microwave link option allows QinetiQ staff to control the serviceability and therefore 
the operational availability of the system from ‘in-house’ with minimal reliance upon third 
party support. This option also allows QinetiQ to capitalise upon its current technical 
competence and experience in the use of microwave link data transfer. This option was 
removed as a possible solution due to the distances, topography and costs of multi-linking 
(multi-hopping) between both sites. An over-land path would have required about ten relay 
stations whilst an over-sea path would have required some six relay stations. This latter 
option may not have delivered the operational resilience required due to both clement 
(multi-path effects leading to signal cancellation) and inclement (obscuration and fade due 
to high precipitation) weather behaviour. Each relay station would have required a main 
and standby system with ‘hot’ (real-time) changeover configuration. A similar type of 
system (though with a greatly reduced bandwidth) procured for the communications facility 
at MoD Aberporth in 2007 cost around £90,000. It should also be noted that the system was 
procured as a standard COTS system with no capability for intra-link handshaking. For a 
multi-hop facility from the Hebrides to Aberporth a number of geographical sites would 
have to be identified and either bought or leased to support such an operation. Due to the 
varied complexities of such a proposal a ROM cost was not identified by the author though 
 134 
it is imagined that it would be well in excess of any cost benefits that the project would 
hope to deliver. 
 
5.5.6.2 National Private Circuit Links. 
The national private circuit link is a concept already used by both sites. The idea has been 
in existence since the early days of the General Post Office (GPO) and was part of a safety 
critical UAV operation since the 1960s at MoD Aberporth and MoD Llanbedr (Jindivik 
UAV Operations). As technology has advanced then so the data circuits have migrated 
from copper to fibre-optic. National private circuit links support both local area and wide 
area networks, internet access, video transmission and telephony requirements. They may 
carry any form of digital transmissions at data rates ranging from 64 kbits-1 to 622 Mbits-1. 
For higher bandwidths the use of more specialised circuits allows transmission rates of up 
to 10 Gbits-1 to be achieved (Cable & Wireless, 2006a). Consumer and technical 
information from a suitable service provider (such as Cable & Wireless) suggests that a 
mean annual circuit availability figure of 99.87% and 99.3% is available for the 622 Mbits-1 
and 10 Gbits-1 circuits respectively (Cable & Wireless, 2006b).  
 
The use of national private circuits also provide a degree of security; once allocated and 
initiated the user of such a circuit has sole use of it and no data may be transmitted through 
any other organisation’s facilities. Additionally, by the use of constant intrusion monitoring 
any disturbances can be detected immediately. Such systems are currently utilised within 
the police and criminal justice organisations for secure, quick and cost effective data 
exchange.  
 
5.6   The Security Aspects Of Remote Data Transfer. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the data being captured during the conduct of Range activities 
all information must be appropriately managed and safeguarded from disclosure without 
lawful authority. Under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1989 it is an offence to disclose 
official information in six specified categories if the disclosure is damaging to the national 
interest. Government contractors, such as QinetiQ, in addition to crown servants, must 
comply with the requirements of the OSA. 
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5.6.1   List ‘X’ Company Status. 
Due to QinetiQ’s position as a prime partner with the UK MoD it has sites which are 
identified as list ‘X’. List ‘X’ status applies to commercial companies, on UK soil, which 
are approved to hold UK government protectively marked information at ‘Confidential’ 
classification and above; it applies to a site and not to a company. 
 
5.6.2   The Official Secrets Act. 
All trials related information generated and handled within the Ranges environment is 
subject to the terms of the OSA (1989) under which it is an offence to disclose to 
unauthorised persons any official information. A breach of security could cause harm to the 
interests of the nation and have consequences far more serious than can be envisaged by 
those immediately or partly responsible for a breach of security. This can be through the 
result of carelessness or even the lack of discretion as well as by a deliberate act. Staff are 
liable for disciplinary action and/or prosecution if there is a breach of the legislation. In 
additional to matters of national security, staff must safeguard records arising where there 
is a commercial information content. 
 
MoD currently classifies its data in the following classifications. They relate to information 
and material whose unauthorised disclosure of which would, for: 
 
• Restricted - be undesirable in the interests of the nation; 
• Confidential - be prejudicial to the interests of the nation; 
• Secret - cause serious injury to the interests of the nation; 
• Top Secret - cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. 
 
5.6.3   Compliance with MoD’s Security Requirements. 
The transmission of data from one MoD site to another must be in accordance with 
published MoD security guidelines. Consultation with the Aberporth site security manager 
together with peripheral discussions with other individuals involved with the transmission 
of MoD data has confirmed that the centralised Air Range project would need to satisfy JSP 
440, the MoD’s Defence Manual of Security; and JSP 480, the Defence Co-ordinating 
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Installation Design Authority Manual of Regulations for Installation of Information 
Systems. These standards are a minimum and may be augmented and/or supported by other 
company and MoD policies and standards. 
 
The overall strategy adopted by the author for this project is to minimise the transmission 
of any secure data and thus lower the security restrictions that must be applied to the data 
link. By inference, this suggests that the requirement for robust data encryption applications 
is minimised or even discarded. 
 
5.6.4   Data Encryption. 
Data encryption techniques employ the use of data receivers, predominantly digital 
registers which act as incoming data buffers; these are in turn accessed by a processor and 
the data are manipulated according to the encryption techniques utilised. Having been 
processed and manipulated by the central processor the data is forwarded to yet another 
stage of registers which act as outgoing data buffers, to await further interrogation and 
onward transmission to the final recipient. Note that this process is executed both at the 
data source (encryption) prior to path transmission and again at the data destination point 
(decryption). Data quality and integrity checking at both ends of the transmission path may 
be utilised; examples include bit parity checking and secure confirmation handshakes. A 
number of systems will strip out discrete packets of received data and retransmit them back 
to the origin to be used as a source code for subsequent data streams. 
 
Such complicated methods of data handling invariably adds time to the data transmission 
process. Data which is not encrypted to a high degree of security classification may be 
transferred within timeframes which may be measured in tens of milliseconds. Highly 
encrypted data may suffer from a latency approaching two seconds. Though this timeframe 
may appear somewhat inconsequential, in the T&E environment it can cause problems, 
predominantly within the safety argument. For example, consider an air to air trial activity 
at the Hebrides. To meet a test parameter an aircraft is instructed to fire a missile whilst it is 
flying at a speed of Mach 1.5 at a prescribed altitude; for the engagement the UAV target is 
to accelerate and achieve Mach 2. For a frontal hemisphere (head-on) and co-altitude attack 
profile the closing speeds are at Mach 3.5. Using simple mathematical calculations and 
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applying a figure of 300ms-1 as the speed of sound one can deduce that the closing distance 
covered every second is just over one kilometre. Furthermore, from this example when 
utilising a transmission method which has a data transfer latency of two seconds the 
positional real-time track data (provided by Range tracking radars) shown at the destination 
control & command consoles may indicate that the assets are circa 2½ km out of position. 
In reality the assets may not be out of position but it is the latency of the data link which is 
creating the false real-time image. For engagements where operators must intervene in real 
time to destroy missiles as they approach a boundary the problem caused by latency is 
magnified especially when such weapons can achieve higher speeds and turn rates during 
the initial phases of flight. 
 
From a safety perspective the latency of a link may be overcome by increasing the hazard 
area of the activity (safety trace energy boundary) by a factor which corresponds to the 
latency of the link. Given the physical size of the Hebridean Danger Area and the 
dimensions of typical weapon safety traces operated there, an additional 2½ or even 5km 
will not limit any activity in the horizontal plane. In the vertical plane, the Range Danger 
Area may be further extended by increasing its height; again commensurate with the link 
latency. 
 
It should be noted that specialist data encryptors can also be very time consuming as far as 
management time is concerned. Prior to being operational such systems often require a 
setting-up period such as the synchronisation of security keys. The use of such encryptors 
on a daily and often tactically driven activity would be extremely onerous upon the 
operational teams at both the Hebrides and Aberporth sites. Thus the author’s overall 
strategy of minimising the transmission of secure data will deliver operational benefits in 
addition to minimising data link latency. 
 
5.6.5   TSPI Data Classification. 
Communications with the MoD’s security advisor during 2005 established that the raw 
Time, Space & Positional Information (TSPI) data derived from Range instrumentation 
tracking radars is graded Unclassified. This is the prime source of data utilised by the 
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operational teams for real-time command and control. The marine and air surveillance data 
streams are not classified and therefore do not constitute any security issues for the project.  
 
All voice communications via RT on the Ranges is minimal and codified through the use of 
a brevity code; e.g. playmate knock-on may be interpreted as the UAV has been damaged. 
All non RT communications traffic in the majority utilises plain English with some use of 
key brevity codes; the content of code utilised is largely driven by the classification of the 
trial activity in progress. To conform to the MoD’s security requirements and to allow this 
project to become tangible there is no reason why a more rigid brevity code could not be 
utilised for non-RT operational communications. 
 
Predominantly the most sensitive part of any data parameter displayed and utilised in real-
time within the T&E environment is that data pertaining to a weapon’s energetic 
capabilities. This is primarily information which demonstrates the weapon’s limits of 
capability such as its Maximum Energy Boundary (MEB), its maximum useful range to 
target or its manoeuvring abilities. This data may include aerodynamic and/or ordnance 
(explosive warhead) energetic performances. Such sensitive information when combined 
with the basic laws of propulsion and aerodynamics may allow hostile forces to determine 
the engagement profile and tactics to be used when engaging such weapons. Subsequently, 
the development of defensive manoeuvres to combat such systems may also be determined. 
 
This type of information is generically termed a ‘safety trace’ (or part thereof) within the 
T&E environment. During a typical trial activity the operational team must have the real-
time positional information of the trials platforms, in particular the launch platform and 
elected target, superimposed within the Range boundary for control and command 
purposes. Current in-service second and third generation weapons (e.g. Sidewinder AiM 9L 
and ASRAAM respectively) have safety traces which are classified as Secret. The author 
believes that by loading, storing and displaying the relevant safety trace parameters and 
Hebrides Range boundary data in the Aberporth TCS that the security level of the data link 
could be kept at a minimum. By adopting this approach the requirement to transmit highly 
sensitive data from one site to another is minimised. 
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Though the T&E Ranges handle data up to a classification of Secret, the majority of data is 
classified Restricted and/or Confidential. The author believes that the data required to be 
transmitted across the data link would remain as Unclassified and that the link itself only 
requires basic system integrity to accomplish business resilience, ensure business continuity 
and maintain reliability on a mission critical basis. The latter is extremely important given 
the cost and lead times of all deployed assets which must be in place prior to the 
commencement of any deep-range activity at the Hebrides. The fragility of the final 
ensemble of operational, specialised and mission critical assets serves only to reinforce the 
need for a reliable data link. 
 
5.7   A Preliminary Safety Case for the Proposed Engineering Solution. 
The intent of this part of the thesis is not to demonstrate the author’s ability to construct a 
preliminary hazard assessment and safety argument for the proposed engineering solution 
but to communicate to the reader how such arguments are composed at an early stage. Of 
greatest note is the demonstration to comply with standards which are wholly driven by a 
quantitative approach and therefore demonstrating compliance with the ALARP argument 
as communicated by the H&SE. 
 
The information recorded here includes the results of activities which have been carried out 
by the author as a facilitator and/or as a participant in safety workshops. The text is 
designed to introduce the reader to the early stages of a safety argument and to convey the 
rigidity of the quantitative approach currently demanded by the MoD within the author’s 
current working environment. Some discussion is entered into at the closing stages of this 
work which relates to the qualitative aspects of arguing safety.  
 
It should be duly noted that, within the context of this thesis, the safety argument for any 
UAV system will be completely independent of the remote command safety case. It is 
suffice to say that, given the regulatory requirements for UAV operations, combined with 
the Ranges’ safety integrity requirements, that the safety argument for any UAV will be 
virtually identical at each site; any deviations from such a single model of safety would be 
a function of population density variations or local climatic extremities. The design of an 
UAV, and its operational safety case, would be virtually the same at each site. 
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5.7.1   Defining the Safety Criteria. 
The safety argument for the integrated command link between Aberporth and the Hebrides 
must not grossly undermine the extant safety arguments formally recorded in each Range’s 
extant operational Safety Case. Therefore, the accident severity categories, probability 
categories, equivalent numerical probabilities and accident risk classifications used for the 
proposed centralised Air Range operation must remain aligned with those specified for both 
Range Safety Cases (Rowley, 2008 & Warner, 2009). 
 
The main safety related function of the centralised Air Range operation is the provision of 
displays which show the positions of trials participative assets, non-participative vessels 
and/or aircraft in conjunction with safety boundaries in real-time during a trial activity. 
These displays may be located at Aberporth and will facilitate complete situational 
awareness of the Hebrides’ Range environment in real-time to allow RACs and Trials 
Conducting Officers (TCOs), located at Aberporth, to conduct activities in a safe manner.  
 
As the extant Aberporth TCS has no direct input or exhibits no direct control over either the 
participative or non-participative assets displayed to the Range’s operational teams the 
system is considered to have a secondary function in the context of determining a software 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL). Though the TCS handles and displays information of a safety-
critical nature, it is the operators (human intervention), using multiple solutions, which 
make the final decisions such as terminating the flight of a weapon or UAV. This 
secondary function consideration aligns with the strategies and policies adhered to in the 
Range Safety Cases at both sites. Whilst the core component of the centralised Air Range 
operation is that of providing a suitable data link, it is important for the system engineers 
employed to be aware of the software SIL level of the TCS system which it will be linked 
into. Any additional software requirements demanded by the centralised project must 
demonstrated cognisance of the extant system’s SIL level requirements. 
 
The top-level safety requirement stated within the Range Safety Cases for Aberporth and 
the Hebrides demand the principle of ALARP to be followed. This requires all risks to be 
reduced to an acceptable level and that risk reduction (mitigation) is applied as far as 
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reasonably practicable. To enable the risks from the planned centralisation to be effectively 
identified, logged  and sentenced an appropriate SMS should be applied. 
 
5.7.2   Safety Management System. 
The author suggests, that in accordance with the MoD’s guidance, the SMS should clearly 
identify the following elements to enable efficient and consolidated control of the project to 
be exercised. 
 
A clear project safety organisation should be created which identifies the responsibilities  of 
all key individuals and the roles that they hold within the organisation; the safety 
organisation must also clearly and unambiguously identify the reporting lines of 
responsibility within the project team. The author recommends that the project safety 
organisation should be based upon the following roles; 
 
• Centralised Air Range Project Manager - An individual who is responsible for 
ensuring the development and deployment of a safe system, including the 
identification and mitigation of safety issues. S/he must also ensure that all safety 
related activities are identified and carried out by the appropriate personnel as well 
as giving final approval for the project’s safety related tasks. 
• Centralised Air Range Project Safety Engineer - An individual who acts as the focal 
point for all safety related issues and has responsibility for planning and conducting 
safety engineering activities within the project. These activities may include 
maintaining and controlling all project safety related documentation and ensuring 
compliance to all safety standards. One of the key roles for this individual will be to 
advise the design authorities on any safety related issues and to provide technical 
assurance on all outputs. 
• System Design Authority - The Authority has responsibility for ensuring that any 
potential hazards and risks have been identified and have been formally recorded 
within the system hazard log. It must also ensure that all essential and appropriate 
actions are taken to reduce each hazard log entry to an acceptable level. In the 
identification and management of risks the System Design Authority must ensure 
that all relevant documentation (e.g. instructions, procedures and drawings) is 
 142 
appropriately annotated with the relevant safety related information. During any 
application of subsequent system changes the System Design Authority must ensure 
that such changes do not undermine any of the extant in-built system safety 
configurations. 
• Independent Safety Advisor - The Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) must conduct 
technical reviews and audits throughout the life of the project. Any views, 
observations or findings must be reported to the project’s safety committee as 
appropriate. The ISA may provide independent advice as necessary and produce a 
final report at the end of the project. 
• Project Safety Committee - There is a need to establish a Project Safety Committee 
(PSC) which has the responsibility of reviewing and endorsing all outputs of the 
project’s safety related processes. Any safety related issues identified must be 
raised formally within the PSC to allow any corrective action, as appropriate, to be 
identified and to be assigned to individuals for implementation. The PSC offers an 
opportunity for all hazards to be constantly peer reviewed as the project matures. 
The PSC will include projects members such as the Project Manager, ISA, System 
Design Authority, Project Safety Engineer and any other individuals who have a 
safety related role or may offer information which may affect the safety of the 
project. The author would consider that in the context of a Centralised Air Ranges 
Project that the Trials Safety Managers (TSM) from both the Aberporth and 
Hebrides sites should be members of the PSC. The TSMs are the principal authors 
of the Ranges’ Safety Cases and will ensure that the project’s safety goals are 
aligned with those of the Ranges. 
• As the project matures then additional working groups and committees may be 
created to tackle bespoke tasks; their outputs may be fed into the prime and project 
core committees identified above. 
 
The aforementioned is the author’s view of how the project’s safety management 
organisation should be configured based upon his experiences of working within many 
project teams over the past two decades. The fact that the options for a centralised approach 
to Air Range operations is currently with MoD was raised earlier within this thesis; despite 
the need for MoD to authorise project execution there was a need to conduct a feasibility 
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study and therefore to review the preliminary hazards and obtain a deeper understanding 
and help quantify some of the problems. 
 
Whilst the project may not achieve realisation due to funding and pay-back timelines the 
author co-facilitated the first workshop on identifying the preliminary hazards and technical 
issues which need to be managed for the project to succeed. The following text explains 
how the initial qualitative approach quickly ran into the extant base requirements that the 
Ranges demand; i.e. a quantitative approach which would require an estimated three to five 
man years of activity to effectively determine an output which satisfies the Ranges’ 
requirements. 
 
5.7.3   A Preliminary Hazard Assessment. 
The author co-facilitated the first workshop to discuss the possibility of controlling the 
Hebrides from Aberporth during 2008. The initial activity of scoping the problem was led 
using both informal causal route diagrams and HAZOP approaches. The former was used 
to support the capture of logical thoughts and to bind the ideas into more well-defined 
routes. The latter was used to provoke questions within the team and to explore as many 
areas as possible, including peripheral areas, which may be affected by the concept of 
remote operation. 
 
Whilst the project in itself may be considered as a standalone technical entity, in true 
‘systems engineering’ terms it must take account of the wider environment and its need to 
interface with the Ranges. The over-riding requirement was therefore to create a ‘system’ 
which, when realised, would become a sub-system component within a much larger, 
integrated and centralised Air Ranges trials execution system. To deliver a realistic, 
efficient and practical solution, in holistic terms, would require an intimate level of 
meshing. 
 
5.8   The Extant Range Safety Cases. 
The Ranges’ safety cases consist of a body of evidence, written in free text and supported 
by fault tree analysis, which justify the safety claims made by QinetiQ in respect of their 
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management of the MoD Ranges and facilities. The safety cases are deemed to be a core 
requirement by the MoD in their application of due diligence and compliance to the HSE’s 
legislation on safety management systems.  
 
The safety cases provide evidence and logical arguments that all hazards have been 
identified, attended to and that any residual risks have been reduced to a level 
commensurate with the ALARP principle. Additionally the safety cases provide a degree of 
verification that the level of safe operation can be both met and perpetuated. The expression 
for delivering the evidence and arguments is almost exclusively carried out by the use of 
fault tree analysis with supporting explanations written in free text. The overall structure 
and approach for the creation of Range safety cases is based upon a framework contained 
within Defence Standard 00-56 (MoD, 2004). 
 
The following information on the specific safety cases at Aberporth and the Hebrides is 
intended to convey to the reader how intensive the MoD’s safety case requirements are and 
how they are almost wholly based upon a quantitative approach. It is quickly seen how 
such an approach may be suitable for a major capability such as a T&E Range facility or 
even a large military UAV but seem inappropriate for use in assessing the risks inherent 
within a relatively small and light UAV system which is the basis of this thesis. Of note, 
and what is quite obscure and perverse, is the fact that some of the foundational 
information from which to build the fault trees from is based upon an expert qualitative 
understanding of the hazards and risks such as the reliance upon individuals being 
competent and applying professional due diligence during hazardous activities. These latter 
thoughts will again be discussed in more detail in chapter seven. 
 
5.8.1   The Extant Aberporth Range Safety Case. 
Whilst the Aberporth Range safety case identifies the Range’s safety management system 
in detail using free text (e.g. Command Structure, Responsibilities of Staff, Safety 
Committees, etc.) the defining and underpinning information is based upon quantitative 
figures derived from a fault tree analysis. The residual risks to various parties are identified 
within numerous categories; the author has selected two pertinent examples to convey the 
heavy application of quantitative analysis to the reader. 
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5.8.1.1 Annual Individual Risk Exposure to Activity Participants. 
These individuals are considered as participants in the activity of delivering a hazardous 
activity and/or service in direct support of a trial activity. This group of individuals consists 
of staff who are directly involved in preparing aerial targets (e.g. fuelling, fitting & arming 
of pyrotechnics and Jet Assisted Take-Off (JATO) motors); preparing, fitting and arming 
weapon systems (e.g. Loading of stores on to helicopters, interfacing the Range 
instrumentation to ground launched stores); and the recovery of articles, including unspent 
ordnance, munitions & explosives from the land and sea danger areas. Having identified all 
of the hazards present within the operating environment of these trials participants the risks 
were calculated, by the application of quantitative techniques, and assembled to give an 
overall figure of risk by the use of fault tree analysis. The fault tree top level events for this 
class of participant is shown at Table 5.1. 
 
 
Safety Case Fault Trees 
 
Probability per 
Single Event 
 
Number of Events 
Planned per Annum 
Annual Risk per 
Individual (Based on 
team of 4) 
FTR 04 
(Storage, Transportation & 
Preparation) 
 
2.47 * 10-08 
 
234 
 
5.52 * 10-06 
FTR 05 
(Gun Firing) 
8.11 * 10-13 100 8.11 * 10-11 
FTR 06 
(Sighter Rocket Firing) 
2.07 * 10-09  100 2.07 * 10-07 
FTR 07 
(Sea-Skua missile loading) 
1.53 * 10-08 20 3.05 * 10-07 
FTR 08 
(Disposal of unspent OME) 
1.77 * 10-07 4 7.08 * 10-07 
Total Annual Risk to Activity Participants : 6.74 * 10-06 
 
Table 5.1 - Fault Tree Top Events for Activity Participants (Rowley, 2008). 
 
Note: As the Range’s explosives team consists of four individuals and that the expectation 
is that no one individual will participate in every hazardous activity it is deemed 
appropriate to consider that each explosive worker will be subject to 50% of the annual 
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hazard budget. With this in mind the total annual risk to a single participant falls to 3.37 
x10-06 per annum. Whilst this level of risk exposure is marginally greater then the HSE’s 
Broadly Acceptable boundary it is considered ALARP and mitigated by the Range due to 
the rigorous training, inspecting and peer reviewing regime which is applied within the 
environment. As with all safety management tools, the Range’s safety case is subject to 
annual review; these risk exposure levels to participants will be again checked and peer 
reviewed. The fault tree logic which supports the top level events shown at Table 5.1 is 
shown in Appendices D, E, F, G and H. These again serve to illustrate the considerable 
level of quantitative measures taken to support the safety case argument. 
 
5.8.1.2 Annual Individual Risk Exposure to Military and Civilian Light Aircraft. 
This group includes individuals and third parties aboard aircraft who may be in innocent 
passage outside the Range’s Air Danger Area and/or stray into the Danger Area and 
become intruders. The Range’s geographical position (Appendix A) places it within a 
complex network of national and international civil air routes and various military low 
flying areas. Due to the very highly structured network of air routes and procedures used by 
civil airlines the Range considers, from both expert opinion and experience, that the 
overwhelming majority of Danger Area airspace intrusions are caused by military fast jets 
and civil light aircraft. With these suppositions in mind, the Range considers that the hazard  
presented should be considered within the context of a military aircraft and/or a civil light 
aircraft carrying a maximum of ten persons aboard. The relevant fault tree top level events 
which support these deliberations is shown at Table 5.2. 
 
The fault tree logic which supports the top level events shown at Table 5.2 is shown in 
Appendices I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P and Q. These again serve to illustrate the considerable 
level of quantitative measures taken to support the Range’s safety case argument. 
 
5.8.2   The Extant Hebrides Range Safety Case. 
To further illustrate the very high reliance upon a quantitative approach for the creation of 
Range safety cases the author includes the following high level event from the Hebrides 
Range safety case. Rather than reviewing a similar event to the Aberporth Range safety 
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case the author has selected a different trials related event. This enables the reader to further 
understand the complexity and the effort required to create and maintain such an entity. 
In a similar manner to the Aberporth Range safety case, the Hebrides use a degree of free 
text to explain and qualify the capability though it is the fault tree analysis which underpins 
the whole safety argument.  
 
 
 
Safety Case Fault Trees 
 
Probability per 
Single Event 
 
Number of Incursions 
Considered per 
Annum 
 
Annual Risk per 
Aircraft 
FT 01 
(ASRAAM OM / 
Sidewinder AIM 9 strike) 
 
1.91 * 10-09 
 
81 
 
1.54 * 10-07 
FT 05 
(ASRAAM TOM strike) 
5.74 * 10-09 20 1.15 * 10-07 
FT 08 
(Non-participative aircraft 
collision) 
1.95 * 10-10  500 9.75 * 10-08 
FT 09 
(LGB / JDAM strike) 
3.41 * 10-12 200 6.82 * 10-10 
FT 12 
(Non-guided store strike) 
3.41 * 10-12 100 3.41 * 10-10 
FT15 
(Maverick / Sea Skua strike) 
3.41 * 10-11 60 2.05 * 10-09 
FT 18 
(Rangehead Gun Firing) 
(AS90 strike) 
3.48 * 10-13 100 3.48 * 10-11 
FT 21 
(Sighter Rocket strike) 
3.48 * 10-13 100 3.48 * 10-11 
FT 26 
(Mirach UAV strike) 
2.83 * 10-11 100 2.83 * 10-09 
Total Annual Risk to Military Aircraft & Civilian Light Aircraft : 3.73 * 10-07 
 
Table 5.2 - Fault Tree Top Events for Activity Non-Participants (Rowley, 2008). 
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5.8.2.1 Per Event Risk of a Store Breaching the Weapon Operating Area. 
The Range considers that for any store to breach the Weapon Operating Area (WOA) it 
must either have an errant trajectory, the Range may have applied an inappropriate safety 
trace or the data displayed to the trials conducting personnel is incorrect. Procedural and 
operational mitigations are emplaced within the capability to minimise such occurrences 
though the risk is still present.  
 
The fault tree logic which supports this top level event is shown in Appendix R; again it 
serves to illustrate the level of quantitative approach determined by Defence Standard 00-
56 (MoD, 2004), which is prevalent within the T&E environment. 
 
5.8.3   Concluding remarks on the Extant Range Safety Cases. 
The various fault trees discussed in the preceding paragraphs and illustrated within the 
relevant appendices are meant to convey to the reader how focussed the current 
methodology within the T&E environment is upon a quantitative approach. Each one of the 
Range safety cases reviewed by the author has over 700 individual fault tree components 
and has taken over one man year, per Range, to create.  
 
From experience the author believes that here is an opportunity to create a relatively robust 
safety case, especially for smaller systems, using a more qualitative approach. Whilst a 
heavily quantitative approach is fundamental for some high risk industries such as nuclear 
power and/or aerospace activities, there is an argument to be made, for lower risk 
industries, especially when dealing with smaller and simpler systems, for a less onerous and 
straightforward approach to safety management. Whilst a completely qualitative approach 
may seem too much of a step away from the established norm, the author suggests that a 
safety case could be created, for a suitably appropriate system, using a predominantly 
qualitative argument supported by a few key quantitative components such as fault tree 
analysis.  
 
A typical and simple example to illustrate this revised concept would be the activity of 
allowing a young child to ride a motor-powered vehicle, such as a tricycle, for the first 
time. Seating the child astride the tricycle whilst it is static and explaining the controls 
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(brake, steering, accelerator) could be considered as a qualitative component of safety 
management; additionally, checking the integrity of the boots, helmet and chinstrap would 
also be considered as a similarly qualitative aspect of the safety management. The 
qualitative aspects will have been peer reviewed subjectively for suitability and 
appropriateness by ‘subject matter experts’ in the field of trike riding (e.g. sales staff) and 
child care (e.g. parents and other responsible adults). 
 
Having gone through the whole qualitative aspects of the planned activity a quantitative 
based approach could be considered for any underpinning safety control mechanism, i.e. 
the long length of rope held by the supervisor and connected to the vehicle’s ‘kill switch’. 
The quantitative approach for this element of the activity would consider the length of 
string and its ability to withstand the tension incurred to bring the vehicle to a safe stop. 
This latter ‘safety critical’ aspect could be investigated and recorded using a quantitative 
tool such as a fault tree analysis and/or even a simple spreadsheet mapping the length of 
rope and speed of tricycle against the mass and height of the child. This approach is already 
carried out in some environments, for example when there is a need to alter suspension 
settings for a bespoke activity (e.g. touring, racing, etc.). 
 
This example brings into focus the fact that certain individuals, such as parents or sales 
staff, are important to some of the safety related decisions in our daily lives. Their inputs 
are clearly subjective and qualitative; whilst they may use an instruction manual to obtain a 
few basic quantitative bits of information, their inputs are almost wholly qualitative. Whilst 
the example above relates to the risks involved in allowing a child to ride a tricycle there 
are numerous other everyday activities where qualitative approaches are used to manage 
the safety of subjects which are more emotive, closer to our personal beliefs and probably 
more intimate and important to us in our own lives. General Practitioners (GPs) apply very 
much a qualitative approach to diagnosis; initial engagements with patients rely very much 
upon a qualitative approach by asking questions on where something hurts or how long 
they have had the symptoms. For most patients this first stage of qualitative assessment is 
sufficient, however, further investigations may require a degree of quantitative assessment 
through the application of more specialised techniques such as blood pressure 
measurements and blood analysis. Dispensing chemists engage in a subjective dialogue and 
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use a qualitative approach in issuing some drugs to customers. From the author’s 
experience of vehicles, the approach taken in garages which conduct ‘Ministry of 
Transport’ (MoT) roadworthiness tests may be relatively objective and quantitative in some 
aspects (e.g. tyre tread depth, brake efficiency, etc.) though the detection of rusting 
framework and its correction (e.g. the welding of strengthening plates) is very qualitative 
and subjective, and relies greatly upon the personal integrity and experience of those 
individuals engaged within the process. With these observations in mind the author further 
investigates the concept of a qualitative approach to safety cases and safety management 
within chapter seven where the concept of a qualitative approach to safety, especially for 
light UAV systems, is further developed. 
 
The term personal integrity and its importance to a safe system of diagnosis, control and 
execution was raised in the preceding paragraphs. Whilst it may not appear at first glance to 
be important the author suggests that it is fundamental to a safe system of operating. When 
the author uses the term personal integrity he is trying to encapsulate the requirement of an 
individual to act professionally within the confines of their discipline with a relatively high 
degree of moral principle. Effectively the individual is exhibiting a high degree of 
consistency and displays a distinct lack of corruption. Clearly, if a more qualitative 
approach to safety management is to be credibly considered then an in-depth review needs 
to be conducted of those aspects which constitute how an individual, or a group, may 
operate from a moral behaviour perspective. Whilst this thesis has discussed engineering 
and safety from a predominantly quantitative and somewhat events-based viewpoint so far, 
it now needs to look in more depth at the human components of the system under scrutiny. 
 
5.9   The Human Component of a System. 
The development of a safe system relies very much upon the integration of a multitude of 
different engineering skills. As briefly introduced in chapter one, modern systems are 
becoming more complex through not only advancements in technology but in their 
increasing interfacing and coupling with humans; this is especially important when 
considering semi-automated and fully-automated applications. 
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The majority of engineering integration is carried out by engineers who are well practised 
in the more ‘traditional’ engineering disciplines such as software engineering, electronic 
engineering and mechanical engineering, to name but a few. Of note though is that these 
traditional engineers are not well practised in the understanding, and application, of human 
factors engineering within systems (Sandom, 2002). Perrow (1984) characterised complex 
and interactive systems as those which support dynamic processes which involve hardware, 
software and human elements that interact in many different ways; examples include Air 
Traffic Control towers and nuclear power generation plants. Some complex and interactive 
systems are safety-critical and rely heavily upon human intervention in real-time as well as 
equipment and procedures to maintain a safe operational environment. Such systems rely 
heavily upon the human interfacing aspects; this includes taking cognisance of the human 
aspects, including the social and organisational structures, when making claims about the 
system’s safety integrity levels. 
 
Despite the aforementioned, safety cases are predominantly focussed, as highlighted within 
chapter four, upon the technical and engineering components of the system. Such 
approaches typically address the hazards arising through technical failures alone despite the 
fact that human error is repeatedly cited as a major contributing factor and/or the direct 
cause of many incidents. The human component of the majority of safety-critical systems is 
rarely considered in the same depth as the technical components of the system; this is 
obvious from the distinct lack of human focussed hazard analysis and risk assessment tools 
which are applied in the process of creating most safety arguments. The predominant ‘tool’ 
for assessing the human component within the author’s environment is based wholly upon 
an individual’s training record, certificate of competency and log book of currency. This 
approach is merely a review of attendance at training courses and a subjective, and 
somewhat cursory, view of the demonstrable paper chain to fulfil a management system 
requirement. True due diligence is simply not applied. 
 
5.10   Minimising Human Errors. 
One of the foundational methods used by organisations to minimise the opportunity for 
human error to occur is to promote a ‘safety culture’. Many organisations monitor the 
safety culture within the organisation by use of tools such as questionnaires which are 
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completed by the staff. The responses offered by the staff are assumed to be a measure of 
the ‘safety culture’ within the organisation due to the fact that the questions are based upon 
certain key definitions of what constitutes a safety culture. In simple terms, the organisation 
trusts the staff to answer the questions in a truthful manner to reveal the ‘community’s’ 
safety perspectives and measure how ‘good’ or how ‘bad’ it is. Whilst this may sound 
simplistic and easily achievable at first glance, a further in-depth review reveals a whole 
host of complicated aspects and issues which should be carefully considered and reviewed 
before drawing any conclusions. 
 
The following chapter introduces, discusses and reviews safety culture in the context of 
applying it as a tool to monitor the extant safety values and underlying operation of an 
organisation as well as using it as a leading indicator to provide an insight into potential 
sources of safety concern in the near future. 
 
Note: The proposal to control and command the Hebrides remotely, which has been 
discussed in this chapter, is the author’s own concept for realistically delivering an 
aligned operation whilst realising a degree of cost saving. The prime driver is the 
delivery of a Range service which is seen to be consistent from the customer’s 
perspective for T&E operations at both sites. QinetiQ, during the period of this 
doctoral study, has taken the integrated operation concept much further and tasked a 
relatively large team to devise a plan for delivering such a project. This plan was 
effectively delivered to the MoD for ratification during early 2009. Whilst the details 
of the plan remain Commercial-in-Confidence it proposed that around £45M was 
invested to facilitate the remoting of the whole T&E operation at the Hebrides, 
allowing control to be exercised from Aberporth. The plan included, but was not 
limited to, the full remoting of all functions at Benbecula, its peripheral radar sites, 
and the outlying and instrumented island of St Kilda. The plan identified that 125 jobs 
would be lost from the Hebridean site and that the permanent presence of staff on St 
Kilda would be removed. 
 
On the  15th of September 2009 the Scottish Secretary announced that the plan put 
forward by QinetiQ to remotely control the operation at the Hebrides, was to be 
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completely abandoned. The decision taken by the government was based primarily 
upon the ultimate cost to the islands, the islands’ families and their economies.  
 
Whilst the author’s plan, as discussed within this chapter, highlighted a degree of cost 
saving, it primarily focussed upon the realistic delivery of an aligned T&E operation 
to the benefit of the customer/Range user. The impact of implementing such a modest 
plan could have been met through staff natural wastage and would have allowed a 
stronger and richer operational team to have been created. By attempting to deliver 
the ‘Big-Bang’ solution, the company created, and magnified, many issues which 
included technical, economical and political elements. 
 
Whilst the decision to take the plan forward was based upon the fact that a sound 
safety argument could be delivered for the remoting operation and that it was 
economically sensible for QinetiQ to do so, the fact remains, that the decision would 
have eroded the economy within the wider environment. The Scottish islands have 
been suffering greatly from economic decline for many years and this proposal would 
have probably dealt a lethal blow to the remaining threads of island life. Whilst the 
economic view from within QinetiQ made business sense the wider ramifications did 
not. The author suggests that the decision taken by the government aligns with the 
view expressed in this thesis that many important decisions must rely upon qualitative 
data as well as the hard evidence offered by quantitative data alone. In this instance 
the quantitative facts (cost reductions) aligned with the requirements of the business 
drivers yet the decision to abandon the concept was wholly based upon the qualitative, 
subjective and emotive elements of island life, culture, heritage and politics. 
 
A more detailed account of the decision is available on the internet; the following BBC 
News website may be found to be useful and accurate at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk 
/mpapps/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands; accessed 25th 
September 2009. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Safety Culture - A Literature Review 
 
6.1   Introduction. 
It is suggested that we cannot hope to understand the attitudes of either management or 
workers until we have seen them from an historical context (Brown, 1980, p276) and that 
much of what we currently define as part of ‘human nature’ is, in fact, the output of its 
particular culture at a specific point in time. The opinion that work is an unsavoury 
necessity, that the worker is self-interested, lazy and competitive and that society consists 
of a plethora of unruly individuals and that the fear of starvation is the prime negative 
incentive whilst money is the main positive one is an image of society taken at a certain 
point within its development. These beliefs align with no known fundamental human 
characteristics; they simply reflect, when applicable, a very small minority of members 
within the industrial environment. It is regrettable that these assumptions were assimilated, 
over time, to form the basis, not only of management practice but also the majority of the 
early work within the field of industrial psychology. From Taylor (1919) and Gilbreth 
(1911), the catalysts of industrial efficiency, as well as Mőnsterberg (1913) and Myers 
(1909, 1921), the early industrial psychologists, the overall approach was a completely 
“atomistic and mechanistic one” (Brown, 1980, p276). Such an approach took no view of 
psychological drivers or even any social elements. Balchin (1947) suggested that though 
the struggle for survival in the early days of industrialism was extremely hard, the worker 
did in fact experience a manner of “grim satisfaction with his lot”. Within such a struggle to 
obtain, by some considerable effort, a meagre living from society the individual gained 
some basic reward through the taking on of something immensely powerful, not giving in 
to it and in fact winning small battles against it daily. The underpinning strength for this 
type of behaviour is not fair play, justice or equality but pride and satisfaction that come 
more or less instinctively from the process of survival; and this in an age when it was not 
easy. Another important and fundamental facet of life during this age was that of religious 
belief; seen as a relatively short preparatory phase for an eternal life of true happiness, the 
meagre existence served only as a casual expenditure of time until death. Happiness was 
not about to arrive tomorrow or next week but was to come upon leaving the current life. 
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Through the process of time and by the application of management learning more modern 
working conditions were introduced; through such changes the irrational satisfaction of 
existing within such a hostile environment was removed (Brown, 1980, p277; Maslow, 
1943). Slowly, working life became more palatable, but with it came the slow erosion of 
the survivability ethos and the gradual crumbling of the worker’s religious convictions. 
Happiness, reward and pleasure were items that the worker now desired in this life, rather 
than in the next; the incentive to work is not pure survival in this new regime but that of a 
new kitchen, another holiday or even a financial bonus. Suddenly (relatively) the whip 
wielding ogre of a boss becomes a modern businessman, hours of attendance are forty 
hours per week and workers are paid for absences of sickness and even holidays. 
 
Subsequently, psychologists, human factors engineers and other learned individuals set 
about measuring and distilling every component which could have limited the worker’s 
ability to achieve continuous high output. Everything, including temperature, lighting, 
humidity and even noise was monitored and dissected to optimise throughput; everything 
that is, except people. The result was a body of misaligned papers which could not have 
possibly led to a model of good working conditions. Balchin (1947), observed a factory 
where five hundred women, most of them under the age of thirty, operated under “perfect 
working conditions” but within “appalling living conditions” (Brown, 1980, p276). Outside 
this sterile and monotonous work environment the women lived a life “for colour and 
excitement and drama and change – for emotion”.  All that interested them or that they 
really cared for was left outside the working environment. 
 
Hopefully, it has been demonstrated that the physical conditions of the working 
environment has a direct influence on the worker, but to focus solely upon these elements 
can lead to a systematic failure in understanding of how an individual may give an optimal 
output. More importantly for highly commercial and certainly for safety related 
organisations is the fact that the psychological, (relating to, or arising in the mind) (Oxford, 
1995), predominantly that of the cultural (of or relating to the cultivation of the mind or 
manners) (Oxford 1995), facet of working life must be understood to allow a more 
complete and systematic entity to be created and managed.  
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Psychology, in a similar manner to other sciences, has a prime objective to try to foretell 
the future behaviour in any system under observation (Brown, 1980, p287). The fact that it 
currently cannot predict accurately should be unrelated to any argument for its abstention 
from an application; moreover, any extant information, such as trends and biases should be 
taken as a positive and constructive advancement. Cognisance should be taken of such 
behaviours shown in our daily lives; examples include the economics of a country (bank 
interest rate control of economic growth) and even market spending fluctuations which are 
dependent upon the weather (overcoat and umbrella sales). Each day we conduct business 
which is predominantly based upon our assumptions of what others will do or require in a 
more or less predictable way (Brown, 1980, p285). 
 
Over a relatively short period of time, safety research has tended to focus upon counting 
and analysing adverse incidents in order to try and stop them from recurring. However, in 
recent times a growing perception has developed which recognises that there are broader 
dimensions involved with safety incidents. Initially the legal emphasis on safety was 
focussed upon engineering; for example, the fitting of guards to dangerous machinery (e.g. 
agricultural machines, pulleys, drive belts etc.) and the use of load indicators on lifting 
equipment. Whilst this approach resulted in a significant drop in the overall accident rate 
there were still opportunities for further improvements. Having invested quite considerable 
resources into the application of engineering solutions to the safety issues it was identified 
that if there was no effective management control of risk then accidents would continue to 
occur as a result of omissions in, for example, improvements, usage, maintenance etc. 
Organisations which had effectively applied safety engineering concepts and created a 
robust safety management system conceded that there had been a drastic downturn in 
accidents but found that there were still some residual occurrences. Such events were 
identified as being related to behaviours. The majority of accidents can be linked to a 
failure of a person, or group of persons, somewhere within the chain of events. The first 
two methods of minimising accidents involved approaches which applied restrictions or 
requirements upon individuals; i.e. they are done to people rather than embracing them as 
part of the process. The third approach which is now being adopted builds upon the 
engineering and management approaches; it includes and involves all individuals within an 
organisation. By working as one entity, both managers and workers are required to 
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collectively identify and eliminate unsafe behaviour with a goal of creating a positive safety 
culture through the changing of attitudes. 
 
Hollnagel (2004, p45) also suggests that trends in attributed accident causes have changed 
over time; though they commenced by focusing upon equipment in the 1960’s, re-focussed 
upon human error in the 1990’s, they are now turning their attention to organisational 
causation. Figure 6.1 provides an useful illustration of the evolutionary change in accident 
causation. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Trends in attributed accident causes (Hollnagel, 2004). 
 
Over the past decade it has been widely accepted that examining the organisational culture 
of an organisation is imperative if achieving sustainable improvement in the safety domain 
is to be realistically delivered. Most large organisations now accept that there is a need to 
understand the common attitudes, beliefs, values and assumptions that influence people’s 
perceptions and actions when dealing with safety related issues linked to their organisations 
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(Kirk, 2005). These shared components of our safety related lives are more commonly 
referred to as a ‘safety culture’. Current research into safety culture owes a great deal to 
studies on organisational culture and the common components of shared beliefs, norms and 
values of people who work within an organisation. It is thought that the actions and 
communication patterns within an organisation may be influenced by the organisational 
culture (Kirk, 2005); however, it should be noted that organisational culture is not 
considered to be a single entity but a collective of various sub-cultures operated and 
commanded by various professional groups, departments and teams. 
 
An organisation’s safety culture was not deliberately created but in fact developed naturally 
in response to the specific needs of institutions where there was a potential risk to the 
workers or the general public. It can therefore be deduced that the safety culture of an 
organisation is but a single component part of the greater organisational culture which 
focuses upon improving, augmenting and reinforcing the use of safe policies and practices. 
It should be stated that one of the most important but difficult to measure aspects of both 
organisational and safety culture is that of the qualitative and the intangible. Personal 
attributes such as attitudes, beliefs, responsibility, confidence (non-exhaustive) as well as 
the more abstract ones such as an individual’s perception of risk or their acceptance of an 
open reporting regime (non-exhaustive) are extremely difficult to bound and measure. 
 
6.2   Background. 
The idea that an organisation could be influenced and controlled by underlying events and 
processes was first tabled during the 1970’s (Guldenmund, 2000) but it was only later in 
the 1980’s that the concept started to be referred to as organisational culture. Guldenmund 
(2000) further identified that the term culture was occasionally replaced by the term climate 
as the concept began growing in application. His work also identified that the original 
concept and the use of the term climate related more specifically to its global definition; 
whereas, the modern definition for it now is organisational culture. Furthermore, the term 
organisational climate is now seen as a demonstration (or manifestation) of organisational 
culture. 
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The fact that theorists in management practices are appearing to replace the term 
‘organisational climate’ with the term ‘organisational culture’ was identified by Hale 
(2000). It seems that the term ‘culture’ is now firmly identified and utilised as the modern 
substitute for ‘climate’ in organisational safety behaviour work (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Cooper, 1998, p1). 
 
6.3   Separating Culture And Climate. 
Within the safety behavioural environment the definitions of culture are very similar to that 
of climate; though the term safety culture is generally seen as a more rounded and 
comprehensive term than that of climate. The term culture is generally seen to be 
intertwined within the life of an organisation and/or bound within its institution, whilst the 
term climate suggests a state which is influenced by an external force such as social trends 
(Oxford, 1995, and Glendon & McKenna, 1995). Cooper (2000) does in fact put forward a 
theory for the interrelated aspects of safety culture as an embodiment of three elements; 
 
• Psychological aspects (often referred to as ‘safety climate), 
• Behavioural aspects (or ‘organisational’) aspects, 
• Situational (or ‘corporate’) aspects. 
 
Glendon & McKenna (1995) described safety culture as “the embodiment of a set of 
principles which loosely define what an organisation is like in terms of health & safety” or 
“the way that we do things around here” (CBI, 1990). Though individuals within different 
parts of an organisation will be dictated to by the same procedures and instructions, their 
view of the environment will differ by a smaller or greater degree depending upon their 
relative positions. It is these underlying beliefs and persuasions that the worker has which is 
seen to be more aptly reflected within the term culture (Guldenmund, 2000 and Payne, 
1996). Such variances in safety views within an organisation are predominantly caused by 
the various levels of local practices and customs which have evolved over time and have 
been allowed to flourish under local management; the creation of local citadels. This level 
of variance is further exacerbated by the variations in risk levels across and within the 
organisation. By consolidating these issues an increasing influence is uncovered which 
greatly affects compliance with an organisation’s inherent safety management system. In a 
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nutshell, the safety climate is viewed as a barometer for gauging an organisations safety 
culture from the viewpoint of the employee at a point in time (Cox & Flin, 1998). 
 
The author within his own experiences of T&E management has been guilty of misusing 
and incorrectly interchanging the terms safety climate and safety culture; in reality, these 
terms and their definitions are not clearly distinguished. 
 
6.4   An Overview Of Safety Culture. 
Over the past few years the outputs of various boards of enquiries into major disasters has 
highlighted the fundamental importance of a proactive strategy to safety management 
within organisations. Such outputs have driven many companies to give safety management 
a higher order of importance within the organisation; it has also engendered a realisation 
that the organisation’s safety culture probably needs to be improved (Cooper, 1998, p225). 
At first sight the aforementioned seems to be a straightforward issue, but, scientific 
modelling of human behaviour suggests that prior cognisance should be taken of the 
interactive relationships between people’s behaviours, attitudes, perceptions and their 
environment if any attempts are to be made to improve an organisation’s safety culture. By 
ignoring or overlooking such important relationships many initiatives to change culture, 
such as Total Quality Management (TQM), have failed (Cooper, 1998, p1, 14,). The 
author’s work on ‘Synergy’ during 2006/7 relied heavily on an understanding of each of the 
four Air Range’s local management systems; the effective delivery of an aligned system of 
operating could only have been achieved through co-operation and a broad understanding 
of local cultures, attitudes and perceptions. 
 
An efficient safety management system, as it matures and develops, will enhance 
organisational control, communication and co-operation within the organisation though 
cognisance must be taken of the requirement to invest and develop the underpinning 
competencies which are essential for success. Such an approach requires the management 
team to effectively understand what the staff’s perceptions and attitudes are towards safety 
thereby enabling a more focussed approach to any change requirements. Such changes 
should not be considered as superficial but should be seen as a wholesome commodity fully 
woven into the fabric of the organisation. In a similar way, the management team should 
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consider their motivational strategies (Cooper, 1998, p24, 44, 89, 214) so that the staff 
readily and consistently, behave in a safe manner. For such changes to be effectively 
delivered within an organisation the senior management team must show strong leadership 
and commitment throughout the implementation and maturation phases; to be fully 
effective the whole organisation must appear to be fully aligned and permeated by a 
genuine wanting to be safe. From a purely business perspective the rewards to the 
organisation in terms of competitive advantage, quality, reliability and profitability can be 
massive (Cooper, 1998, p2, 214). 
 
6.5   A Definition For Safety Culture. 
The use of the term safety culture began in the atomic energy industry following the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) initial investigation into the nuclear reactor 
accident at Chernobyl, USSR (Lee, 1998). Further investigations into the incidents at 
Clapham Junction, Kings Cross and Piper Alpha suggested, quite strongly, that the safety 
systems had in fact broken down. This occurred not because of the processes and 
procedures that were in place but because of the safety climate and safety culture within the 
organisations. Though a number of definitions have been used since these incidents it is the 
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations’ (ACSNI) definition which is 
the most widely accepted and used (HSE 1993); 
 
“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety 
management.” 
 
“Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications 
founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by 
confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.” 
 
Though other definitions are available which try to further break down or distil that which 
has been articulated in the preceding text, the general agreement is that safety culture is 
ultimately a proactive perspective towards safety. 
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6.6   Linkages To The Causes Of Accidents. 
Established praxis on endeavours to improve safety within the workplace have 
predominantly concentrated on the technical problems encountered and/or any identifiable 
human failings. It was not until the occurrence of relatively recent major incidents such as 
Chernobyl, the train crash at Clapham Junction, the fires at Kings Cross and Piper Alpha, 
that the role of organisational policies and procedures were seen as contributors to such 
occurrences. Desmond Fennell QC, during the Kings Cross Inquiry, stated that “…a 
cultural change in management is required throughout the organisation” (Fennell, 1988). 
 
Following on from Fennell’s observations, Lord Cullen held similar views during his 
investigation into the Piper Alpha incident. During the investigation Lord Cullen reported 
that, “it is essential to create a corporate atmosphere or culture in which safety is 
understood to be and is accepted as, the number one priority” (Cullen, 1990). In more 
recent times Lord Cullen has focussed greatly on the role of safety management systems 
and the safety culture within the rail industry as a whole. The judge’s inquiry into the 
Ladbroke Grove incident in 1999 has pointed to evidence which suggests that a large 
proportion of accidents, incidents and near miss occurrences may be caused (both directly 
and indirectly) from unsafe acts that are a result of fundamental or latent deficiencies in the 
system’s safety management regime (Cullen, 2001). During the inquiry Lord Cullen 
highlighted the relationship between “good safety and good business” and went on to 
establish the importance of leadership to a positive and successful safety culture. One of the 
key revealing pieces of information put forward to the inquiry was the lack of clear safety 
leadership within the industry; caused primarily by the government’s privatisation strategy 
which resulted in a largely fragmented environment. Cullen emphasised the importance of 
senior management’s commitment to safe operations and that this should be seen at all 
times by the “front-line” workers. The inquiry also pressed home the need for effective 
safety communications within the industry and that safety targets and goals should be given 
as much importance as the financial aspects of both strategic and daily operations.  
 
6.7   A Growth Of Knowledge. 
As with most occurrences in life, with each new event, a finite amount of new 
understanding is uncovered; constantly with each incident that occurs our knowledge of 
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causal factors which make systems vulnerable to failures grows correspondingly. It has 
transpired through time and experience that these vulnerabilities are not simply driven by 
pure human error, probabilistic chance and/or engineering failures alone but are rooted in 
the protocols and policies of the offending organisation. Such weaknesses have been 
identified and highlighted many times during these relatively recent incidents where they 
have been shown to be present for a substantial period of time prior to the final incident. 
Such a vulgar statement in itself highlights how weak and inappropriate the policies were if 
they did not stop the incident in the first instance. As a clear example, the Clapham 
Junction train crash occurred as a result of both individual and corporate safety failures; 
predominantly caused by inappropriate attitudes towards safety and incongruous policies 
relating to safety management. It is from such observations and new understanding that 
current Health and Safety practitioners focus upon organisational concepts and values that 
may augment an organisation’s safety management and performance during periods of 
hazardous and/or complicated operations. 
 
6.8   The Scope of Safety Culture. 
Whilst research evidence suggests that a positive safety culture will improve an 
organisation’s safety performance, there is not much guidance on how organisations might 
achieve such improvements through cultural changes (Clarke, 1999). Weick (1987) 
suggested that highly reliable performance can be achieved through the development of an 
organisational culture which encourages ‘interpretation, improvisation and unique action’. 
For such a culture to exist, there has to be trust, openness and mutual understanding, on the 
part of the workers, their managers and the wider community of operation. Such qualities 
of culture are cited in the HSE’s description of a positive safety culture, which should be 
characterised  by ‘communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures’ (HSE, 
1999). The ultimate viability of a complete safety culture must therefore depend on a 
number of disparate, yet critical elements, including staff-management communications, 
inter-company communications and, especially within the defence industry, the regulatory 
and inspecting bodies. Within the context of this thesis the author suggests that for a full 
and positive safety culture to be present across the Air Ranges, the MoD, QinetiQ and all of 
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the regulatory bodies (e.g. DOSG, TESD, etc.) must be fully aligned and bought-in to the 
safety culture regime. 
 
Through personal experience, and from observation (Haddon-Cave, 2009), the author can 
appreciate how the demands of an operation can tangibly and directly affect its safety 
related focus. At the lower and daily working levels there may be a decent and positive 
safety culture both within an organisation and across the wider field of partner 
organisations involved in the operation. At this level the individual may be sparingly 
cognisant of project cost pressures, or pressing timescales, but the overall personal attitude 
of individuals is still predominantly focussed on accomplishing the daily task in a safe and 
competent manner (e.g. welding, fabricating, testing, etc.). As an individual’s position 
within an organisation rises then so the balance between the daily task and the more 
strategic organisational issues shifts. Project costs and/or timescales become much more 
important to middle and senior managers, especially when organisations are driven by 
commercial elements; as the level rises within the organisation then so the target of making 
money increases and the focus upon delivering a daily task becomes diluted. It is this 
dilution of safety in ascent within organisations, especially at the most senior levels, that 
should be noted; it may also be exacerbated when many large organisations are operating 
together or within a single environment. 
 
The author reiterates that creating a positive culture within one organisation may not 
ultimately deliver a completely safe operation; the author cites the recent Haddon-Cave 
inquiry into the loss of an RAF Nimrod aircraft in theatre as a tangible example (Haddon-
Cave, 2009). In the case of the Nimrod incident the inquiry found that both defence 
contractors (QinetiQ and BAE Systems) had failed, in varying degrees, to apply appropriate 
due diligence to the safety systems. Additionally, but probably more importantly, the MoD, 
as the owner of the operating domain, was found to be wanting in its management of the 
whole environment, especially that of safety and technical management.  
 
A positive safety culture can make a substantial contribution to the principle of ‘defence-in-
depth’ (Barraclough & Carnino, 1998). It can promote the vigilance needed to recognise 
actual or potential safety problems and to communicate the need to address them. In 
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addition to the safety culture within an organisation, the use of peer reviews, especially 
externally driven ones from the regulatory regime, can help immensely. Whilst regulatory 
inspection and enforcement are essential tools for monitoring safety, the attitude of the 
regulators towards inspection and/or enforcement, can help or hinder the safety culture 
(Barraclough & Carnino, 1998). 
 
6.9   Attributes Of A Good Safety Culture. 
It is argued (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000) that a good safety culture may be reflected and 
further promoted by four factors; 
 
• Commitment to safety by senior management, 
• Realistic and flexible policies and practices for handling both well-defined and 
weakly-defined hazards, 
• Feedback, monitoring and analysis of information offers opportunities for 
continuous organisational learning, 
• The whole workforce needs to share and own the concerns for all hazards within 
the organisation. 
 
By surveying the attitudes of workers towards safety and their perceptions of hazards 
within the work environment senior management may be given a measure of the 
organisation’s safety climate and essentially its underlying safety culture. A great deal of 
research has been carried out on the link between safety climate as an indicator for an 
organisation’s safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000 and Flin et al, 2000). Cheyne et al, (1998) 
suggest that employee attitudes are one of the key elements in determining a safety climate; 
this is due predominantly to its multi-faceted dependence upon many constituents from the 
working environment. They submit a view that attitude towards safety is a fundamental 
component of any safety culture. Further work by Williamson et al (1997) suggests that any 
safety procedures or actions that are put in place may be inadequate if the attitudes of the 
employees and their perceptions of hazards are not taken into account. 
 
In more recent times the independent review into the Nimrod XV230 loss in Afghanistan 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009, p261) has reiterated how important it is to have an adequate and/or 
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effective safety culture present within an organisation. In his report Mr Haddon-Cave QC 
states that responsibility for a culture which is committed to a safe and ethical operation lies 
with the leadership of the organisation (Haddon-Cave, 2009, p261). 
 
6.10   Focussing On The Safety Climate. 
Cooper (2000) suggests that safety culture itself can be distilled into three prime 
components; psychological, situational and behavioural. Measurement and analysis of these 
components can be carried out by utilising many qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
situational aspect of a safety culture is often observed in the structure of organisations such 
as their protocols, policies, work schemes, management systems etc. The psychological 
element is often analysed through the use of safety climate surveys created to interrogate an 
individual’s perception of safety by focussing questions upon their values, norms, 
dispositions and attitudes. Behavioural components are often measured by (external) 
workforce observation or self-feedback (internal) through further surveys and 
questionnaires. Though much work has been conducted over many years to try to develop 
surveys which focus upon understanding the core constituents of a safety climate (Zohar, 
1980, and Lee, 1998) the results often reflect the safety climate of individuals, which are 
erroneously reported through amalgamation, as that of the whole organisation. It seems that 
the topic of safety climate measurement has been considerably investigated over many 
decades and is now inclined to be used as a substitute metric of safety culture. 
 
The re-awakening of interest within the topic of safety culture since the turn of the 
millennium is attributed predominantly to the requirement to truly understand the causal 
factors of major events such as Piper Alpha, King’s Cross and Clapham Junction. This has 
injected further energy and vigour into the topic; a recent review by Flin et al (2000) has 
highlighted the fact that there are many assessment tools, including survey techniques, now 
available to support safety climate interrogation. Such assessment tools usually rely upon a 
core model which is specially adapted and/or re-engineered for use within a particular 
industry; examples include the power industry, general manufacturing, the health industry 
and aerospace. Flin et al (2000) specifically investigated nineteen studies and concluded 
that sixteen had been derived from pure literature reviews of preceding safety research; six 
of the studies utilised qualitative methods such as discussion (focus) groups and/or 
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interviews whilst three used extant questionnaires. Established factor analysis was used to 
derive and highlight common threads; in this instance the number of threads (elements) 
identified ranged from a simplistic two to a more complicated nineteen. It is clearly seen 
from such work that this qualitative approach to safety climate measurement allows a great 
deal of dimensional variation in terms of subjectivity and therefore makes comparative 
measurements (between studies) much more difficult.  
 
Further investigation into other safety climate measurements uncovers additional problems, 
predominantly with that of consistency. Glendon & Litherland (2001) uncovered the fact 
that when the same questionnaire was used on two completely separate occasions the 
results varied considerably. Zohar (1980) established that there were eight safety climate 
elements present in his work with Israeli production workers whilst Brown & Holmes 
(1986, cited in Glendon & Litherland, 2001), using the same questionnaire, found that there 
were only three safety climate elements present in a sample of American production 
workers. Glendon & Litherland (2001) further cite the work of Coyle et al, (1995) where 
they subjected two similar organisations to a common safety climate questionnaire; the 
results again uncovered inconsistencies. One organisation revealed seven safety climate 
elements present whilst the other reported only three. 
 
6.11   Developing Patterns Of A Safety Climate. 
As highlighted in the preceding text, one of the main problems that the concept of safety 
climate brings is that of specifics; safety climate covers such an array of factors both by 
default and by design. Combined with this is the inconsistency of the results which, when 
coupled to misaligned outputs from surveys and questionnaires, leads to an inability to 
identify common elements within the work of various researchers.  
 
Of some importance in the interpretation of common elements within the research of safety 
climate is the work of Cox & Flin (1998), where they identified five common elements 
from their collected data; 
 
• ‘management commitment to safety’, 
• ‘personal responsibility’,  
Formatted: Bullets and
Numbering
 169 
• ‘attitudes to hazards’,  
• ‘compliance with the rules’,  
• ‘workplace conditions’.  
 
Further work by Flin et al (2000) and Guldenmund (2000) gravitates towards three prime 
elements as a common metric for analysing (the presence of) a safety climate; 
 
• ‘management’,  
• ‘risk’ and  
• ‘safety arrangements’.  
 
In support of these prime elements is the presence, occasionally, of secondary elements;  
 
• ‘work pressure’,  
• ‘competence’ and  
• ‘procedures’.  
 
The following text attempts to corroborate the presence of these six primary and secondary 
elements. 
 
6.11.1   Management. 
The element of management, (specifically management commitment and/or supervisory 
related), was found to be predominant within the reviews carried out by Dedobbeleer & 
Beland (1998) and Flin et al (2000). Particularly included within this management element 
was that of the perception of attitudes and behaviours in terms of safety and organisational 
output; these were included in the reviews as were other components such as recruitment 
selection and discipline. An observation raised by both reviews was that the term 
management was used in slightly different ways thus making it difficult to ascertain and 
therefore define what level of management was being reported upon. Such an observation 
should be carefully examined as organisations have various levels of management 
conducting specific roles within its operation and the perception(s) from the workforce will 
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alter sympathetically (Brown, 1980, p282). From the author’s work within his host 
organisation principal managers are seen to support safety activities by creating and issuing 
policies and procedures. At an intermediate level, middle managers and team leaders form 
an important conduit between the principals and the ‘coalface’ workers active within the 
organisation. The importance of these middle managers should not be underestimated as 
they not only manage and monitor the daily operational activities but provide continuity 
and ownership through essential bilateral feed back. 
 
During the Ladbroke Grove train crash inquiry Lord Cullen (Cullen, 2001) suggested that 
there was “no substitute for personal contacts” and that all senior managers within a large 
organisation should communicate and engage with ‘coal face’ (frontline) workers, 
especially on the topic of safety. A further suggestion offered by Lord Cullen was that 
senior managers explicitly schedule a minimum of one hour per week into their diaries to 
focus upon employee safety; additionally he suggested that middle management schedule 
one hour per day for such work whilst first line managers apportion 30% of their total time 
to safety. These suggestions were raised by the fact that the frontline workers had reported 
that they did not see their senior managers during daily operational activities; it was 
apparent that they merely saw them during special (VIP) visits. Linked to these 
observations of Lord Cullen’s are the observations cited within Flin et al (2000) where a 
number of managers from various oil companies were questioned. The output of the survey 
suggested that the managers felt so weighed down by the organisation’s administrative 
arrangement and/or by the corporately driven initiatives that they felt unable to offer 
sufficient time to manage safety appropriately. They did themselves acknowledge the fact 
that they needed to be seen amongst the workers and to be involved with the daily activities 
to ensure continuous safe operations. Of particular interest here is the observation made by 
Collinson (1999) in a case study of an offshore operation. He found that senior managers 
based onshore (London and Aberdeen) had quite a skewed view of the safety culture 
offshore. Despite advocating and driving forward a very strong and positive safety culture 
onto their workers Collinson found evidence of “accident concealment” on board the 
offshore platforms. The study pointed out how senior managers can be “hierarchically, 
geographically and culturally separated from local practices”. 
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Much of the literature reviewed for this paper has shown that management commitment 
greatly influences the success of any safety initiatives. What is certainly in need of 
clarification though is the form of discrimination between the term management, often part 
of a more hands-off executive, and supervisors, who are predominantly seen as having their 
presence felt at the ‘coalface’ during daily operations. Thompson et al (1998) observed that 
managers and supervisors would often bias the organisation’s safety culture in differing 
ways; he found that managers predominantly affected safety through communication and 
reporting whilst supervisors affected it through the level of fairness that they applied to the 
workers. One particular study (Simard & Marchard, 1994) did in fact try to uncover what 
behaviours and traits a supervisor displayed which supported accident prevention. The 
study looked at two circumstances; the first (participatory involvement) where the 
supervisor worked alongside the subordinate in any safety activities, and secondly, 
(hierarchical involvement) where the supervisor conducted any safety related activities 
without the involvement of subordinates. Though the participatory approach was deemed to 
be more effective at minimising lost-time accident rates the supervisor’s ability to deliver 
such an effect was not completely independent; it was ascertained that the supervisor’s 
results were linked to the organisation’s safety activities across the whole site. The study 
suggested that a well developed safety regime can be positively correlated with a 
participatory form of supervision but, that it is difficult to examine the supervisor’s role in 
isolation as his output will be affected by the safety culture within the greater organisation. 
 
No review of management commitment to an organisation’s safety culture would be 
complete without some words on corporate reputation and/or profits. A poor health and 
safety record has the potential to seriously damage a company’s image by forcing one or 
more of its stakeholders to view the organisation with some disdain. Research by Smallman 
and John in 2001 uncovered some evidence that senior managers at board level were in fact 
taking the importance of a good health and safety record seriously. On a slightly different 
angle though was the thought that a good health and safety record did not necessarily 
augment the corporate image; i.e. a balance had to be struck between the cost of 
implementing and maintaining a health and safety regime (e.g. training, equipment,) and 
the possible cost of an incident. This research also highlighted how isolated the senior 
managers were from the costs involved. Further research identified that it was the fear of 
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losing its corporate image which drove a company to invest within the health and safety 
domain. Additional research by Peterson (1993) suggested that the lack of management 
buy-in was in fact more of a perception rather than a reality. Peterson went on to suggest 
that senior managers are in fact committed to safety and it is the barrier(s) erected by the 
middle tier of management which often causes issues to arise. Though middle management 
are often briefed by senior managers upon the importance of health and safety their daily 
perceptions may be obscured by other more topical or pressing topics such as budgeting, 
productivity or even rationalisation. Peterson (1993) therefore believes that to achieve a 
good safety culture within an organisation the senior managers must be seen to be 
supportive; the middle managers should be actively involved and the supervisors must be 
accountable for all daily activities. Clarke (1998) augments this view by suggesting that a 
positive safety culture within an organisation is provided through a systematic approach, by 
approaching the organisation’s culture as a whole and not as a series of smaller discrete 
packets. Most of the literature reviewed suggests, both implicitly and explicitly, that 
management has a strong impact upon an organisation’s safety culture. It was observed 
though that the various layers of management within an organisation affect the safety 
culture in sympathetically different ways; of importance was the observation that Collinson 
(1999) made that if the senior managers of an organisation are geographically remote from 
the workers (and the hazardous activities) then the safety policies and procedures fall into 
disrepute. Taking this point further, large organisations will be reliant upon local (sub-
ordinate) site managers to influence the safety climate by being both operational and 
strategic; such an approach will occur naturally for smaller organisations where the top 
level managers are usually resident (by default) at the operational site. 
 
6.11.2   Risk. 
Research into risk has shown that workers both within the same organisation and job-set 
will have varying levels of risk perception. Cox & Cheyne (2000) observed that oil and gas 
offshore platform workers had a greater awareness of risk and the need for safe operations 
than other members of staff within the same organisation. What they also found was that 
the drill workers had a significantly lower perception of the risks involved in the task than 
the management team. It was suggested in their study that this may have been due to the 
fact that the drillers consisted of a specialised team which was imported on a sub-contract 
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basis to carry out the drilling activities and that they were part of their parent company’s 
safety culture. However this does not explain why their perception of risk was so different. 
Earlier work by Rundmo (1995) found that offshore workers perceived their working 
environment to be much safer in 1994 than in a previous period (1990). This perception 
included both the low end risks (e.g. slips, trips and falls) as well as the more serious risks 
which had the potential of being catastrophic (e.g. fire, explosion,) and could have been 
associated with the improvements that had been instigated since the Piper Alpha 
catastrophe of 1988. It would seem that if the chances (probability) of an accident occurring 
diminishes then the perception of risk would also diminish. Other work by Rundmo (1995, 
1996, and 2000) suggests that risk perception and related behaviours are associated with the 
attitudes towards safety and the safety climate although the causal path of interrelationships 
between them is unclear.  
 
Though the concept of risk is frequently reported within safety climate surveys 
(questionnaires) a clear definition for its meaning is not quite as easy to obtain; the term 
can include not only specific task related (often specialised) activities but those which 
include a more indefinite view of risk such as corporate or even business risks. Cox & 
Cheyne (2000) also found out that the way that workers view the risk associated with their 
activities, as well as their need to feel safe, as an effective measure within their safety 
climate assessments. 
 
6.11.3   Safety Arrangements. 
The term safety arrangements as used by Flin et al (2000) is a relatively extensive term 
used to encapsulate the tools and methods used by various organisations conducting a host 
of activities in many industries. The term was devised to include constituents such as (non-
exhaustively); 
 
• Management safety committees, 
• Site safety plans, 
• Emergency plans, 
• Crash exercise plans, 
• Safety management systems, 
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• Safety equipment / Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), 
• Health & safety representatives / managers/ advisors. 
 
It was found that the status of the safety advisor (or manager) and the safety committee 
affected the worker’s view of the safety climate (Zohar, 1980). We have already reviewed 
what role management plays in establishing and maintaining a positive safety culture and 
this is further corroborated by the work of Cooper (1998, p25, 175) where he suggests that 
the safety manager should reside within the organisation’s senior management team. Such 
an appointment clearly demonstrates to both internal and external parties that the company 
is wholly committed to a safe and proper operation. It should be noted that within the 
author’s own host organisation the role of safety, both in terms of general Health, Safety & 
Environment (HSE) as well as Trials Safety is represented at both divisional and corporate 
management boards. 
 
Safety committees in general are formed by management teams to ensure that the workers 
and managers meet to align the whole process of safety. Cooper (1998, p25, 205, 212) 
suggested that the creation and operation of such committees could be viewed as a measure 
of management’s commitment to communicating its safety policies to the workers. 
Additionally, the content of the related meetings indicate the flow and direction of safety 
related information between workers and management. It is broadly accepted within 
industry that those organisations with an effective safety committee are much more likely 
to take safety more seriously and to make improvements than organisations without. Such 
committees are often scored on their ability to influence and even promote safety within an 
organisation. Correlations have been identified between good safety attitudes within the 
workforce and the inclusion of safety topics within team briefings (Lee & Harrison, 2000). 
Reinforcing this view is the work of Rundmo et al (1998) where a link was established 
between poor worker management and the lack of interest exhibited by workers in safety 
related improvements; consequently it was suggested that poor management could lead to a 
reduction in safety standards. Cooper (1998, p25, 161, 191) also identified that whilst 
safety committees are predominantly measured upon their impact within an organisation by 
their ability to lever and/or support Health & Safety (in general terms) it is the time line 
afforded for implementation which is of greatest importance. The committee will be seen as 
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credible, productive and competent if its recommendations are executed promptly and 
advertised appropriately to the whole workforce. 
 
6.11.4   Work Pressure. 
The difference between work-related stress and pressure is often not clearly defined. All 
individuals experience pressure daily; it is a motivator and also, for the majority of 
individuals, a catalyst for high performance. It is when individuals experience high levels 
of pressure for extended periods of time without any opportunity for recovery that stress is 
experienced. The HSE defines stress as “the adverse reaction a person has to excessive 
pressure or other types of demand placed upon them” (HSE, 2004b). Flin et al (2000) 
considered the pace of work and its burden collectively as work pressure. Their work 
suggested that establishing an equipoise between the operational pressure to deliver a task 
and overall safety within the environment was important; this relationship was also 
identified as a key element of safety culture by the Advisory Committee on the Safety of 
Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) in their report of 1993 (HSE, 1993). Though the perceptions 
of offshore workers to their management’s commitment to safety were established as 
largely positive in a survey by Mearns et al (2001), it was found that the majority surveyed 
believed that production would not be stopped due to safety concerns if profit was at risk. 
In a similar survey of safety within the nuclear power industry (Lee & Harrison, 2000) it 
was highlighted that the workers perceived that management would put pressure upon 
production before safety. This primacy of production ahead of safety was perceived to be 
wholly driven by management and not by safety representatives or co-workers. 
 
Another important element of safety management is that of the work pressure exerted upon 
managers. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) established that excessive 
workloads applied to managers affected their proficiency to effectively manage and 
supervise safety. Such an impairment manifested itself operationally through an inability to 
conduct preventative and elementary safety management tasks such as investigating 
occurrences or the checking of logbooks (Dyer, 2000). 
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6.11.5   Competence. 
Competence is defined by the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) as “the 
ability to perform activities to the standards required in employment using an appropriate 
mix of knowledge, skill and attitude” (IET, 2008b). A further definition, albeit in holistic 
terms, is offered by Lindsay & Stuart (1997); “integrated sets of behaviour which can be 
directed towards successful goal achievement within contribution domains”. From the 
author’s experience of management and the application of competency frameworks within 
the T&E industry the term competency is predominantly used to encapsulate elements such 
as formal qualifications, subject matter knowledge and personal skill sets. 
 
One of the major weaknesses with competency measurement is that of a need for 
continuous appraisal to ensure that what is formally recorded accurately represents the 
individual’s extant level of competency and that all lapses, if any, are identified and 
managed accordingly. The NII’s report on Sellafield (Dyer, 2000) identified such failings 
within the site’s safety management regime. Their methodology for managing competency 
and training was seen to be defective in that records of competence were either out of date 
and/or were unclear on what the competencies were. Recommendations from the report 
included a need to apply a consistent, robust and effective method of managing staff to 
include human resource elements such as training, skills analysis and continuous 
competency assessment. 
 
Competence and ignorance were highlighted in the report into the broader issues 
surrounding the loss of the Nimrod aircraft XV230 (Haddon-Cave, 2009, p262) as a 
fundamental weakness in the ability of QinetiQ to fulfil its role in providing independent 
advice on the aircraft’s safety case. These issues, as well as heavy work pressures and high 
work loads, were was also raised against the MoD’s IPT and BAE Systems; this lacking of 
competence in BAES led to the initial identification of 1,300 ‘hazards’ and demonstrated a 
lack of competence and fundamental understanding of what was required of them within 
their role (Haddon-Cave, 2009, p270). 
 
Formal training in general health and safety can be very weak in some organisations though 
the author must state that it is extremely good in his host organisation. The ACSNI report 
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of 1993 raised comments regarding the lack of health and safety training within 
management training courses whilst there was a distinct absence of safety related 
information within the majority of business related texts. Pearson (1999) highlighted that 
only 7% of senior executives held a National Examination Board in Occupational Safety 
and Health (NEBOSH) Certificate and that only 4% held the Diploma. 
 
6.11.6   Procedures. 
Monitoring is not appropriate if suitable procedures are absent or cannot be devised. In a 
similar way, monitoring is not necessary where another method of evaluation is used that 
demonstrates that the control measures in place are adequately controlling exposure. 
Procedures must be written and reviewed by those who have both an understanding of the 
real practices conducted by those staff who will use them and of any safety related 
requirements demanded by the organisation. 
 
Once written, and used for a relatively short span of time, any newly-created procedures 
must be carefully reviewed and altered (evolved) to ensure that all sub-activities are 
effectively encapsulated and duly risk assessed. The opportunity for local equipment 
managers to discuss any changes required of any procedure should be seen as an important 
prerequisite for effective organisational safety management. 
 
6.12   The Existence Of Sub-Cultures Within Organisations. 
Many of the definitions and constituents of culture have been included previously in this 
chapter. Most of these definitions may be encompassed in a general statement of workers 
holding shared values, tenets and beliefs (even morals) regarding safety. Such a view 
appears logical and fits in with the majority of literature reviewed by the author. One of the 
main issues for larger organisations (the author’s host organisation is included here) is the 
management of sub-teams and their de-facto sub-cultures. The existence (and presence) of 
sub-cultures within larger organisations suggests that the business is not a fully holistic 
entity. The work of Pidgeon (1998) questioned if a culture change or culture management 
initiative could be designed for a large organisation without due cognisance to any sub-
cultures which may exist. Such sub-cultures will no doubt have their own hierarchical order 
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where relationships and interactions will differ both within the sub-team and across to other 
sub-teams.  
 
Mearns et al (1998), during their survey of offshore platforms, found evidence of safety 
sub-cultures operating with different perspectives and views of safety within the industry. 
Such sub-cultures manifested themselves through variations in age, work pattern, 
appointment and even rank. A further component which affected the creation of a safety 
culture was that of accident involvement; i.e. a greater diligence to safety was applied when 
a member of the sub-team had been involved in an accident. These findings were supported 
by further research into the roadways construction industry (Glendon & Litherland, 2001) 
where distinct differences were seen in the safety culture across relevant sub-teams. 
 
The lack of effective and continuous communication between the day and night shifts that 
led to the Piper Alpha incident, in spite of the presence of safety management systems (e.g. 
shift hand-over systems) (Mearns et al, 2001), was indicative of the presence of safety sub-
cultures and that they can, at times, lead to variances, incompatibilities and even conflicts. 
Collinson (1999) suggests, somewhat negatively, that sub-teams tend to assess safety from 
their own localised position rather than buying into the wider organisational perspective. 
From a different standpoint, Mearns et al (2001) suggest that these variations in risk 
perception should be aggregated to form a richer and deeper knowledge pool thereby 
offering wider boundaries to the identification, assessment and management of risk. For 
this type of approach to be successful the focus of management should be upon effective 
communications and conduits to enable the various safety sub-cultures to exchange views 
and any subsequent deliberations. Another catalyst for the creation of sub-cultures is the 
use of different terms of employment for workers within the same organisation. Collinson 
(1999) found that sub-contractors operating amongst the most dangerous and demanding 
tasks without paid leave (sick and/or holiday) became isolated from the owning company 
and its management system. Safety management was seen as something which was second 
in priority to continued production output; subsequently, and quite understandably, their 
accident record was greater than that of the owning company.  
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Research into the cultures operating within the nuclear power industry uncovered evidence 
of a dichotomy; the presence of a management safety culture in addition to a ‘worker’ 
safety culture. The former included technically competent staff whilst the latter included 
industrial staff (Harvey et al, 1999). Though they identified that the existence of two sub-
cultures could cause problems in areas such as communications or even actions they did not 
conclude that it was detrimental to the operation. It was suggested by them that through the 
use of effective communications the divisions between the two parties could be minimised.  
 
Though the extensive number of reports researched here offers information and views on 
the safety climate of an organisation they do not however identify any donations to the 
overall safety management offered by any sub-cultures. As well as the safety sub-cultures 
which may occur within the sub-teams of large organisations there would be instances 
where other sub-teams were created by the business during its daily operations. Such 
instances would occur when (for example) external agencies such as contractors were 
employed to conduct specific tasks. The author has experience of competing agendas 
within his own host organisation, typically when third party contractors were employed on 
civil or building works, where some (minor) safety requirements were breached in their 
hastiness to complete a time constrained task. Though initially reported as a sub-team 
(contractor management) failing, the incident would be investigated and corrective action 
applied if appropriate; but, it typifies the lack of distillation and cognisance that could be 
applied to gain a deeper understanding of safety sub-cultures (in general) within the larger 
organisation. Note that this example is typical of all major organisations and should not be 
read as a specific negative against the author’s host organisation. 
 
6.13   Effective Communications Within Organisations. 
The topic of communication, especially effective communication has been discussed both 
directly and indirectly in much of the previous text. Communication in its base form can be 
defined as (1) the act of imparting, especially news. (2) a means of connecting different 
places. (3) social intercourse. (4) the science and practice of transmitting information. (5) 
the means of transport between a base and the front (military). (6) a paper read to a 
learned society.(Oxford, 1995).  
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It was suggested earlier within this paper that the presence of an effective communications 
element within an organisation aligned well with the presence of a positive safety culture. 
The presence of effective communications allows for the sharing of ideas, views, concepts 
and in fact risk; safety is therefore deemed to be of importance to all employees and not the 
millstone strung upon one individual such as the HSE adviser. As these shared beliefs 
expand the level of mutual trust across the organization grows and with it a level of 
confidence in the mitigations which must be maintained for a safe working environment. 
The Health & Safety Executive have issued many papers and articles relating the 
importance of effective communication to a positive safety culture; HS(G) 48 (HSE, 1999) 
outlines how managers can communicate effectively with their employees in a number of 
ways. The three key methods are; 
 
• By the use of visible behaviour managers may communicate to employees the 
importance of health and safety within the work domain. This concept relies upon 
the sub-ordinate monitoring and adapting its behaviours to align with that of the 
supervisor. Management commitment to the safety ethos may be conveyed through 
participation in site safety inspections, attending safety meetings and by active 
participation in accident investigations. One caveat to be applied is that any 
management negativity can undermine the whole process of developing and/or 
sustaining a positive safety culture. 
• Through the use of written communication such as health and safety (corporate) 
policy statements, minutes of formal meetings, company performance, results of 
audits (internal & external) and notice board newsletters et al. This latter form of 
communication, though one-way, conveys the same information (and therefore, 
image) to all parts of the organization and is important in creating a single and 
aligned safety culture. It also acts as a catalyst for discussion and debate between 
workers and management. 
• Face to face meetings between workers and management which allow healthy 
discussions and therefore personal ownership of issues to be developed. From a 
human behaviour perspective such engagements allow the workers to feel as if they 
are personally contributing to the development of a safe working environment. Face 
to face meetings need not be solely confined to the ritual and formal site meeting 
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agendas but should be promoted within the more informal briefings as well as any 
site walk-around tours. By discussing safety in the periphery of other discussions it 
moves from being a bolt-on topic to being a  fully infused part of the daily 
operation; a tool to help and support daily operations rather than being viewed as a 
bug-bear or a limitation on any process. 
 
Communication (specifically the lack of it) was clearly identified as a weakness within the 
rail industry (Cullen, 2001) where its level and quality varied considerably. Lord Cullen 
emphasized that effective communication is paramount to maintaining a safe operation and 
that it involves all parties engaging in listening and discussion. The inquiry also identified 
that workers feel more valued, respected and demonstrate a belief within the host 
organisation when engaged in effective communication. 
 
6.14   Collecting, Measuring and Analysing Safety Related Information. 
Companies are strongly recommended to record and analyse their safety performance in 
order to either maintain or improve their operational health and safety performance. These 
recommendations are reiterated in the HSE’s publication, HS(G) 65 (HSE, 2000). The 
safety performance of an organisation may be measured and analysed by proactive, active 
or reactive methods. One concept in the application of a proactive approach is that of 
deploying lead indicators within the organisation which tries to forecast trends within an 
organisation’s safety performance. The active method relies upon the organisation actively 
putting in place facilities such as environmental monitoring, worker health surveillance & 
screening regimes, plant (equipment) inspections, site inspections and audits. The reactive 
approach is usually initiated by an occurrence or an incident (including a near miss) where 
the event is identified, reported, investigated and lessons learnt (if any) are realised. 
Typically within this type of approach to an occurrence, local boards of enquiry as well as 
independent and external review may form part of the overall investigation. Virtually any 
industry and any organisation has a host of both qualitative and quantitative tools available 
which may be used to measure and analyse its extant safety management system and/or its 
safety climate.  
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6.14.1   Qualitative Approach. 
Qualitative approaches try to identify and analyse elements of the safety management 
system which may have an effect upon the overall system risk (Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998). 
Though they often qualify the quality of a particular element of a safety system they will 
not give a numerical output of the predicted risk level within it. Despite such limitations the 
qualitative approach is very useful in understanding an organisation’s safety culture from a 
‘systems’ or ‘holistic’ perspective. By utilising assessors with a varied background and skill 
set a combined judgement may be offered of the organisation under scrutiny. The 
combinational effects of the various inputs (e.g. from questionnaires, interviews, audits, 
etc.) may be interpreted giving a ‘gestalt’ view of the organisation’s safety culture 
(Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998). One of the limitations of such an approach is that the 
indicators chosen (questions) need to be sufficiently accurate, realistic and comprehensive 
to include all of the issues which need to be analysed. Some of the tools used for qualitative 
appraisals include analysis frameworks such as Operant Supervisory Taxonomy Index 
(OSTI) and the Nuclear Organisation and Management Analysis Concept (NOMAC). Other 
methods include audit tools such as the International Safety Rating System (ISRS); the 
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT); the Complete Health and Safety 
Evaluation (CHASE); the Five Star System (FSS); the Professional Rating of Implemented 
Safety Management (PRISM) and the Assessment of Safety Culture in Organisations Team 
(ASCOT) (Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998). 
 
6.14.2   Quantitative Approach. 
Quantitative approaches to assessing a safety management system are generally based upon 
the use of Quantified Risk Assessments (QRA) or Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA). 
QRA uses numerical data from inventories of equipment and/or sub-components to make 
an overall quantitative assessment of the overall system under analysis; such an approach is 
predominantly (but not exclusively) used in the process industry. The tools used for 
assessing a safety management system within the QRA approach include MANagement 
Assessment Guidelines in the Evaluation of Risk (MANAGER) and the Process RIsk 
Management Audit (PRIMA). 
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The PSA approach has been developed from the high risk industries such nuclear energy 
plants where the need arose for a more holistic approach to risk management; it assesses the 
risk offered from virtually all types of failure including human, hardware, software and 
even the environment (Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998). PSA involves modelling the 
relationships and events (failures, interactions, etc.) within a system and determining 
quantitatively what the likelihood and consequences would be if an incident actually 
occurred. One of the more well known tools for a PSA approach is that of Work Process 
Analysis Modelling (WPAM).  
 
For large and complex systems, quantitative analysis commences with the smaller sub-
systems and is numerically ‘aggregated’ with other sub-systems to form an overall 
quantitative system risk. This final risk figure can then be compared with any regulatory or 
legal requirement that the organisation must comply with; for example the risk of a weapon 
excursing the boundary of a Test & Evaluation (T&E) Range facility must be lower than 
one event in one million (1:10-6) (MoD, 2004). 
 
In conclusion, it is accepted that the PSA approach allows the safety management process 
to be effectively modelled and therefore enables the failure events to be effectively traced 
from source to (possible) consequence. This approach is deemed appropriate not only in 
determining failure paths and causal chains but in the uncovering of failure combinations 
though some of the assumptions and extrapolations that may be required from information 
gained through audits and/or questionnaires may be quite large (Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998). 
Succinctly, PSA requires that the possible causes and failure mechanisms are specifically 
and comprehensively modelled whilst QRA requires either no modelling or a much lesser 
degree of modelling. Whilst the level of detail and depth applied to the modelling can seem 
onerous, the usefulness of such an explicit approach not only determines the level of risk 
but can form a useful guide in its reduction post initial identification and assessment. 
 
6.15   Incidents And Near Misses. 
In researching this paper the author found it difficult to identify and qualify the safety 
climate results which are discussed in the various sources; this is due predominantly to the 
fact that safety behaviour relies upon self-reporting regimes. As in the author’s host 
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company, the majority of information gleaned from near misses and actual occurrences 
comes from the ‘coal-face’ worker; this in itself subjects it to local interpretation and/or 
filtration before it is entered on the management’s recording system. Actual incidents 
(relatively small) may be interpreted by workers as ‘mishaps’ or just ‘mistakes’ and may 
often be hidden or misreported to the organisation. Though isolated and local in nature (e.g. 
chemical spills, trip or fall) they may form part of a series of indicators of a much larger 
health and safety problem. Cooper (2000) suggests that one of the fundamental weaknesses 
with the self-reporting regime employed is that it is subject to “social desirability biases” 
where the workers feel compelled to behave as they should rather than as they actually 
would. Therefore it follows logically that measuring worker’s beliefs and convictions may 
not predict how they would actually behave. 
 
By investigating near misses an organisation gets access to both a good measure of extant 
health and safety performance as well as opportunities for learning from mistakes. Though 
very useful, applying diligence to near miss reporting usually occurs in only a few 
industries, predominantly those with the potential for major incidents and relatively large 
catastrophic consequences. Examples include the airline industry, the offshore (oil & gas) 
industries, the nuclear industry and aerospace (e.g. munitions & military aircraft 
operations). These industries have a well-founded and mature ‘no-blame’ culture in which 
reporting is acceptable to all. 
 
Near miss reporting requires organisations to investigate occurrences which may have 
possibly led to an incident in order to try to minimise the chances of a similar occurrence 
and/or a more serious consequence from happening in the future. Pidgeon (1998) highlights 
how the monitoring of near misses is used to promote and engender safety management 
improvements within industries such as aviation. A key environmental component in the 
creation of a safety conscious culture and the reporting of near misses is that of a ‘no-blame 
culture’. Various published papers discuss a ‘no-blame culture’ and whilst the theory is 
very acceptable and simplistic its application in the real world, especially within the more 
safety critical industries, brings with it some problems. Pidgeon (1998) suggests that the 
prime problem is that of the “dilemma of blame” where immediately after a serious incident 
there is a craving to not only understand what happened but also to identify an individual to 
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blame. This need to establish blame should not be dismissed without some further thought. 
From a positive perspective the presence of blame ensures that individuals with 
responsibilities within an organisation’s safety management system must also carry the 
mantle of accountability; a burden that many managers find difficult to own when incidents 
occur. The greatest drawback from this approach is that individuals will tend to hide many 
safety related issues; a culture of blame evasion may develop which leads to a downward 
spiral. Pidgeon (1998) goes on to suggest that a ‘no-blame’ organisational culture is not the 
solution and that the issues should be sub-divided into “culpable” (“deserving blame”, 
Oxford, (1995)) and “tolerable” (“able to be endured”, Oxford, (1995)) errors.  
 
The performance and behaviour of most organisations is largely measured against the 
results offered by accident and/or near miss reporting. Such metrics are termed as lag 
indicators of safety performance. The output of a report carried out on a wood processing 
company in Finland (Varonen & Mattila, 2000) identified that there were two dominant 
elements which correlated its accident statistics with its overall safety climate. Specifically 
these were (a) the level of training executed, and (b) the level of good ‘housekeeping’ 
demonstrated throughout the organisation. A higher score in safety climate aligned with an 
overall reduction in the accident rate. It should also be stated that safety improved when 
senior management demonstrated a positive attitude to safety and when the work 
environment was clean and uncluttered.  Despite such findings it is suggested that the use 
of accident information for safety performance measurement is fraught with problems 
(Cooper, 2000). Such information does not take cognisance of the different risk exposure 
levels across the various operating environments; is often subjected to local interpretations 
on seriousness and/or magnitude; and ultimately different organisations (and sub-teams) 
may not report each and every occurrence. Another issue with that of using such 
information to measure the safety climate is that of the inherent timelines involved between 
the occurrence, the investigation and the feeding back of data to the management team. The 
information dataset is very much a lagging indicator and as such should be viewed as a 
measure of consequences rather than that of risk. Cooper (2000) suggests that a reduction in 
reported accidents may be due to a change in metric or a change in the business elsewhere 
rather than as a direct result of an organisation’s safety culture; for example, some incidents 
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may not be reported as it may impact upon an individual’s (or team’s) financial bonus 
payments.  
 
The monitoring of safety behaviour has been used in many organisations as a metric to 
identify or support overall safety performance; predominantly this focuses upon the random 
sampling of how workers go about some of their everyday tasks. Examples may include 
using independent and trained auditors to judge lifting techniques, the use of appropriate 
(and safe) practices or even disposal of hazardous waste. Cox & Cheyne (2000) used this 
type of behavioural evaluation and combined it with both employee attitude assessments 
and interviews to create their ‘Safety Assessment Toolkit’. The report suggested that minor 
incidents and near misses may be identified through directly monitoring worker actions. 
These observations can then be tabulated to form a ‘checklist’ whereby the behaviour (and 
consequential actions) can be correlated against a particular form of accident avoidance. 
Cox & Cheyne (2000) further state that these behavioural elements may be used as 
indicators to help support the creation of a more holistic model of an organisation’s 
predominant safety climate. This theory has some virtue but does not identify any empirical 
evidence between an organisation’s safety climate and its employee’s safety behaviours. In 
their research of the offshore industry, Mearns et al (2001) examined the relationship 
between worker’s perceptions of risk, their behaviours and their attitudes across two years 
of data. They concluded that there was a great amount of correlation between what the 
worker thought of the management team’s commitment to safety and the worker’s consent 
to self-report any occurrences. It was also observed that the worker’s perception of a 
manager’s competence level within his field was important. 
 
6.16   Developments Within The Behavioural Aspects Of Safety Management. 
Some organisations, in an effort to modify safety behaviours, have introduced a rewards 
based initiative where rewards are given for reductions in the number of accidents that 
occur within the organisation. Whilst well intended such an approach can often lead to the 
misreporting or none reporting of incidents which may lead to a false sense of security. 
Cooper (1998, p35, 112, 183) suggests that a complete lack of information on accidents and 
incidents, especially near misses, is a prime indicator of poor organisational culture. Other 
approaches which actively encourage the reporting of safe organisational behaviour such as 
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near misses, safety problems and possible improvements are deemed to be more effective 
and appropriate. 
 
Behavioural based safety involves identifying, through direct observation, behaviours 
which are deemed to be safe and those which are not. Such an approach usually involves 
training of workers and/or the use of specialised observers to help create a baseline model 
for the extant organisation. By creating work teams, identifying targets and giving 
management encouragement, the workers focus upon raising the safety level of the 
environment above and beyond the baseline. 
 
The use of behaviour based safety, though a useful tool to use within an organisation, is 
limited and can put the onus of safety behaviour completely upon the worker. During such 
occurrences management’s level of ownership for the organisation’s safety culture may be 
eroded somewhat. Atkinson (2000) suggests that although the worker has been trained in 
safe behaviours, (e.g. to call the engineer to unblock a mechanical machine), the safety 
culture of the organisation may still give primacy to production thereby pressurising the 
individual to quickly unblock the machine themselves. 
 
6.17   Summary. 
Culture may be viewed as a notion which describes the collective values and opinions 
within an organisation; it is that which models and shapes the behaviours and attitudes of 
those individuals within it. The safety culture of an organisation is a component part of the 
overall organisational culture and may be viewed as an influencer in terms of the 
organisation’s beliefs and behaviours towards safety related activities (Cooper, 2000). 
Though Flin et al, (2000) have tried to differentiate and clarify the differences between 
safety culture and safety climate, it remains very difficult to maintain the dichotomy when 
dealing with the reality of every day issues. It is due to this prime reason that the terms 
safety culture and safety climate are often swapped erroneously. 
 
The research reviewed suggested that the worker’s perceptions of management’s attitude 
and conduct towards safety, operational planning and output was the most convenient 
method for measuring an organisation’s safety climate. The research also suggested that 
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different levels of management within an organisation impacted upon the workers’ 
perception of health and safety markedly; levels and type of communication as well as 
fairness in dealing with occurrences were important. 
 
HS(G)65 (HSE, 2000) strongly advises that safety advisors within organisations should 
have sufficiently high enough status, training and relevant competencies to both advise 
management and to engender the correct attitudes within the workforce. Cooper (1998, 
p175, 205, 210) suggested that the overall status of safety advisors was perceived by the 
workforce as a reflection of management’s devotion and buy-in to safer activities. If 
principal managers (predominantly senior executives) cannot perceive the importance of 
effective health and safety management then the safety advisors will not be appointed at 
any appropriate (and useful) level within the organisation. Safety committees are heavily 
reliant on senior management attendance and support to be effective; if managers view 
safety forums with disdain then worker attendance will dwindle and any outputs will be 
diluted and weak. Change management may suffer as a consequence. 
 
Performance measurement is deemed to be important in so far that it allows the extant 
safety environment to be measured and used as a reference; as new initiatives are rolled out 
across the organisation then further data may be recorded to understand the effects, both 
positively and negatively. Performance may be measured using near miss reports, post 
accident data, behavioural methods, independent audits and even through self report 
questionnaires. 
 
The use of bonus schemes to improve production output and/or to compensate for 
hazardous operations may lead to the development of unsafe practices through pressurising 
workers to work quicker, inducing risk taking and even not reporting accidents. The use of 
any bonus scheme must be carefully considered and rationalised against possible changes 
in worker behaviours before being implemented.  
 
Whilst site safety audits and inspections may be used usefully and effectively to measure an 
organisation’s safety environment they must be carefully administered and not confused 
with each other. It is suggested that effective audits should be conducted by suitably 
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competent, trained and independent individuals and/or teams. Again, it must be stressed 
that management commitment to the process is fundamental to an effective audit. By 
demonstrating support through the availability of time, resources and participation 
managers will communicate and engender the correct image to developing a more positive 
and healthy safety culture. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A ‘Systems’ Approach To Safety Cases 
 
7.1   Introduction. 
The preceding chapter on safety culture identifies how organisations seek to construct 
defences to minimise the opportunity of human error creeping into their activities. One of 
tools used to monitor and feedback the ‘climate’ of safety attitude embedded within the 
organisation is that of the use of a questionnaire which is duly completed by the staff. By 
the use of established industry criteria and definitions the responses to these questions are 
presumed to allow a measurement to be made of the organisation’s prevailing safety 
culture. 
 
We currently live in a very highly technological era where most of our daily lives are 
controlled or influenced by high technology applications. Farmers gather crop yield data 
whilst harvesting which is loaded into a real-time processor aboard the harvester; the yield 
figures are also correlated with map co-ordinates fed from the on-board Global Positioning 
System (GPS) so that fertiliser and seed dispersal may be similarly controlled the following 
year to optimise returns. The same harvesting machine advises the local main dealer of its 
servicing and maintenance requirements via a satellite link; the farmer receives a telephone 
text and/or e-mail message to advise of the arrival of the engineer on site. The same 
satellite link will completely disable the harvester, when appropriately advised by the 
supplier, if hire purchase payments are defaulted; control of such activities are often 
executed from other countries and/or other continents. 
 
Despite our current tendencies to over complicate our lives the fact remains that this was 
not always the case. Since we started to operate in higher risk environments, such as 
commercial explosive manufacture, and started using machinery to optimise outputs in 
other industries, many lives have been saved and/or made safer by the timely application of 
just plain, simplistic and often inspired technical arrangements. Examples which quickly 
spring to mind include Samuel Plimsoll’s marking on the side of a ship to show its legal 
limit of submersion when loaded with cargo under various sea conditions. Mining in 
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general has been a greater beneficiary of risk mitigation due to its inherent dangers and 
lengthier history when compared with most other industries; mining for coal, ore, precious 
gems and building material range back to many centuries. The introduction of the miner’s 
safety lamp and alternative routes for egress (The Hartley Colliery disaster, chapter four) 
are just two further examples of how similar incidents were averted by applying some quite 
simple and basic precautions. 
 
Western society has done a huge amount over the past century to deal with some of the 
most obvious roots of accident causation; as far back as 1802 the welfare of children 
working in the textile industry was seen to be in need of a form of control (Factory Act, 
Health and Morals of Apprentices Act). Clearly it can be deduced that the most obvious  
and largest causes of risk are primarily seen and dealt with the quickest whilst those which 
are less obvious and do not carry high consequences take longer to become conspicuous 
and to be dealt with. What is apparent in today’s society, as a function of the 
aforementioned progressive approach, is that causations will become less obvious and 
mitigations or controls will become more complex and involve a multitude of components, 
often from disparate areas. Such an evolution therefore suggests that a somewhat different 
and probably discerning method is required to effectively decompose, understand and 
manage the risks embedded within today’s activities. When combined with the 
technologically varied, multi-disciplined and very complex systems operated within today’s 
society the need for such a different approach to risk management is again magnified.  
 
From a financial perspective, as the progressive approach to removing risks is applied, one 
can quickly identify how the risk mitigation returns get progressively smaller as the cost of 
any application rises. In real terms, as society gets safer and the level of accidents and 
fatalities subsides then the cost of providing a subsequent and higher degree of safety 
increases. Whilst another host of papers could be written for and against the morals of such 
an argument the reality is that we are probably approaching a point whereby the cost of the 
next safety mitigation may be too expensive to apply. The author would suggest that the 
practical implementation of the ALARP concept as applied by the H&SE may need to be 
re-visited in due course, especially in relation to what financial figure may be applied to 
avoid a fatality. It may be prudent to consider augmenting the ALARP principle by 
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assessing the overall net safety gain (or loss) after applying any mitigation whatever its 
financial cost. 
 
Whilst the progressive approach to applying safety mitigation trundles forward many 
organisations are collecting a large amount of information relating to fields such as ‘near 
misses’, ‘incidents’, ‘fatalities’ and ‘safety culture’ to name but a few. Though such 
activities demonstrate a good proactive approach to safety management and the application 
of due diligence, the author, from his own experiences within his host organisation, 
suggests that the information gathered is not optimally used. A variety of regulatory, 
corporate, divisional and local forms and databases are used everyday in various 
organisations in various industries to record virtually everything pertaining to some event 
or other. How many true and meaningful lessons are learnt from these records? The author 
would suggest that the majority of information recorded is left in the archive until it is 
discarded in a number of years due to the need to ‘move on’ or to ‘streamline the 
company’. Any output gleaned from any such report predominantly manifests itself as a 
series of small internal recommendations, or at times, a knee-jerk reaction to an incident 
which had an increased profile within the organisation. Quite often the recommendations 
do not identify or address the real underlying causal factors which may have been hidden 
by complicated structures such as internal political ‘wars’, organisational pressures or 
socio-technical issues, implanted, surreptitiously, many years ago. From experience, the 
author would suggest that the degree of focus and energy applied to the reporting of an 
incident within his own organisation is often determined by the perception and personal 
judgements of those managers directly involved in managing the area of incident. 
Consequently the delineation of what is reported as a near-miss, or an incident, is biased to 
a degree by subjective decision making; in a similar manner, the degree of investigation is 
also driven by subjectivism. Of note is the fact that many of the ‘lessons learnt’ which are 
published by organisations are not identified because of their clear and strong importance 
but as a direct function of the fact that the incident had been treated more importantly and 
that more time and energy had been given to exploring the causations. The author suggests 
that in a similar manner many large accidents may appear much more complicated than a 
‘near miss’ whilst in reality the latter may have been equal or greater in complexity, but due 
to the lower level of scrutiny applied it is deemed to be less complex. 
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Of concern to the author and key to this thesis is the systematic refusal by many managers, 
including safety managers, to actually recognise the information gathered in reports, 
statements, interviews and recording media, in support of incident reviews and 
investigations. Such information is generally regarded as being too subjective though it 
probably contains many hidden truths which could enable a better judgement to be made 
and therefore better identify the true causal routes of an incident. The author strongly 
believes that this subjective information is key to learning about the truth behind an 
incident; currently the trend within organisations is to avoid subjective information and 
focus predominantly upon collecting objective data sets. In simple terms we need to 
understand not only what has been said (or written) but also how it was said (or written).  
 
The aforementioned is probably exaggerated by an organisation’s operating ethos. 
Managers, and supervisors to some degree, rely very much upon being fed ‘objective’ and 
somewhat ‘filtered’ data sets within reports which have been created in accordance with 
local business requirements; collected data is usually rather succinct due to the limitations 
of the fields within the corporate form combined with the time pressures to sentence 
causation and move on to the next task. 
 
7.2   Integrated Air Range Safety Case. 
Quite clearly the high level safety case for the integrated Air Range project discussed in 
chapter five is wholly focussed towards providing the regulators of safety (both internal and 
external to the organisation) with a quantitative figure of risk. Whilst each of the T&E 
safety engineers involved with the preliminary safety assessment had in excess of 20 years 
of experience within the industry their well honed, wide-ranging and qualitative skills were 
not effectively utilised.  
 
The whole experience of creating a preliminary safety argument was governed by the 
constraint of an established quantitative approach in the guise of a Range Safety Case.   
Though a qualitative and somewhat subjective approach was allowed to occur in the 
creation of a HAZOP analysis; this was probably the only real identifiable occasion for 
using a qualitative approach. Whilst the HAZOP analysis allows some degree of freedom 
of thought, the exercise, as with others that the author has been involved with, becomes 
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very quickly focussed and reliant upon the HAZOP codeword cues. One of the dangers 
with the code words, especially when they are applied repetitively to one activity after 
another is that the thought process driving the objectivity becomes ‘flavoured’ or ‘skewed’ 
by a former activity which was discussed at length. In simplistic terms, if one of the earlier 
activities which were ‘HAZOP-ed’ led to a somewhat specialised discussion (possibly 
leading down a ‘rabbit hole’) then there is a danger that any subsequent analysis of other 
activities may be similarly affected. Linked to this issue with the use of HAZOP codewords 
is the underlying reliance upon the codeword list as the ‘holy grail’ of catalysts for hazard 
identification, discussion and sentencing. 
 
One of the impediments of using a HAZOP approach is that of the limitations of the panel 
of assembled engineers. To allow a reasonable degree of hazard scrutiny to occur during 
the exercise there is a need to have both a relatively large number of engineers and experts 
present in relation to the size of task and the team must also encompass many disciplines. 
From the author’s experience it is suggested that some of the disciplines which need to be 
employed for an effective hazard analysis may seem peripheral or even obscure to the 
project team. The value of non-specialists must not be ignored; the opportunity to ask 
simplistic and ‘dumb’ questions often leads to an enlightenment, especially when dealing 
with large and complex systems. At first sight an engineering project may seem relatively 
straightforward and to the un-initiated may demand the attention of a project team 
consisting of hardware and software specialists; upon further investigation there may, for 
example, be a need for a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) specialist, an ergonomics 
specialist, a psychologist, a thermodynamicist or even a ballistician to be present for the 
decomposition and analysis of hazards. This type of approach is acceptable and realisable 
both in time and cost terms for relatively large projects but has severe limitations for 
projects which are relatively small or cost sensitive. 
 
As stated earlier, the creation of the preliminary safety argument was completely driven by 
the need to ultimately identify both systems and sub-systems which could be assigned a 
quantitative figure of risk and which ultimately would support the extant safety cases of the 
two sites. The extant site safety cases are underpinned by hazard logs which were populated 
through the use of similar HAZOP exercises complemented by periodical peer review by 
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Range Subject Matter Experts (SME). The quantitative aspects of the site safety cases are 
analysed using Boolean algebra and displayed using fault tree analysis; such an approach 
displays a logical sequence of events leading progressively to an overall quantitative figure 
of risk for both the sub-systems and the complete system under scrutiny. What is certainly 
prevalent within the author’s environment is the focus upon achieving or calculating a risk 
figure which is acceptable to the corporate model of risk management; as reviewed within 
chapter four the acceptability of risk within the organisation is driven by the HSE’s risk 
tolerability model. Calculations to support the quantitative (FTA) models at the sites are 
almost wholly focussed on the engineering and functional failures of components and sub-
systems; the only qualitative aspects which are taken into account are the subjective use of 
historical data on archaic systems to develop ‘proven by usage’ arguments and/or to assign 
simplistic and generalist human error figures for equipment operators. Very little attention 
is paid to the competency and skills element of any operator despite the presence of robust 
real-time monitoring and multiple peer reviewing of actions combined with a good incident 
reporting system. Discussions with the Aberporth Trial Safety Manager (TSM) during 2009 
suggest that the inherent engineering systems and processes employed at the site give the 
required level of risk mitigation; there is little need to analyse the more subjective and 
qualitative aspects of the system. This suggests to the author that a degree of valid 
qualitative data may be being ignored systematically within some large organisations. 
 
Whilst quantitative data has been selected as a prime source historically to best argue the 
risks and consequences of safety related activities the author suggests that much important 
information relating to context and perspective may have been filtered or even disposed of 
through ignoring the qualitative data. It may be argued that those individuals who are 
tasked with managing and/or reviewing safety arguments should use all of the available, 
relevant, dependable and authentic data in the quest for an optimal safe solution. 
 
7.3   A Subjective View of Safety. 
From experience and from communications with other safety managers, the author offers 
the view that the extant safety management regime, certainly within the T&E environment, 
is predominantly focussed on objectivity and a quantitative approach. Notwithstanding this 
last statement the author suggests that there is more to be learnt from the subjective and 
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contextual information which surrounds any incident. This thought strongly supports the 
work of Davies et al (2003, p16) who state that; “the whole area of risk and safety is 
grounded in individual differences and subjectivity; that such subjectivity is a useful source 
of information;…”. 
 
Whilst subjective and qualitative data may be rich in explanatory and contextual terms its 
manipulation and measurement is very difficult to manage. Questions arise as to what 
metrics may be used to indicate the importance or strength of a certain key item of 
information whilst another may be related to how we ensure that one individual’s 
perception of importance or insignificance aligns broadly with another? Whilst it may 
sound difficult to answer these questions there are methods available which may be used to 
help identify an aligned approach. It has already been stated that quite often a simple and 
relatively cheap human factors application will minimise risk before the need arises to 
devise and employ a complicated and expensive technical solution. One of the basic and 
earliest pieces of advice that the author was taught during his formative years in T&E 
safety was to ensure that any weapon was pointing in the right direction, i.e. in a safe 
direction, and that all personnel and equipment were located behind a large lump of 
reinforced concrete! Risk mitigation at its cheapest and simplest state. 
 
Wilde (1994) reviewed a number of studies of car drivers which provides supporting 
evidence to the aforementioned. His conclusions included the observation that an increase 
in future public safety would unlikely be found in a ‘technological fix’ due to the way that 
people respond to such ‘fixes’. Alternatively he suggests that the future of increased safety 
lies within the human being rather than within the machine or environment created by the 
human. Whilst some aspects of this approach seem rather absurd (clearly there is a desire 
and a need for some technological fixes) Wilde does recognise that the human interfaces 
and aspects of safety are quite often ignored in instances where there is a clear opportunity 
to use a simplistic and cheap approach. This approach, if directed at the human component, 
may deliver a relatively better solution than an alternative which demands complex 
technology and probably more expense. In conclusion, there is a need to develop a method 
of recording, measuring and acting upon people’s free text and speech so that safety 
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managers may enhance their own abilities to better understand the foundational problems 
often encountered in wide reaching and often complicated systems. 
 
Risk and people’s individual perceptions of risk have already been discussed in previous 
chapters and is known to be varied and a function of local attitudes, beliefs and even social 
cultures. These variances in risk perception, including what they perceive as being 
personally important or not, when combined would provide the safety community with a 
much greater degree of understanding to allow the management of risk to be taken in new 
directions. 
 
7.4   Quantitative and Qualitative Safety. 
The majority, if not all of the methods identified for managing risk seem to be based upon 
the same theoretical approaches and appear to be commonly driven by a deterministic view 
of life; the author is conscious that he has little experience of safety management processes 
outside of the Western world and therefore caveats the aforementioned statement. With this 
in mind the author would certainly advocate future studies to research how safety is 
managed, even in general and less formal environments, outside the developed Western 
world. There may be opportunities to learn how other cultures view and value subjectivity. 
 
Whilst the application of common sense relates well to the aforementioned observation to 
apply simple and cheap control measures before any expensive and complicated 
technological ‘fix’ there is a need to create or to adapt a new approach to handling and 
processing qualitative and subjective information. Davies, et al (2003, p18) identify this as 
a problem area and raise the issue of; 
 
“the lack of rigorous methodology for dealing with ‘subjective’ reports concerning 
accidents, their causes and their consequences, where the choice appears to be between, on 
the one hand, a loose and undisciplined qualitative approach, in which extracts from 
reports are selected apparently whimsically by a third person as being particularly salient 
on the basis of criteria which remain unspecified and unknown, and on the other an 
approach which seeks to demonstrate its ‘scientific rigour’ by simply refusing to accept 
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that such subjective reports might constitute useful data in any form, or even be amenable 
to principled and replicable analysis.” 
 
Modern science itself is caught up somewhat in differing paradigms of determinism, 
probability and even a half way house such as chaos theory; the latter being based upon a 
deterministic approach but never having sufficient information at hand to qualify or 
accurately forecast the output of a non-linear system (Crystal, 1990, p240). What is 
common though to all of these paradigms is the human element; it is the human who either 
observes, investigates or postulates a theory. Surely in light of such a common denominator 
in virtually all that underpins our quantitative and objective lives we should pay more 
attention to its interference, both constructively and destructively. Whilst the delineation 
between what is subjective or objective seems very distinct the determinant as to which 
side of the fence that it falls into is so ludicrously fickle that it approaches absurdity; if an 
observation such as a broken fence at a school playground is reported to a head teacher the 
fact that it has been reported by another party immediately sentences it to be classified as 
‘subjective’. If it had been observed first hand by the head teacher then it is classified as an 
‘objective’ and real fact. By simply having the observation reported by another individual 
the fact is ‘downgraded’ as if it may be inaccurate, biased or even fabricated; and all of 
these presumptions may be applied despite the fact that the observation was reported by the 
deputy head teacher for the school! Verifying that there is in fact a broken fence can only 
really be done by going along and observing the fact for oneself; but surely we cannot 
demand this approach for all observations and issues raised by other parties or we would 
very quickly undermine one of the prime tenets of civilised society, trust. Additionally, we 
just wouldn’t have the resources available to review every observation in person.  
 
From a safety management perspective the safety manager and/or engineer relies upon third 
party reports, statements, interviews and even technical publications, often written many 
years ago, to create, understand and even make recommendations in support of risk 
management. From the author’s experiences, organisations take time and incur relatively 
large costs to both train staff to report safety incidents and to put in place a system of 
reporting them including data bases, websites and forms; yet those organisations are not 
very well equipped to manage and interpret the gathered data. Within large organisations, 
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which are very hierarchical in composition, the author suggests that a great deal of 
important information may be lost during translation from tier to tier; this observation may 
also be not unique to safety management. 
 
Safety reporting is motivated by individuals who want something to change or to inform 
the organisation that something nearly ‘caught us/me out’; this therefore suggests that there 
are morals and passion contained within the reporting event. Whilst some individuals will 
write a better or worse report the fact remains that there is a degree of subjectivity to the 
recorded data. The majority of the safety information recorded is from other people’s 
reports and reported probably with varying levels of subjectivity and selectivity and also 
from personal perspectives of varying understanding, skills and interpretations. Despite the 
vagaries of such reporting the value of what is contained within the reports remains 
important; not only to the recipient (i.e. the organisation) but also to the originator of the 
report. 
 
A great amount of work has been carried out in the field of interpreting free text 
information to create a more clearly bounded objective model from such qualitative data. 
Whilst the Newtonian perspective of determinism relies on a model of an universe which is 
populated with many objective and ordered facts, more recent work by Groenweg (1996) 
and Carver & Scheier (1998), who have looked at applying theories such as chaos and/or 
catastrophe theory to the study of human behaviour, suggest that the ultimate truth (of the 
universe) may either be a delusion, be based upon misconceptions or deterministic in 
principle but pragmatically unknowable (Davies et al, 2003, p22). Of note though, is that 
relativity, quantum mechanics and chaos theory are all dependent on the human as the 
‘observer’ of what is uncovered. The human, and the techniques used, are all considered as 
an integral part of the system under scrutiny and are considered as having a direct influence 
upon the observation. On the other hand, the Newtonian deterministic perspective considers 
the human as independent of those elements which are being observed.  
 
The author suggests that the whole process of collecting and analysing safety information 
in support of a safety argument should not be considered as a pure and formal scientific 
activity; it is suggested that the extant methodologies of obtaining objective information, 
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often clinically and quantitatively, for dissection by quantitative and objective experts 
should be reconsidered and replaced, to some extent, by a more subjective and 
‘wholesome’ approach. It is suggested by the author that a higher degree of ‘good’ safety 
information, leading to a more complete understanding of a system under scrutiny, may be 
assembled if the assessment involved more social and qualitative processes to understand 
the underlying beliefs, culture and opinions. From experience, the author has observed how 
a relatively large, professionally assembled safety case, supported by a team of well trained 
and experienced engineers, has failed operationally due to an eventual breakdown in the 
‘soft’ (human/culture) aspects of its construct. 
 
7.5   Applying Qualitative Data. 
This chapter has proposed and recommended that qualitative data, predominantly in the 
form of free text, should be used more to support safety arguments. The underpinning 
argument for this approach is that it befalls upon safety managers to learn the truth about a 
safety incident; correspondingly the safety manager should ensure that as much information 
as possible is made available to him/her of a proposed safety related activity so that a more 
systematic, insightful and ‘truthful’ safety decision may be made ahead of the activity. 
 
Having established the constructive need to use qualitative data there is a requirement to 
understand how the qualitative information may be combined with the quantitative in a 
unified and coherent manner and ultimately create a synergistic output. By reviewing 
qualitative and subjective information along with the more well defined quantitative 
components the concept of true systems engineering is naturally approached. 
 
7.5.1   Triangulation. 
Triangulation is a term which was first used by Campbell and Fiske (1959) for describing 
elements of their work on psychological testing; specifically theoretical frameworks. The 
predominant method of triangulation used by safety managers for combining qualitative 
and quantitative data to create a more ‘rounded’ and ‘complete’ picture of an activity is that 
of complementary triangulation. Such an approach, often carried out unconsciously by 
managers, relies upon treating the qualitative and quantitative components of a safety 
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argument as predominantly separate and individual entities; they are then combined to 
provide a final output. Another form of triangulation which is advocated by many is that of 
validatory triangulation. For the provision of context and additional support to the 
qualitative importance of safety information within safety arguments they are both 
discussed below. 
 
7.5.1.1 Complementary Triangulation. 
Complementary triangulation emerges from the belief that qualitative information, often 
from interviews are ‘just things people tell us’, while ‘official’ statistics, as an example, are 
‘objectively true’ (Davies et al, 2003, p71). Such an approach suggests that one source of 
information cannot be used to test or validate the other due to the consideration that they  
do not measure the same observation or object.  
 
The complementary approach considers the use of qualitative information as providing 
additional information to both augment and test (challenge) the quantitative data which has 
been gathered. Supporters of the complementary approach denigrate any views that 
information sourced from qualitative and quantitative means may be consolidated and 
merged into a common entity. Fielding and Fielding (1986) claim that any merging hinges 
upon the false supposition that there is a common and valid theory between the information 
sources. One of the key observable issues with the complementary approach is the primacy 
given to quantitative data ahead of any qualitative data without any real strong and clear 
arguments. 
 
The testing of a theory to demonstrate its validity is fundamental to its acceptance as a 
scientific principle or not. Any scientific theory must be capable of making predictions and 
such predictions being possible to be falsified. Theories that cannot produce predictions 
which are falsifiable may be valuable but cannot be described as scientific. It therefore also 
follows that no scientific theory can be shown to be true. Karl Popper introduced the 
concept of falsification to indicate his rejection of classical empiricism and the classical 
observationalist account of science which had evolved from it (Popper, 1963). Popper 
suggested that scientific theory, and human knowledge in general terms, is based 
predominantly upon conjecture and hypotheses, which have been generated by creative 
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imagination solely for the purpose of problem solving in specific environments. He 
postulated that no number of positive outcomes to challenges in experimental testing could 
confirm a scientific theory though a single counter-example may be accepted as a logical 
and decisive event of confirmation. Popper’s description of the logical asymmetry between 
verification and falsifiability is core to his philosophy of science. His belief in this idea 
inspired him to apply falsifiability as a base criteria for identifying what is genuinely 
scientific and what is pseudo-scientific (Popper, 1963). A typical real world example, and 
application of the aforementioned (as pointed out by the author’s supervisor), concerns the 
dynamics of a rugby ball and the application of Newtonian mechanics. When we deal with 
very small items then quantum mechanics must be applied; and when the items are very 
fast and very large then special relativity must be applied. Neither of the two need be 
applied to the rugby ball. 
 
The reluctance to test and challenge theory is a weakness of many humans, including 
scientists. This weakness is both recorded and accepted by many institutions including the 
judicial system of England and Wales. A current Law Commission consultation paper 
(Emson, 2009) describes the process, and need, to test and challenge theories and expert 
judgements, especially in the context of forensic applications, in a competent and logical 
manner. 
 
Robson (1993) and Breakwell et al, (1995) raise concerns with the complementary method 
of triangulation. Within the complementary approach, they raise the issue that researchers 
usually gather objective numerical data first and then “pick and choose” qualitative and 
diffused information to align with those numerical results. A typical example of such an 
approach would be for near miss incidents within an organisation to have risen from X to Y 
over a defined period of time. The complementary approach would be to ask simplistic 
questions to support the increase in this quantitative data set; most of the questioned would 
suggest answers which were plausible and which would tend to reinforce the numerical 
data set. In simple terms, the numerical data is accepted as real and true and that any 
qualitative data is seen to be merely for augmentation rather than as a tool for the testing of 
an hypothesis or the validation of a data set. 
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7.5.1.2 Validatory Triangulation. 
This form of triangulation relies upon the belief that there is an amount of convergence or 
coincidence between the information sources. Many papers have been written which 
discuss the virtues of validatory triangulation and its ability to test theories by applying 
challenges from more than one data source as opposed to relying upon a single 
interrogation. Maxwell (1998) states that triangulation “reduces the risk of systematic 
distortions inherent in the use of only one method”. 
 
Given the degree of strong support for the complementary approach, and the lack of general 
interest in using qualitative data, one can quickly deduce that there is a need to change 
mindsets within the general safety community if validatory triangulation is to be seriously 
and consciously applied. 
 
7.5.1.3 A Balanced Approach. 
Whilst it is easy for the author to criticise the extant methodology of dealing with 
qualitative information, especially within his field of safety management, there are some 
benefits to the complementary triangulation approach. In the current world of safety 
management there is certainly a high degree of pressure, both in time and cost, applied to 
the overall topic of safety management. Managers are conscious of the need to deliver 
reports or investigations within tight timeframes and to a limited budget and therefore tend 
to follow the ‘path of least resistance’. Whilst convenience and practicality are great 
facilitators and catalysts for a certain mechanism to be employed it falls upon those 
managers to use a tool which is effective and provides a truthful and complete answer. No 
tool should be employed simply due to its convenience. 
 
Whilst the preceding text has identified how complementary triangulation has been used 
predominantly more often than validatory triangulation to support safety arguments, this 
preference has been driven almost wholly by the theory that quantitative and qualitative 
data are very distinct in content, the former being ‘more objective’ than the latter. It is 
recommended by the author that any data gathered is looked at as a source for determining 
the truth about a system and that whatever the format it should be used to its fullest 
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capacity. Both quantitative and qualitative data may be good or bad; the secret is in filtering 
out the bad from the good and not in pre-judging one form of data from another. 
 
7.6   Verifying Qualitative Texts. 
One of the key observations that the author has in terms of his own safety management 
environment is that almost all of the organisation’s safety managers are sourced from 
engineering foundations. Whilst safety managers may head up a department, they will have 
been trained and evolved from an engineering background; the author himself was trained 
in electronic engineering and subsequently moved into weapon engineering. 
 
A prime feature of using qualitative data is the fact that safety related information, whether 
in risk assessments, reports or even safety arguments should not be managed and 
disassembled into its component parts like a watch or radar system. Of consideration is the 
fact that descriptors and context for qualitative information is supplied using spoken or 
written words and not just numbers; we use a language. Of note is the fact that when a 
number is written down without any form of language to provide context (units) the 
number means nothing. Those who are singularly focussed upon the use of quantitative 
data must acknowledge the use of language in the form of prefixes, units of measure or 
even acronyms to convey any meaning at all.  
 
One of the main issues with language is the fact that it is so varied, unstructured and open 
to so much interpretation that it is often very difficult to analyse efficiently and concisely. 
Quantitative data on the other hand is very easy to analyse using mathematical models or to 
translate into statistical reports and graphs; such information is also very quickly tested for 
patterns and underlying trends. Despite the vagaries of language, a transcript or few 
sentences written in the words of the interviewee is a more accurate method of capturing 
the required data and also easier to defend than a question within a quantitative 
questionnaire which uses someone else’s words, often with a generalist approach. There is 
a tendency to use the ‘best fit’ answer to an imprecise or vague question. 
 
Whilst language allows communication it also allows for miscommunication; both 
purposefully (e.g. lying) and accidentally (e.g. miss-learnt meanings for words). This 
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immediately raises questions relating to the true meaning of text; in simple terms, reading a 
text does not allow simple access to the minds of those who have spoken or written it. With 
this observation in mind there is the need to understand how such text may be interpreted 
and verified as correct, especially if it is to be used to both support and improve the safety 
argument or safety management of a system. In its basic form any text may be interpreted 
by simply engaging with the author or interviewee and simply asking them if the 
interpretation is correct. But if language is merely a form of spoken or written debate then 
the result of such another engagement would be even more debate and ambiguity. 
 
One of the prime tools used to try to ensure that the correct interpretation of a text had been 
obtained in other environments has been the application of hermeneutics. 
 
7.6.1   Hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of text; predominantly that of the Bible 
and literary texts (Oxford, 1995). Its application started with the study of works such as the 
Bible or the Torah due to the way that such texts had been written; often they were 
complicated as they used parables and allegories to communicate (Wallace, et al, 2003). 
Reading and applying the ‘correct’ form of interpretation was one of the prime tasks of the 
priesthood within those early times. This requirement was therefore sub-divided into two 
prime areas; the first involved analysing the texts in a manner which looked beyond the 
superficial statements whilst the second involved the verification of what had been 
interpreted. In a similar manner, these two requirements are fundamental to the use and 
application of qualitative information to support safety management. 
 
The first version of hermeneutics was developed by the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 
- 1911) in a bid to defend the social sciences from the analytical technique which was 
prevalent within the natural sciences. Throughout the twentieth century hermeneutics were 
wrapped up in debates over whether the approach was based upon an ‘individualistic’ 
approach or a ‘positivist’ approach.  
 
Martin Heidegger (1962) offered a major and complex piece of work in 1926 (re-issued in 
1962) where he raised two important issues. The first identifies that an individual’s 
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empathetic interpretation is often ‘coloured’ by previous texts and interpretations in terms 
of our presumptions, prejudices and conjecture. Whilst this may appear as a limiting 
function of such an approach it is quickly seen that by reading subsequent texts the former 
readings may be re-interpreted again and again as part of an iterative process to achieve a 
more refined and (hopefully) truthful result.  
 
The second issue raised by Heidegger relates to a paradox called the hermeneutic circle. 
During the act of reading the human mind breaks the text down into its component parts 
(sentences and words) but must reassemble those discrete components to recognise and 
discern what is being communicated. According to Heidegger there is a continual dialogue 
and reasoning (dialectical processing) being applied during an act of reading between the 
concepts of reductionism and holism. This behaviour manifests itself in two distinct areas; 
the first is a paradox in that we cannot ever understand a text without breaking it down but 
we must analyse it as a whole before understanding the component parts. This is classical 
‘chicken and egg’ with each step of understanding relying logically on the state of the 
other. Interpretative reading may be considered therefore as a paradoxical action; to break 
out of the paradox there is a need for the reader to take a somewhat irrational ‘leap’ of 
subjective faith ‘into’ the text. Once ‘within’ the text, the reader, through an iterative 
dialectic process, may disassemble and reassemble the text until its meaning becomes more 
lucid and unambiguous. 
 
Further work which built upon Heidegger’s principles of applied hermeneutics were carried 
out by Hans-Georg Gadamer in the 1960’s and Paul Ricoeur in the 1980’s. Furthermore, 
hermeneutics were further developed and applied between 1999 and 2001 by the University 
of Strathclyde in its qualitative methodology for Confidential Incident Reporting and 
Analysis System (CIRAS), (Wallace, et al, 2003). The project involved qualitative safety 
data being decomposed and stored within a central data base; by applying a new ‘Applied 
Hermeneutic Methodology’ it was able to provide a method of reliably analysing 
interpretations between different interpreters. Due to the method of classifying which was 
used, and that textual elements were represented using numeric formations, it is suggested 
that the application crossed the ‘qualitative - quantitative divide’ (Wallace, et al, 2003). 
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Whilst this brief introduction into the subject does not delve deeply into some of the 
theories which are applied, it is designed to communicate to the reader, especially those 
who are ‘hardened’ quantitative safety practitioners that ‘objective’ outputs may be 
generated by applying a process, such as hermeneutics, to qualitative information. 
Hermeneutic methodologies may not be a complete answer to the qualitative aspects of 
safety information but could be used, like any other tool, to help provide a more truthful 
and wholesome level of safety management. 
 
7.7   Concluding Remarks on a Qualitative Approach. 
The author has tried to illustrate within this chapter how qualitative information may be 
used to not only augment any quantitative approach but that it should be used within its 
own right. The nature of the language that we use and the way that we use it not only 
reflect our view of the world but also give an insight into how we perceive it. Due to the 
personal and individualistic character of human beings we cannot yet perceive how words 
can ever provide the same meanings to any two individuals. This creates so many problems 
as can be seen in the way that safety management, both as individuals and teams, handle 
and manage incident reports, near misses and any other safety related text. 
 
The predominant and extant method of learning from such reports and written words, 
certainly within the author’s working environment, is to employ an expert such as a ‘safety 
engineer’ or ‘safety manager’ to decompose the material into a ‘more understandable’ and 
‘easily manipulated’ format. Whilst this may seem a trivial matter on the surface, the author 
would suggest that there is a clue within the more understandable phrase; the underlying 
thought which is provoked here may be related to that of competence. Whilst the author is a 
professional engineer, trained in many fields, including safety, he struggled with the 
concepts of safety culture and a qualitative safety approach for many years before studying 
for this doctorate. A ‘typical’ safety engineer would probably read and decompose any text 
within an incident report and quickly assign causation through an engineering mindset, 
probably quite unconsciously. Given the pressures of cost and time such assignments are 
either classified relatively well within the specific areas of engineering discipline or 
classified as ‘other’ or ‘human factors’ if they appear to fall outside his specialised domain. 
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Safety experts are human; they suffer from the afflictions that normal individuals suffer 
from. They will not always agree with each other’s views and interpretations and they will 
always be affected by subjective prejudices and distortions. This suggests that there is more 
to be learnt, possibly from the hermeneutic process, which has been adopted in other 
environments where the task of extracting a wholesome and ‘truthful’ message is judged to 
be important. What is becoming quite evident though as this discussion is advancing is that 
safety experts, both individuals and teams, predominantly from an engineering background, 
may need to understand not only the technical attributes of their operating environment but 
also grasp the implicit and explicit fundamentals of language and the culture of the 
operation under scrutiny. 
 
Sentencing causation of an incident to ‘human error’ is not an explanation or conclusion in 
itself; it is merely the first step of a requirement to further investigate to another level of 
understanding. Such a vague and coarse descriptor conveys no message on how to stop the 
same incident from being repeated again; in a similar manner, the term ‘mechanical failure’ 
to explain a commercial airliner disaster does not offer any insight into how to avert 
another similar incident. In simple and everyday terms they can be identified as ‘someone 
had blundered’ or ‘the kit broke’; neither really helps us to understand how to stop it 
happening again. From experience, what is quite unequivocal within the author’s industry 
is that the safety experts will have distilled the mechanical failure down to the exact 
component and why it failed; the final report will often recommend improvements both at 
component and system levels in the absence of any such demands by the enquiring body. 
Again from experience, any sentencing of incidents to ‘human error’ will be largely left at 
that; there will be very little delving into more specific causes other than reviewing 
processes and any individual competency and training records. There is minimal use of all 
information, both qualitative and quantitative, at one time to produce a more complete, 
meaningful and ‘truthful’ conclusion.  
 
7.8   A ‘Systems’ Overview. 
As systems have become more technologically complicated and the problems within them, 
or the incidents which they are involved with, become more multi-disciplined then so the 
process of understanding becomes more difficult. Whilst such systems are being evolved 
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and created with a great amount of mature technical risk management, the causation of 
incidents is predominantly shifting towards how humans interface with them. 
 
The term systems engineering deals with the orderly process of bringing a system into 
being and the subsequent effective and efficient operation and support of that system 
throughout its projected life cycle (Blanchard, 2008, p1). Systems engineering and the 
adoption of a ‘systems’ approach involves using an interdisciplinary approach and 
technique to allow for the creation and operation of an efficient and favourable system. A 
system consists of a complex combination of assets such as human beings, materials, 
equipment, facilities, services etc., which may be integrated in a way as to fulfil the 
requirements of a need. The prime objective behind applying a systems approach is to 
address the requirement within the context of a complete and whole entity rather than as a 
group of individual separate components. One of the more important views within the 
systems approach is the realisation that the final system performance is very much 
dependent not only upon the efficient and timely integration of all of the components but 
upon ensuring the correct and appropriate intra-relationships between them. Within the 
context of this thesis it may now become evident why the author considers the available 
qualitative information, predominantly that which concerns human interaction within a 
system, as being fundamental to its correct and safe functioning 
 
Of the many disciplines considered important for the application of systems engineering is 
that of human factors and safety engineering where the human being is addressed as a 
major element of a system and its integration (Blanchard, 2008, p170). This discipline deals 
with the anthropometric (scientific study of the measurements & proportions of a human 
body), human sensory, physiological, and psychological factors within the system design. 
The safety engineering facet of the discipline considers if the system under design will be 
safe to operate, repair and maintain throughout its whole lifecycle. The safety design 
process, in a similar manner to the MoD’s design cycle process discussed in chapter four, is 
an iterative process where various measurements (error rates, time between failures, etc.) 
are fed back into the design and provide a state of evolution. 
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7.9   Human Factors within System Safety. 
It has already been established both within the preceding text of this chapter as well as 
within other chapters of this thesis that the development, delivery and management of a 
safe system relies upon integrating many and various engineering disciplines. It has also 
been claimed within this chapter that the topic of human factors is largely not well 
understood by the ‘traditional’ engineering practitioners. Perrow (1984) sums the 
interactive human interface with systems, in terms of human factors, as systems that 
support dynamic process involving large numbers of hardware, software and human 
elements that interact in many different ways. Examples of such interactive systems may be 
found within nuclear power generation sites, command & control centres (e.g. civilian 
emergency services, military operations, air traffic control centres etc.) and even in the 
remote controlling of UCAVs. Whilst some of these systems may be deemed as safety-
critical, they rely upon the complete integration of humans, hardware, software and 
procedural control to deliver an efficient and safe activity. It is therefore relatively obvious, 
within the context of such a system, that human factors have been considered throughout 
the whole activity from the design phase through to the writing of operational and 
maintenance procedures. For such systems the overall safety integrity level which is 
claimed will include human factors as a component of both control and failure. 
 
The human component was discussed in chapter six and whilst it is seen as a relatively 
important component of a system it is often either ignored, sentenced as ‘too difficult to 
explore further’ (‘someone blundered’) or just left hanging in ‘mid-air’ under the broad and 
unhelpful banner of ‘Human Factors’ on the occasion of an incident enquiry. Safety cases 
for complex systems which require a human operator predominantly consider safety from a 
technical perspective which is limited to addressing the hazards which could arise from 
technical failures alone; this is despite the fact that human error is alluded to frequently as a 
major contributory of accident causation within the safety case. The author considers the 
civil airline industry as a typical example of a highly disciplined and orderly industry with a 
‘good’ safety record. It is only when published figures for human factor related incidents 
are reviewed that the enormity of the subject is fully unveiled; the CAA’s Aircraft 
Proximity Reports for 1997 showed that 98% of incidents within UK’s airspace for that 
year were attributable to human error (CAA, 1998). 
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The author would suggest, based upon his own experiences, that there is a degree of 
paradox present within the general safety related industries. Many incidents within the past 
three decades such as the ‘Herald of Free Enterprise’, ‘Clapham Junction’ and ‘Piper 
Alpha’ act as forbidding reminders of human failures within complex systems. Whilst 
identified as an important factor within safety critical systems, the human component is 
rarely considered as truly safety critical and therefore not subjected to the hazard 
identification, analysis and assessment regimes which prevail for the technical components.  
 
7.10   A ‘Systems’ Approach for Light UAVs. 
The author, upon reflecting on the preceding discussions on human factors and qualitative 
safety information, combined with the lack of regulatory guidance within the environment 
of civil light UAVs, proposes a revised safety approach which consolidates all of the 
components which should be addressed in the creation of a safety case for such platforms. 
From his experience, the author is relatively content that most, if not all, of the technical 
elements of an UAV platform are sufficiently explained and qualified within extant safety 
cases. Note that this observation is based upon the larger UAVs, almost exclusively 
military registered, which are operated within segregated airspace across the UK. Despite 
the fact that extant safety cases are technically sound the overall approach avoids the most 
important and fundamental component of safety, -the human component. 
 
As stated elsewhere within this thesis, this revised approach to assembling a safety case for 
civil light UAVs does not tackle the most demanding of current UAV challenges which is 
that of ‘sense and avoid’. The aim of this new type of safety case approach is to facilitate a 
more complete body of evidence so that safety engineers, safety managers (or regulators) 
may make a more accurate, relevant, and consolidated safety judgement of the whole 
system under scrutiny. 
 
UAVs, in general terms, challenge many of the established methods of safety planning and 
safety management. It has already been established how minimal the regulatory regime is 
within the light civil UAV environment; combined with the fact that there is no pilot 
aboard, the thought processes for self preservation are possibly not vested as strongly or as 
emphatically as within a manned aircraft. When compared with the commercial airline and 
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light aircraft operating environments the level of procedural control is very much lower in 
the case of small and light civil UAVs. Figure 7.1 illustrates how the light civil UAV 
environment compares with other flying activities within the procedural and residual risk 
categories. 
 
 
 
Fig 7.1 - Diagram illustrating the procedural and residual risks of various aircraft 
operations. 
 
The need to include the human element, specifically the culture within an organisation has 
been shown as being very important in the overall scheme of safety within an operating 
system. By incorporating the human element with that of the technical aspects of the 
system the resulting output would appear to offer a much ‘rounder’ and complete argument 
of system safety. Whilst human factors engineering has been present within the manned 
flight environment for many decades, its use within the UAV environment is still relatively 
light; any human factors engineering present is predominantly focussed towards operator 
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training, competency and currency rather than systematically throughout the whole system. 
The author suggests that the system, within the context of Civil Light UAVs, should 
include not only the platform from a technical sense but the supporting business frame 
which facilitates the creation (or destruction) of a positive safety culture. 
 
The following chapter introduces the reader to the concept of a ‘Safety Case Elicitation 
Tool’ (SCET) for Civil Light UAVs and the use of a more qualitative approach. The author 
proposes that some of the more expensive, time consuming and quantitative safety 
assessment methodologies which are prevalent within the safety ‘world’, may be reduced in 
usage for a more qualitative approach, especially when dealing with low cost, relatively 
low mass and low speed civilian UAVs. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The Safety Case Elicitation Tool 
 
8.1   Introduction. 
The preceding chapters highlighted many of the deficiencies and limitations in the 
application and use of the typical industry model for safety cases. This chapter describes 
how a relatively simple guideline, for creating a safety argument, may be used for smaller 
and/or less complicated systems. Whilst the author believes that this approach may be 
developed and applied to almost any small modern system he has focussed on his 
experiences within the aerospace industry and that of UAVs.  
 
The guideline itself, based upon experiences within the T&E environment, has been broken 
down into its component parts. Each component is listed and accompanied by both 
explanatory and descriptive texts to help maintain focus when being used as an elicitator 
for the creation of a simplified safety argument. The guideline is termed a Safety Case 
Elicitation Tool (SCET) and is designed to aid in the construction of a simplified safety 
case for light UAVs. 
 
Much of the background leading up to the creation of the SCET is steeped in the 
methodology for creating safety submissions for the conduct of T&E trials on the UK’s 
Ranges. Certainly well before the HSE suggested that major sites or hazardous activities 
should be underpinned by formal safety documentation (CIMAH 1984) the Air Ranges 
were demanding ‘safety submissions’ from potential users of Range facilities to 
demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of any activity’s control systems. The author 
is cognisant of the work conducted over the past decade by both himself and Rowley in 
attempting to document the requirements of a T&E Range specific ‘safety submission’. The 
overarching problem in trying to create such a document was to avoid being too 
prescriptive whilst avoiding creating something which was so ‘loose’ as to provide little or 
no instruction.  
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In recent years the author has been involved with more UAV activities and has engaged 
with other technical experts across the company. The author is also duly cognisant of the 
work conducted by Ayliffe (2006) in the field of UAV flying and the checklists employed 
by him and his team in support of such activities at the WWUAVC. It is fair to say that the 
work conducted with Rowley was concerned predominantly with that of the technical 
abilities of the platform and the ability to terminate flight (missile and/or UAV) by using a 
predominantly probabilistic application. Ayliffe’s checklist again focuses upon the 
technical and flying attributes of the UAV platform though there is some cognisance of the 
need to look at operator training and competences. Both of these approaches emphasise the 
trend which was highlighted by the author in preceding chapters where safety arguments 
are focussed upon the technical attributes of the system rather than including, 
systematically, the safety attitude and composition of the operating organisation.  
 
As in many other industries, most practices are honed through evolution; new concepts are 
migrated into the standing practice as a result of new legislation or learning from an event 
whilst bad practices are removed, again through events such as accidents and/or significant 
near misses, through the application of new technology. Whilst the extant practices applied 
on the Ranges are relatively up to date and deemed to be more than adequate for current 
activities the author suggests that there is a degree of ‘overkill’ being applied to some 
activities which may be better managed by applying the SCET approach for smaller 
projects. To provide a degree of qualification for the SCET concept it was peer reviewed by 
the Air Ranges’ Operations and Safety Trials Working Group (O&STWG) during July 
2009. The results of this review are contained within chapter nine. The author is grateful to 
the working group for their time and their feedback on the tool. 
 
8.2   The Author’s Concerns and Observations. 
Having been greatly involved in the development of the WWUAVC at Parc Aberporth the 
author has always had concerns over the safety assessment of those UAVs which would be 
operating from its airfield. Whilst many would operate with a mass greater than 150kg the 
potential was present for a number to be flown with masses within the Light UAV 
classification. Whilst the military registered platforms would be supported by safety cases 
driven by the relevant defence standards, the civilian platforms, especially those within the 
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Light UAV classification would lack a great deal of supporting evidence to argue their 
safety as discussed in chapter three. 
 
Civil UAV activities have been predominantly based upon the recreational model aircraft 
environment; whilst the military UAV scene has developed greatly over the past decade the 
civil world has been quite static in terms of regulation and legislation hence the heavy 
reliance upon the LMA as discussed in chapter three. This observation explains the lack of 
specific regulatory requirements, including safety, demanded by the CAA for civil UAV 
operations under a mass of 150kg; such a minimal approach to safety can be explained by 
carefully analysing the operating environment in which such vehicles operate. Recreational 
model aircraft flying relies very much on ‘green field’ sites offered by friends, colleagues 
and ‘friendly farmers’ or, disused airfields, scattered across the countryside.  
 
There may be occasions where model aircraft are flown alongside operational airfields but 
these occasions are relatively few and very highly controlled. The crucial and most 
important observation from such operations are the numbers of spectators present within 
the area at risk from the aircraft. In all of these flying scenarios the number of individuals 
who are within range of being struck by the aircraft, and being hurt, is quite minimal. 
During model aircraft demonstrations and ‘air shows’ there is a degree of crowd control 
and risk assessment but the overall number of observers (third parties) is very small 
compared to the number of individuals who may be at risk from a civil UAV operated over 
a populated area such as a town. The author suggests that the guiding mindset of an 
individual who has a recreational model aircraft background may not be completely aware 
of all of the potential hazards and risks that may be prevalent from operating a civil UAV 
outside the finite, and immediate, envelope of an airfield or ‘green field’. The author would 
strongly suggest that the presiding mindset would not take cognisance of peripheral or 
indirect consequences; for example, an UAV crashing on a road verge and causing a car to 
veer into the path of another vehicle. Whilst the risk assessment may have reviewed the 
immediate risks to the platform and those parties within its near and intimate environment 
it may be limited, to some degree, by unconscious assumptions and ignorance of insight, 
implanted by many years of operating in a very benign, insulated and ‘safe-by-default’ 
environment. This mindset would be worsened, in the context of risk identification and 
 218 
subsequent risk management, by the fact that the individual was participating in an activity 
which they considered to be fun and recreational; who in their right mind ever considers the 
full safety implication and documents the results of any assessment when actively pursuing 
their favourite pastime or hobby? 
 
Civil UAVs, once established as a viable platform for various activities (e.g. data gathering, 
surveillance, etc.), will quickly need a more rigorous, yet easily populated, risk 
identification process which will require an assessment to be carried out of the whole 
system. The system, in its fullest sense, not only includes the hardware and software, but 
includes the human operator and the series of instructions and Human-Machine-Interface 
(HMI) procedures which are fundamental to safety. Civil UAVs may fly alongside, and 
even over, sites which could generate fatal events if the vehicle was to suffer a catastrophic 
failure. Sensitive locations such as petro-chemical plants, schools, hospitals, major 
roadways and even open gatherings of people (e.g. football stadiums, demonstrations) 
would suffer greatly if impacted upon by an UAV with a mass of up to 150kg. 
 
Whilst neither of the first two mass categorised Small Aircraft classifications identified by 
the CAA (< 7kg & 7kg - 20kg) refer to any airworthiness certification, the third class 
begins to address airworthiness issues in design, manufacture and indeed flight testing. The 
overall presiding limitation for UAVs within this third category is that governed by their 
kinetic energy limits (Haddon & Whittaker, 2002) where both the speed and mass of the 
vehicles are limited in order to minimise damage and/or harm in the event of crash. The 
limitations imposed are such that the maximum combined operating mass and speed cannot 
permit the UAV’s kinetic energy to exceed 95kJ given a free-fall condition from 400ft 
above the surface. 
 
What is not addressed in any of these three categories is a formal requirement to clearly 
demonstrate engineering or flying competence in the planning, manufacture or operation of 
the air vehicle. Whilst researching the creation of a safety case for the initial T&E 
component the author self realised (akin to an epiphany!) that safety cases exclusively 
remain reliable only if the assumptions and/or conditions by which they were originally 
constructed are effectively implemented. One of the key determinants in maintaining a safe 
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operating environment, and complying with the requirements specified within the safety 
case, is that of the competence and underlying mindset of the personnel managing and 
operating the system in question.  
 
The CAA’s Small Aircraft policy, and its underpinning support by the LMA, is well suited 
for recreational activities such as model aircraft flying, but is now demonstrating its 
unsuitability and lack of rigour for a new era of commercial small aircraft flying in the 
guise of civil small and light UAVs. Recreational model aircraft flying is predominantly 
low volume and low technology and occurs within environments which are very low in 
terms of risk consequence and likelihood; the activity usually takes place away from large 
numbers of the general public and at a very low level of frequency compared to what 
commercial civil UAVs may be subjected to. It is now time to take the environment 
forward into a new era. 
 
8.3   The Decision to Include Human Factors and Safety Attitude in the SCET. 
In 1940 it was calculated that approximately 70% of all aircraft accidents were attributable 
to ‘human error’ or, more formally, human factors (CAA, 2002b). A further review by the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) in the mid 1970’s found that there had been 
no reduction in the human factor component in accident statistics (CAA, 2002b). Further 
studies in 1986 and 1996 again identified human factors as the major contributory factor to 
aircraft incidents (CAA, 2002b). 
 
The topic of safety culture was discussed at length in chapter six; within the context of 
aviation it is widely accepted that the indigenous culture of an operation has a marked 
effect upon its safety statistics. Eiff (1998), within the context of aviation safety, 
corroborates what was highlighted in chapter 6, and suggests that “A safety culture exists 
only within an organisation where each individual employee, regardless of their position, 
assumes an active role in error prevention”; he also stresses that “Safety cultures do not 
spring to life simply at the declaration of corporate leaders”. 
 
The culture of an organisation is better judged by what is done rather than what is said; 
many organisations highlight very elaborate mission statements regarding safety, but this 
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may not reflect what is in place and is practised at the working levels. The CAA (CAA, 
2002b) acknowledge the importance of a positive safety culture in CAP 715; they also 
acknowledge how difficult it is to measure the attitudes of an organisation’s workforce. 
One of its recommended methods of measuring safety culture is to use a HSE developed 
questionnaire. This questionnaire has been used by the author, to some extent, to create the 
SCET; this allows the people component of the system under scrutiny to be analysed and 
reviewed to gain an additional insight into its safe operation. 
 
Whilst UAV systems do not carry an onboard pilot, operational experience is already 
demonstrating that human error is presenting a hazard to their operation (McCarley & 
Wickens, 2005). Given the generally reported figures for pilot error in manned flight it is 
not surprising to see relatively high figures for pilot error in unmanned systems; with this in 
mind, it is foreseen that any ground based UAV pilot or controller will soon be replaced by 
a fully autonomous flight control and command system. Despite minimising human errors 
in the pilot function the degree of human intervention will remain relatively constant when 
it comes to maintaining and repairing such unmanned systems. 
 
Tvaryanas et al, (2005) and the United States’ Defense Science Board (2004), have 
reported that the accident rate for UAVs is higher than that of manned aircraft; the loss of 
operational unmanned military surveillance aircraft exceeds the loss of manned combat 
aircraft by a factor of 10 (Johnson, 2003). Johnson does acknowledge that some of these 
losses were directly attributable to the danger of the missions, but, human error was viewed 
as a contributing factor due to the lack of real-time situational information and fewer fault 
recovery options which were available to the pilot. Tvaryanas et al, (2005) and Williams 
(2004) found that a higher proportion of accidents in US Army UAVs suggested that 
system reliability may be emerging as a greater threat to UAVs than it currently is within 
the manned aircraft environment. This pattern may serve to increase the importance of 
maintenance, especially given the limited sub-system redundancies, within smaller UAV 
platforms. 
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8.4   Societal Concerns. 
No systems approach of safety, especially within the field of civil operated UAVs, would 
be complete without a brief discussion on the social aspects of the operation; these include 
‘soft’ issues such as those of societal interactions and any concerns raised by the operation. 
Much of today’s developments in technology happens in some isolation and results in 
developments which do not address our values structure or how it will fit within it. It may 
be argued that the interaction between technology and societal values can play an important 
role in the success or the failure of a new technology. The fact that the US supersonic 
transport programme was curtailed in 1971 as a direct result of environmental lobbying of 
Congress is a clear example of such an interaction. Whilst the interaction of technology 
within any values structure cannot always be predicted, any early due considerations, or 
even sampling of opinions, may help to support and/or direct its wider application and 
acceptance. 
 
Risk is very much an emotive issue which is open to much debate and the many 
uncertainties of individual perceptions. UAVs in a similar manner to motor vehicles have 
the ability to change our lives considerably but many of the hurdles that lie ahead of the 
industry will be formed by public opinion and their reactions to any UAV incidents, 
whether fatal or not. When the motor vehicle commenced its life at the turn of the 20th 
century society demanded the use of a flag bearer to warn the general public that a vehicle 
was approaching; any incidents caused by the new ‘contraption’ were topical news at an 
international level. As society has grown to rely heavily on the motor vehicle’s presence 
then so has society’s perception and acceptance of risks caused by motor vehicles 
decreased and increased respectively. Hundreds of deaths per year on the roads of the UK 
alone are now accepted as part of the modern way of living; will this attitude to deaths 
caused by UAV incidents become the norm in a few decades? The author is not suggesting 
that there is an answer to the question but raises it as a topic for thought. Achieving timely 
and resilient social acceptance of UAV operations is paramount to the industry both in 
economic and cultural terms. If the industry fails to demonstrate cognisance of, or acts 
upon, society’s concerns, misconceptions and power of influence then the road to an 
effective and resilient civilian UAV operation will be arduous, convoluted and painful. 
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Such an approach may only be delivered through the application of a methodical and 
iterative process of safety development utilising true systems engineering techniques.  
 
8.5   Forming the Safety Case Elicitation Tool. 
The SCET has been created by amalgamating the author’s experiences of T&E related 
safety cases with that of his research into safety cases and safety culture; the latter bringing 
with it a revised approach of assessing an organisation’s in-built safety regime. By applying 
a model based upon one of the HSE’s core safety climate tools (HSE, 2001b) and 
amalgamating it with a bespoke engineering focussed safety assessment, the author has 
created a safety case elicitation tool which is largely qualitative in its approach. A degree of 
quantitative analysis is required to support the safety critical component of flight 
termination; this is driven very much by the requirement to correlate with operational safety 
targets mandated by both regulatory regimes and the H&SE. 
 
The overall concept is very much based upon established and well honed practices within 
the commercial airline world. CAP 715 (CAA, 2002b) and CAP 718 (see bibliography) are 
clear examples of how seriously and important the commercial airline industry takes human 
factors within the maintenance and inspection of their platforms. Whilst an identical level 
of application could be ostensibly applied to the world of larger UAVs both civil and 
military, it would not be realistic in the case of small, light and relatively cheaper civil 
UAVs. The SCET is designed for the smaller, and budget limited organisations, which may 
decide to operate within the small and light civil UAV market. The argument which comes 
to the surface from the previous statement is one of trading safety against cost, the 
application of the ALARP concept again. Whilst the author is aware of the need to further 
qualify the statement he believes that to pursue the argument in detail would require 
another lengthy and in-depth thesis. The statement is made here to merely acknowledge the 
fact that further work may be required to qualify the ‘cost versus effort’ concept of the 
SCET. 
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8.6   The Safety Case Elicitation Tool. 
By following the various descriptors against each of the following component headings a 
predominantly qualitative safety case may be constructed by a potential UAV operator. The 
author has included a brief explanation, in italics, with each question. The explanation, 
including references to the literature reviews, also includes exemplar answers and provides 
the reader with an insight into the reasoning and theory behind it. 
 
The aim of this tool (in the form of a questionnaire) is to provide sufficient information to a 
regulator, or safety supervisor (such as a Range), that the system under scrutiny has been 
designed and manufactured with sufficient due diligence and has applied established safety 
and professional engineering practices. The tool also provides information relating to the 
safety and engineering management practices within the operating organisation, giving an 
insight into its underlying engineering and safety culture.  
 
The questions provide the regulatory/supervisory body with a critical insight into the 
organisation’s attitude and maturity towards safety in general. The questions are to be 
answered truthfully and in a descriptive ‘free text’ manner; the information gathered allows 
an appropriate and suitable degree of control and supervision to be applied to the activity. 
Whilst the questionnaire may be completed in isolation by the organisation under scrutiny 
the regulatory/supervisory body may decide to further investigate the organisation, through 
a further interview. The SCET questionnaire, and the answers put forward by the 
organisation, may be used as cues for such interviews. 
 
The SCET attempts to include many of the people and organisational issues which are not 
covered in the ‘traditional’ quantitatively focussed safety case approach. The resulting 
model is acknowledged, within the aerospace T&E Air Ranges community, as the first ever 
‘systems’ approach to a consolidated safety case for UAVs. 
 
8.6.1   Introduction to the Organisation. 
• Introduce and describe the organisation which has overall responsibility for the 
proposed UAV activities. 
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• Include the organisation’s formal company trading name, address and business 
details. 
• Provide the organisation’s relevant contact details. 
• Introduce and describe the organisation’s history and background within the context 
of UAV construction and operating. 
 
This first question offers both parties (the UAV operator and the regulatory/supervisory 
body) with an opportunity to identify with the foundational aspects of the proposed 
operation. Formal details of the company allow a degree of background checking to be 
carried out in relation to financial buoyancy, reputation within industry and even to 
understand if it is involved in any degree of incident or inquiry related to UAV operations. 
Contact details of relevant personnel allow the regulatory/supervisory party to gain an 
understanding and confidence in the technical and managerial staff of the company.  
 
From a Safety Case perspective this first question begins to create a relationship between 
the two parties. It basically takes the first few steps in creating a Preliminary Safety 
Argument (4.11) and conveying the organisation’s attitudes towards safety in general. This 
relationship, especially trust and honesty, will become very important if the 
regulatory/supervisory party is to gain a true insight into the proposed UAV operation. 
 
8.6.2   Previous Experience. 
• Describe the organisation’s experience in the field of UAVs. 
• Has this experience been as a prime contractor, sub-contractor or as a sole provider 
of an UAV system? 
• Include details of previous projects including project names, dates and the role(s) 
that the organisation participated within. 
• Have these experiences and skills been retained within the organisation? 
 
Experience of previous UAV activities will have a major impact on the levels of scrutiny 
that the regulatory/supervisory body will need to apply. Learning from past experiences is 
cited by Lord Cullen as an important factor if an organisation is to improve its safety 
attitude (6.6, 6.7). A good safety culture (6.8) relies heavily upon commitment by senior 
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management, especially when they are involved in learning from past experiences. Senior 
management must be involved in the feedback, monitoring and analysis routes if ‘learning 
from experience’ is to be taken seriously. 
 
It is extremely difficult to create an effective and robust safety case as a singular event 
within the lifecycle of any system; it is an iterative and very much an evolutionary process 
which relies very much on maturation through feeding back lessons learnt from preceding 
work. This form of learning from experience is referenced in chapter 4 (4.11). 
 
One of the more important, yet intangible elements, that arises from working with 
individuals who have a degree of experience in the field is that of confidence. Confidence 
starts to grow, and any initial barriers are slowly dropped, as, through the use of bespoke 
languages, subconscious relationships begin. 
 
8.6.3   Introduction to the UAV System. 
• Introduce and describe the UAV system from a high level perspective. 
• Describe the system’s purpose and mission intent; e.g. surveillance, target or 
detection platform. 
• Describe the system’s command and control concept; e.g. autonomous guidance or 
human operator/pilot control. 
• Describe the system’s history and concept of requirement if appropriate; include 
any evolutionary systems (prototypes) which may provide additional context and 
support to the overall safety argument. 
• Has the system been certified to any standard? (E.g. Certificate of Airworthiness, 
Permit to Fly, UK CAA Type Certificate, Large Model Aircraft, etc.) 
• To which countries standards has the certification been issued? Provide details of 
any form of registration. 
• What regulatory guidance has been applied or has been referred to during the 
designing and manufacturing of the system? 
• Has the system been flown elsewhere? Has flight been refused or been terminated 
by another organisation? 
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• Were the results of these flights satisfactory? Please provide information on such 
flights, including any safety issues within the system as a whole? 
 
These questions simply build upon the preceding ones, delving deeper into not only the 
UAV system itself but the organisation behind it. By starting to tease out the UAV’s mission 
criteria in conjunction with its command and control concept the regulatory/supervisory 
body will quickly form its own views on the risk strategy which has been used by the 
designers and constructors. The risk strategy used may have been completely obscured by 
the eagerness or enthusiasm of the technical team to attain a novel answer to a pressing 
requirement. The author has observed on numerous occasions how technical teams 
‘solution-ise’ and get too involved with the hard engineering principles of an answer to the 
detriment of the holistic requirement, especially those fundamentals related to cost and 
safety. 
 
Delving into the system’s history, especially any evolutionary phases, enters directly into 
the requirement for an evolving lifecycle for safety argument development (4.10). Whilst 
the answers to these series of questions may be predominantly qualitative they will provide 
context to the overall presentation (4.8.3). A degree of quantitative evidence (4.8.1, 4.8.2) 
by deterministic and/or probabilistic means will help to convey the structure of the 
argument. The regulatory/supervisory body, from such information, will begin to build a 
model in their minds of the competency (6.10.5) within the organisation and the degree of 
risk acceptance that the business is operating at. Risk averse organisations will behave in a 
much more reserved manner when dealing with most forms of risk; alternatively, ‘risk 
keen’ or ‘risk ignorant’ organisations will demonstrate a cavalier type attitude to risk. 
 
Designing, constructing and operating an UAV to any standard will be considered by the 
regulatory/supervisory body as demonstrating a certain degree of organisational maturity 
and the application of due diligence from a management perspective (6.10.1). With a 
positive response to this question the UAV company would provide a clear indication that 
its management is aware of it’s legal requirements; this ties in to the attributes of a good 
safety culture (6.8), competence (6.10.5) and effective communications (6.12). 
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When combined these answers will demonstrate the UAV company’s holistic view towards 
safety as a system. The company will ultimately demonstrate its maturity if it allows 
observations and/or learning from other UAV related activities to be openly discussed. A 
typical example response may look like the following; 
 
The Archimedes II UAV flew its maiden flight at Tonopah Test Range in the Nevada 
Desert during May 2007. After completing two half-hour flights it was sent out on a 
three hour mission. On this third flight it suffered a catastrophic failure and 
crashed after one and a half hours. The cause of the failure was deduced by the 
chief engineer to have been caused by overheating of the fuel cells within the wings 
which led to failure of the epoxy glued main bearers. The overheating was caused 
by the excessive climatic temperature of the desert and the excessive current drain 
demanded by the payload. 
 
The Archimedes III, which is planned to be operated at Lochinver airfield will not 
be operated for any periods longer than one hour and will not be subjected to any 
climatic temperatures akin to those experienced in Nevada; this statement is 
supported by a formal Meteorological Office report. Additionally, the UAV will not 
operate any payloads during these flights. 
 
8.6.4   System Technical Overview. 
• Describe the system’s overarching functionality. 
• What are the physical dimensions of the system? 
• Describe the method by which the system is launched. (E.g. spring assisted 
launcher, ‘Bungee’ launcher, Jet Assisted Take-Off (JATO), runway, etc.) 
• Describe the method by which the system is recovered. (E.g. parachute recovery to 
land or sea, runway, sacrificial target (no recovery), etc.) 
• What are the flight performance parameters of the system? This information must 
include data on all phases of flight including the recovery and/or flight termination 
phase. (E.g. for parachute based recovery systems the rate of descent must be 
stated.) Typical parameters included within this category include, for example, 
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maximum altitude, climb speeds, susceptibility to adverse weather such as static 
and/or icing conditions, etc. 
• What are the flight characteristics of the system? This information must include 
data upon all phases of flight including the recovery and/or flight termination phase. 
(E.g. stalling speeds, general stability, roll rate, pitch rate, typical turning radius, 
etc.) 
 
These questions relate entirely to the technical capabilities of the UAV system. The 
information will predominantly be communicated through free text (4.9.1) and will be 
almost entirely of a qualitative nature augmented by some quantitative analysis from a 
recognised authority. The quantitative aspects will offer evidence to support statements on 
fundamentals such as risks to third parties from inadvertent or flawed launches. A typical 
example may include a probabilistic (4.8.2) assessment of the likelihood of a JATO 
exploding on the launch area rather than burning in a controlled manner or, for one JATO 
in a two JATO launch system, to initiate whilst the other does not. The probabilistic risk 
assessment for this latter scenario would focus upon the probability of an asymmetric 
launch and the hazards, including lateral throw of debris, from such an event. A typical 
example response may look like the following; 
 
The Archimedes III will be launched from a Stealth IV spring assisted launcher into 
a head wind of no more than 40 knots. A full failure effects analysis by the launcher 
Design Authority, certified by our Chief Engineer, states that in the event of a 
catastrophic failure, all components and associated debris will be contained within 
a circular hazard area, of radius 65m, centred on the launcher’s single steer-able 
jockey wheel. 
 
Such a response would convey to the regulatory/supervisory body that an appropriate level 
of management engagement (Chief Engineer) had occurred in the safety assessment 
process (6.10.1). The fact that previous work had been demanded by the UAV operator 
upon the supplier of the launcher also suggests that a Safety Management Plan (4.11) with 
associated levels of hazard analysis and risk management (4.12.2) had been initiated. A 
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similar type of response for the recovery activity would also convey a similar type of 
message to the regulatory/supervisory team. 
 
The author would consider that the information on flight performance and any operational 
limitations could be conveyed using a simple table. In order to communicate the various 
types of mitigation used to minimise any transgressions of design limitations the company 
may consider simply adding another column into the table. The following example 
illustrates; 
 
Flight Performance 
Parameters  
Maximum Minimum Mitigation / Control Measures 
Operating 
Temperature 
+ 35º - 15º 
Met forecast prior to flight. Flight profile pre-planned 
by pilot and peer reviewed by Chief Engineer. 
Recovery Parachute 
Rate of Descent 800ft/min 1,000ft/min 
Met forecast prior to flight. Flight profile pre-planned 
by pilot and reviewed by Chief Engineer. 
Stall speeds 
160knots 
@ 5,000ft 
120knots 
@ 1,000ft 
Flight profile pre-planned by pilot and reviewed by 
Chief Engineer. Use of current and competent pilot. 
 
The use of terms such as competency and currency by the UAV company displays 
cognisance of established requirements for airmanship. The use of a company senior 
engineer who holds a trusted position in management also demonstrates company 
ownership at senior level (6.8, 6.10 and 6.10.2). 
 
8.6.5   Operational Environment. 
• What is the maximum wind speed, including any cross-wind component, or sea 
state, for the system during launching and recovery? 
• Are there any limitations imposed upon the system from an environmental 
perspective? (E.g. static, precipitation, lightning, visibility, saline environments, 
etc.) 
• How have these environmental limitations been ascertained? Please provide 
evidence to support this response. 
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Continuing from the preceding answers these questions expose how the company have 
reviewed their operation in a wider sense, i.e. with a systems strategy (7.8, 7.10). Not only 
does the SCET  focus upon the technical task of preparation, operation and recovery from 
an engineering perspective, it is concerned with understanding any environmental 
limitations that may be imposed. 
 
Static or thunder risks are well known to be a threat if explosives or pyrotechnics are to be 
handled or operated by personnel. High cross-winds or tailwinds may make take-off and/or 
landing dangerous or virtually impossible to control; excessive winds may invalidate any 
pre-planned debris hazard area or operational safety trace. A typical example response 
may look like the following; 
 
The Archimedes III will be launched from a Stealth IV spring assisted launcher into 
a head wind of no more than 40 knots; the maximum deviation in heading from the 
wind component will be ± 15º. Recovery to the sea surface, using the onboard 
recovery parachute system, will be conducted in tailwinds of no more than 30 knots 
(max gust). 
 
For flights where recovery to sea is anticipated a saline sacrificial plug is to be 
fitted to the main fuselage section. When immersed in sea water this plug will 
deteriorate over a period of two to three hours (depending upon sea state) and will 
eventually allow water to fill the fuselage. This functionality is designed to sink the 
UAV and therefore minimise risk to marine surface traffic; without such a device 
the UAV would float with a relatively neutral degree of buoyancy, just below the 
surface of the water. 
 
If the UAV is to be flown in airspace which is likely to contain manned aircraft the 
vehicle is to be configured in its ‘conspicuous dress’. The UAV’s fuselage is to be 
painted in Day-Glo orange and will have an approved organic dye added to the 
fuel to increase conspicuity whilst under powered flight. A full environmental 
assessment and hazardous material handling procedure is supplied for the dye. 
 
 231 
The aforementioned paragraphs suggest that the company is aligned with the need to be 
cognisant of other parties who may be under a degree of risk from the UAV operation. The 
UAV company would be seen by the regulatory/supervisory body as having a good 
understanding of the principles of risk management (4.12) and in the application of risk 
reduction in accordance with the HSE’s ALARP argument (4.12.2.5). 
 
8.6.6   Concept of Design. 
• What approach or design strategy has been taken by the organisation? 
• Have any formal ‘Systems Engineering’ concepts been used in the construction of 
the system? If so then please provide a degree of evidence to support this response. 
• What form of professional competence in engineering has been used in the design 
of the system? Please provide evidence to support this response. (E.g. Chartered or 
Incorporated Engineers; formal qualifications in aeronautics, engineering, 
structures, etc.) 
• What quality assurance status does the organisation hold? (E.g. ISO 9001, etc.) 
Please provide evidence to support this response. 
• Does the organisation hold any formal approvals as a ‘Design Organisation’? Please 
provide evidence to support this response. 
• Does the organisation hold any formal approvals as a ‘Production Organisation’ or 
a ‘Maintenance Organisation’? Please provide evidence to support this response. 
• What standards and/or principles have been applied to the system (including 
hardware, firmware and software) during design, build and test? This information 
must include data upon all aspects of the system including design drawings, 
prototyping, assembly and testing. 
• What process is used by the organisation to ensure that design requirements, 
including health and safety related requirements, are effectively communicated to 
any third party supplier? 
 
The use of a well structured design strategy communicates that the UAV has been evolved 
from first principles in an evolutionary manner and with a staged approach (4.11). In 
parallel with the design lifecycle the safety case should have been evolved in a similar 
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manner (4.11, Fig. 4.4). A typical example of a staged approach to creating an 
evolutionary safety case is used by the MoD (4.10, 4.11). 
 
The application of a ‘Systems Engineering’ approach demands that the problem, and its 
complexities, are fully understood (1.6); having decomposed the problem the engineer may 
adopt a suitable ‘systems’ approach to generate an optimal solution. Such an approach 
would include the generation of a Systems Engineering Management Plan and an holistic 
approach throughout. Systems Engineering is about being cognisant of the whole entity, 
both from within the system under scrutiny and also how it will interact with the external 
environment. By delivering a diligent ‘systems’ focussed report on the UAV the 
regulatory/supervisory body gain more confidence that the company is professional in it’s 
engineering and safety related thoughts processes and actions. 
 
A ‘Systems’ approach would be reflected in the competence and skills of the assembled 
team supporting the UAV. For example the Chief Engineer may be formally qualified in 
Aeronautical Engineering or Electronic Engineering and would possibly have had 
subsequent training and experience in various other fields to create a very rounded and 
professional individual who is cognisant of the wider issues that may affect the UAV. 
He/She would most certainly be a member of a number of professional bodies and hold 
Chartered Engineer status or be working towards it. The absence of such an individual 
from the project would not preclude the operation but would simply allow the 
regulatory/supervisory party to pay more diligence to some of the engineering management 
aspects of the aircraft. 
 
The Chief Engineer may be supported by specialist engineers and scientists who may be 
members of other professional bodies and hold experience demanded by the sub-systems 
employed. Typical examples may include explosive experience for work upon pyrotechnics 
within the aircraft systems (e.g. JATO motors, parachute reef line cutters, etc.).  
 
Periodic design reviews, chaired by the Chief Engineer, allows a clearly auditable trail to 
be displayed to any auditor. Such an approach not only allows hazards and issues to be 
tracked but also documents how they have been resolved. Third parties, such as sub-
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contractors, may be requested to attend and deliver formal responses; such attendance 
helps with communication and risk acceptance (6.11, 6.12). 
 
8.6.7   Organisational Safety Management. 
• Describe the organisation’s safety management system. Include a reporting 
structure which clearly identifies responsibilities for health, safety & environmental 
issues. 
• How does the organisation manage health, safety and environmental management 
across its whole structure? (E.g. monthly/weekly briefings, newsletters, etc.) Please 
provide evidence to support this response. 
• How do staff within the UAV system’s supporting team have any health, safety and 
environmental related information communicated to them, especially if they are 
away from their home site? Please provide evidence to support this response. 
• Has the organisation ever been subjected to an internal or external health, safety 
and environmental review? Please provide details of any findings or observations. 
• Has the organisation ever been requested to cease operations, by the Health & 
Safety Executive, on grounds of health, safety or environmental reasons? If so, then 
please provide details of the event(s). 
 
This question focuses upon the Safety Management Plan (4.11), which in itself should sit 
under the Systems Engineering Management Plan. Whilst the author uses these quite 
specific terms for these management plans, they be termed differently in these rather 
smaller UAV companies. What is more important than the terminology is the information 
contained within the submission. For very small companies such management plans may be 
in the form of a few sides of paper but the company must convey the engineering and safety 
approach taken for the UAV in a manner which satisfies the regulatory/supervisory body. 
 
Communication is probably the key to maintaining a safe system of work. In the author’s 
experience many health, safety and environmental issues are forgotten or are simply not 
communicated due to a lack of established process. Most projects, facilities and activities 
start with good intentions and issue copious amounts of safety related information such as 
newsletters and ‘kick-off briefs’. Very quickly, possibly due to other commitments, 
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forgetfulness, etc. the initial surge of safety information becomes stale and outdated. For 
effective safety management there is a need for team leaders and senior managers to 
maintain a weekly or monthly briefing on safety related matters (6.8, 6.10.1). Of benefit, is 
the intertwining of safety related briefings with more business or technically orientated 
meetings or briefings; safety should not be briefed in isolation but should be seen as an 
important element seeping through all of the company’s activities. Teams when working at 
remote sites may not have access to e-mails or newsletters but the team leader should 
demonstrate a degree of initiative to maintain the team’s indigenous safety culture. This is 
very important when third parties are involved in the operation. A typical response to this 
question may look like the following; 
 
The Archimedes III UAV team, deployed to Lochinver for January’s series of test 
flights, will consist of five individuals, including a Chief Engineer, from the 
company. They will be supported on an ad-hoc basis by two contract staff from the 
Meteorological Office. All Health, Safety & Environmental matters during the 
deployment shall be channelled through the Chief Engineer. Daily operational 
briefings, including safety briefs, will be conducted each morning at 08:30hrs in the 
hotel’s conference room; an end of week ‘wash-up’ will commence at lunchtime 
(13:00hrs) each Friday. All staff are to be present for all briefings. 
 
For activities which rely heavily upon a third party, such as a boat which is recovering an 
UAV from the sea, there is a need for the UAV company to be explicit in its explanation of 
how the risks are being managed and by whom. The following example helps to illustrate 
this; 
 
It is intended to recover the Archimedes III into the sea on Thursday’s sortie. A 
final call on the ability to fly and recover will be made during Thursday’s morning 
brief. The Chief Engineer’s call to allow the sortie to be flown will be based upon 
the serviceable state of the aircraft, a formal meteorological brief and a discussion 
with the skipper of ‘Blue Oyster II’. The final decision on suitability of sea state for 
recovery of the UAV lies unequivocally with the skipper. The skipper and his crew 
are to be briefed on the potential hazards of the UAV and its payloads on 
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Wednesday afternoon; during this briefing the crew will sign all necessary risk 
assessment paperwork. 
 
8.6.8   Configuration and Engineering Control. 
• How are any modifications to the state of the system recorded? Is a database or 
index used to control build standards? (E.g. Master Records Index, Configuration 
Control Processes, etc.) 
• What competencies does the organisation have in developing and implementing 
engineering changes include hardware and software? 
• What engineering management systems are in place to ensure that all engineering 
change requests are appropriately and effectively managed? 
• How do technicians and engineers raise observations and concerns into the 
engineering management system? Please provide evidence. 
 
These questions are relatively self evident and relate to good engineering practices for 
configuration control. Configuration control is paramount if the UAV company is to 
demonstrate tangible safety management processes. In the case of an incident there must be 
a clearly auditable trail back to the configuration which was flown. 
 
The author would not expect to see an overbearing and complicated configuration control 
process for a relatively small aircraft; a logbook for the aircraft which contained entries 
for any engineering activities carried out upon it would be sufficient. All entries would be 
signed by the engineer responsible whilst a periodic check and countersignature pre-flight 
and/or weekly by the Chief Engineer would add credibility to the procedure. Such an 
approach would convey an appropriate degree of risk management (4.12.2) and the 
presence of both good engineering standards and safety culture (6.8). 
 
8.6.9   Materials and Construction.  
• What materials have been used in the construction of the aircraft? 
• Why and how have these materials been used for their specific roles? 
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• What methods and standards have been used in the design verification and 
construct assurance of the aircraft? (E.g. Critical Design Review, etc.) Please 
provide evidence. 
• What is the structural safety factor for the aircraft? Have any analysis been 
conducted on the stresses imposed during all stages of flight? Please provide 
evidence. 
• How have any identified limitations, in design or test, been recorded and 
communicated within the design, maintenance and operational teams? (E.g. 
maximum flight hours of the aircraft, material fatigue issues, non-destructive 
testing application, etc.) Please provide evidence. 
• What controls are present to ensure that correct procedures, parts and tools are used 
in the construct and maintenance of the system? 
• What measures have been taken to ensure that all personnel are appropriately 
trained and have been deemed suitably competent to work on the system? 
• What measures have been taken to ensure that all personnel behaviours and 
attitudes are safe and appropriate for working on the system?  
 
Again these questions explore the fundamental engineering principles being applied to the 
aircraft. A simple and cheap UAV may rely upon a pre-manufactured (COTS) recreational 
airframe. Reference to manufacturer’s data sheets and specifications may give a degree of 
supporting information whilst additional data may be gathered from evolutionary tests in 
relatively benign conditions (e.g. climatic chambers, wind tunnels, etc.). This type of 
foundational work carried out would align with established engineering and safety 
management best practices (4.11, 4.12.22) 
 
The latter series of questions starts to delve into some of the more systemic behaviours and 
attitudes within the team. The last question is open ended with the intent that it offers the 
UAV company an opportunity to create a foundation to work from. For a relatively large 
company there may be an opportunity to include results of psychometric analysis or 
behaviour mapping which may have been used as part of a recruitment technique or in-
company process safety mapping. For relatively small companies the response may be 
quite a personal piece of text explaining the backgrounds of the individuals involved with 
 237 
the project and how they behave in general terms. A typical example response from a small 
company may look like this; 
 
UAVs ‘R’ Us is a small company which consists of me, the Chief Engineer, Ron 
Baxter; a Mechanical Engineer, Dave Watkins and a Pilot, Mike Rogers. I have 
known both Dave and Mike for over ten years as we all worked at Sony Aerospace 
on the Moon-shot V project. 
 
Neither Ron nor I have ever been in trouble with the police though Dave has been 
caught speeding twice in the last four years. We regularly meet up socially for a 
drink and to discuss the UAV project. We do not drink whilst we are working on, or 
flying, the aircraft.  
 
As the project’s Chief Engineer, and a long standing Chartered Engineer, I am fully 
aware of the requirements to behave professionally, diligently and with cognisance 
to others who may be affected by my actions. Our experience and training in the 
aerospace industry has a great effect upon our attitudes and behaviours towards 
safety, especially when dealing with an aircraft. We ensure that we are all fine for 
work by having a cup of tea together as a team every afternoon; by doing this we 
learn about each others problems both with the aircraft and at home. All of the 
designing, building and flying of the aircraft has been done as a team effort; any 
issues which have arisen have also been dealt with as a team. This way we can 
discuss all of the options available to us and review each others work. 
 
8.6.10   Hazardous Materials. 
• Please provide a list of all potentially hazardous materials that are contained within 
the system. (E.g. Man Made Fibres (e.g. Kevlar, fibreglass, carbon fibre, etc.), 
Batteries (e.g. Lithium, Cadmium, etc.), pyrotechnics (e.g. parachute reef line 
cutters, flight termination cutting charges, etc.)). 
• Have these hazardous materials been risk assessed? Please provide evidence. 
• Have these hazardous materials been assessed for their environmental impact? 
Please provide evidence. 
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Identifying hazardous materials forms the first few steps in managing and estimating any 
risks within the system (4.12.2, 4.12.2.1). A basic brainstorming exercise will allow a list of 
hazardous materials to be generated. The following example is typically what the author 
would envisage; 
 
Hazard Location  Hazard Source Specific Hazard Mitigation / Control Measures 
UAV fuel tanks Fuel 
Fire, Explosive 
Atmosphere, Skin 
Irritant 
No naked lights, Fuel at launch 
site only, Use of competent 
persons, Ensure adequate 
ventilation, 
UAV 
Pyrotechnics 
Minor Pyros 
Fire, explosive dust, 
detonation. 
Ensure appropriate training, Use 
self contained items, 
UAV fuselage & 
wings 
Man Made 
Fibres (MMF) 
Inhalation of MMF dust Appropriate Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE), Training 
 
Having identified the source of the hazard a method of mitigating and/or controlling it may 
also be identified; any hazards which require further attention before sentencing may be set 
aside as appropriate. This list of hazardous materials may also be used to base the 
environmental hazard assessment upon. 
 
8.6.11   Command & Control System.  
• What type of Command & Control link is used by the system? (E.g. Radio 
Frequency, Laser, etc.) Please provide details. 
• What frequency and data encoding does the system operate on? Are the frequencies 
registered with the national authority for spectrum management? Please provide 
details. (E.g. Bandwidth, Emission/Modulation type (e.g. AM/FM/FSK/TDM, etc.) 
• Is there technical redundancy built into the command and control system? (e.g. 
‘Hot’ standby transceivers, etc.) 
• What antennas are used within the system? (E.g. directional, omni-directional, etc.) 
• Is the performance of the command and control link aligned with the expectations 
of the flight/mission requirements? Will the link be operating at the limits of its 
operational budget? Please provide details. 
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• Is the system reliant on an on-board autopilot? Please provide details and an 
overview of its operation. 
• Does the system respond to de-faulted and pre-set commands at the loss of 
command link? (E.g. enters a loiter phase, climbs and holds, deploys a parachute, 
etc.) Please provide details. 
• What form of resilience and interference testing has been conducted on the system? 
(E.g. Electro-Magnetic Interference, Mutual Compatibility with other sub-systems, 
etc.) Please provide details. 
 
These series of questions relate to the ability of the UAV pilot to effectively and safely 
control the aircraft during flight. The regulatory/supervisory body will be interested in the 
theoretical calculations and/or empirical testing that may have been carried out to ensure 
that control of the aircraft is guaranteed for the duration of the flight. For smaller UAV 
systems which have been based upon a recreational model aircraft there may be a 
requirement to demonstrate the effective coverage of the command link at the boundaries of 
the proposed flight plan. 
 
Cognisance should also be shown to other users of the frequency in use and the ability of 
one system to interfere with another. In the case of a command link failure does the UAV 
default to a state of level flight until command is recovered or it runs out of fuel? Simple 
compatibility checks and/or the use of a frequency band which is protected may be 
considered by the regulatory/supervisory body as an example of due diligence and 
acceptable risk management. 
 
8.6.12   Propulsion System. 
• What form of power-plant does the aircraft rely upon? (E.g. electric motor, turbo-
jet, turbo-fan, normally aspirated piston engine, etc.) Give details of performance 
characteristics. 
• Provide details of how the power-plant is tested before initial installation and before 
flight. 
• Provide details of how maintenance is carried out on the propulsion system. 
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• What form of fuel/energy supply does the aircraft require? (E.g. battery, hydrogen 
fuel-cells, etc.) 
• Is the power-plant designed and built as a bespoke item for the aircraft? Give 
details of the power-plant’s capability and limitations. 
• Provide details of how the power-plant and fuel/energy supply has been designed 
and proven to minimise/avoid fuel starvation and/or interruptions? (E.g. Anti-
Vibration Fuel and Power Connectors, Carburettor Icing, Fuel Line Cavitations, 
etc.) 
• How is the power-plant connected to the rotor or propeller? For rotor driven aircraft 
please describe the complete drive system including any clutch and/or 
disengagement mechanisms. 
• Can the power-plant be re-started during flight? Please provide details. 
• What mechanism is used to communicate to the operator how much flight 
endurance is remaining? What and how is endurance data gathered on-board and 
displayed to the operator? 
 
These questions continue to explore the fundamental engineering principles and level of 
good engineering practice being applied to the aircraft. The initial questions will allow the 
regulatory/supervisory body to make judgements on the type of competency and experience 
required to support and effectively manage the platform described. For example, jet 
powered UAVs are relatively specialised and require regular inspection of the turbine 
blades whilst normally aspirated power plants may suffer from increased wear and/or 
vibration. Subsequently, maintenance regimes will differ as will the level of competency 
required. 
 
The fuel/energy supply feeds heavily into the degree of hazards present and subsequent risk 
assessment and management techniques used. Energy cells such as batteries may require 
venting of toxic gases and may quickly cause a fire if inappropriately handled. The 
questions relating to fuel starvations or energy supply interruptions will indicate if the 
system has been designed and engineered as a holistic entity; the preliminary design for the 
aircraft should identify how the specification meets the requirements of the customer. 
Reverse engineering some overlooked requirements may be costly or simply unworkable.  
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The question relating to any clutch or disengagement system for rotary wing powered 
UAVs relates to the ability of the aircraft to attain auto-rotation, thereby minimising the 
energy at ground impact, despite suffering a catastrophic power plant failure. 
Understanding how much endurance remains within the aircraft is paramount when 
embarking on relatively lengthy flights; flying into head winds and at lower altitudes, 
especially when carrying payloads, may completely ruin any theoretical calculations. 
 
8.6.13   Performance Limitations. 
• What is the Maximum All-Up-Mass of the aircraft for flight? Please provide details 
of these calculations. 
• What is the maximum speed attainable for the aircraft within the environmental 
limitations specified? This figure should take into account the maximum 
permissible tailwind for energy calculations in accordance with the UK Civil 
Aviation Authority’s policy on Civil Light UAVs (Maximum energy of 95kJ). 
• Are there any regulatory or supervisory limitations imposed on the aircraft? Please 
provide details if applicable. 
• How has any flight or operational limitations been communicated to the operator? 
Please provide details if applicable. 
 
Mass and velocity information will allow the regulatory/supervisory body to calculate the 
potential kinetic energy exhibited at impact with the ground (3.12.1). This calculation 
allows the regulatory/supervisory body to fully align itself with extant CAA Light UAV 
policies for civil operated UAVs.  
 
Additional information on the physical layout and shape of the aircraft may allow the 
regulatory/supervisory body to veer and haul CAA guidance on a subjective basis based 
upon aerodynamic drag (bluff body characteristics, table 3.3) and/or any built-in arrestor 
systems (e.g. parachute deployment). 
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8.6.14   Safety Overview. 
• How has safety been designed and engineered into the system? Please provide a 
predominantly textual narrative of how safety has been approached for the whole 
system. 
• Explain how any major sub-system, both Commercial-Off-The-Shelf and bespoke, 
have been integrated into the overall system. Please provide details of any ‘bench-
testing’ and/or ‘de-risking’ which have been carried out. 
• The use of simple diagrams may be useful to support the aforementioned points. 
 
The answers to these questions should reflect good safety management and safety 
engineering practice as stated in 4.10 and 4.11. Some responses will automatically jump 
into a ‘hard engineering’ analysis; such a response should encourage the 
regulatory/supervisory body to engage further and ask for additional information on how 
the ‘softer’ and people aspects (5.9) of safety management was implemented. Training, 
experience and competency should play an important part here (5.9). 
 
Typical responses should include reference to safety arrangements (6.10.3) such as the use 
of safety committees, safety management plans and systems as well as identifying any 
industry safety models which may have been used. A degree of independence within design 
reviews or safety reviews would add further credence to the answer. Smaller companies 
may decide to ask the regulatory/supervisory body to allocate an independent reviewer to 
validate any observations. 
 
As stated in previous questions, there is a clear need for the safety aspects to have been 
treated holistically and to have been ‘grown’ from inception to delivery. 
 
8.6.15   Safety Assumptions and/or Boundary Conditions. 
• Please provide details of any assumptions and/or boundary conditions used in the 
design, manufacture or operation of the system? (E.g. Maximum altitude, 
Maximum rate of turn, Minimum temperature, etc.) 
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• How have these assumptions and/or boundary conditions been carried through the 
life of the system? (E.g. Design Reviews, Documented within operating manuals, 
etc.) 
• Who has agreed and authorised the design and technical reviews? Please provide 
details. (E.g. Chief Engineer, Chartered Engineer, Engineering Consultant, etc.) 
 
Systems Engineering demands that boundaries are consciously understood at the initial 
stages of providing a solution to a problem (1.6). Very often the problem area, and 
therefore the boundaries of the solution, are incorrectly defined and quickly lead to 
problems such as ‘requirement creep’, extended costs, a solution which is a ‘jack-of-all- 
trades and master of none’ and of course, suffering from an inappropriate safety case. By 
ensuring that the boundaries and assumptions are well defined at the initial stage the 
project may be designed and evolved in its engineering and safety related aspects 
concurrently and in a co-ordinated manner (4.10, 4.11). 
 
The use of a Chief Engineer and/or individuals with professional standing convey the fact 
that the UAV is being managed and owned by senior managers within the company (6.8, 
6.10). Recognised and accredited professional bodies, through interview and revision of 
formal qualifications and experience, provide much needed assurances of the type of 
individual and behaviours required at certain levels. For example, prospective Chartered 
Engineers are required to hold first degrees, hold a position of responsibility and to have 
gained some form of experience in an engineering management position, prior to being 
accepted by the Engineering Council as a Chartered Engineer. Whilst such accreditation 
may not guarantee that the individual will always act with professional integrity, the fact 
remains that professional status requires a considerable amount of time and effort to 
achieve and subsequently sets a default mindset which is honourable. It should also be 
noted that professional status, in some trades, brings with it accountability for personal 
actions by law. 
 
8.6.16   Safety Traces / Safety Boundaries. 
• Please provide details of any surface area and/or any volume of airspace which 
requires delineation and segregation in order to manage risk exposure. This will 
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take the form of a scale drawing and will be formally authorised by the appropriate 
system design authority. (E.g. Launch Safety Trace for energetic launchers (e.g. Jet-
Assisted-Take-Off, ‘Bungee Launchers’, Compressed Gas Launchers, etc.), 
Recovery Areas (E.g. Parachute Recovery to Land, Snag Wire Recovery, etc.)). 
• All Safety Traces / Safety Boundaries must include information on all flight 
parameters. (E.g. Operating Height, Speed, Track, Attitude, etc.) 
• All Safety Traces / Safety Boundaries must include a full description of the 
methodology used to identify the area, or volume of airspace, at risk. 
• All Safety Traces / Safety Boundaries which incorporate wind allowances must 
include simple calculations to enable computation of mean wind to the maximum 
applicable height of the safety trace. 
 
Safety information such as scale drawings must be authenticated by the design authority of 
the subject system. The regulatory/supervisory body may require sight of the base 
assumptions (boundary conditions) as well as the mathematical calculations which support 
the safety trace information. The assumptions will list typical variables which have been 
included within the safety calculations; for example an UAV launch launched by a JATO 
system will need to take into account the possibility of the JATO detonating rather than 
operating in the correct manner. For such an event the safety trace may need to preclude 
all personnel within a radius of many hundreds of metres from the launch site. For 
platforms which are launched by less energetic methods such as hand launching there may 
be a safety trace of a few metres and the use of an exclusion zone for other personnel 
within a few tens of metres to minimise slips, trips and falls. 
 
Parachute recovery may at first seem like a an easy method of recovering a target and 
minimising any damage from impact; additionally it may help to satisfy the requirement to 
limit the kinetic energy at impact to within the CAA’s limit (3.12.1). Key to such a safety 
argument is the probability calculated for the parachute not opening meaning that impact 
with the ground would be at a much greater energy level; could this prove fatal? When the 
parachute opens correctly the direction and strength of the wind may take the UAV out of 
the prescribed operating area and create a hazard greater than were it to have failed and 
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plummeted to the ground within it. Such occurrences could include an UAV drifting on a 
parachute onto a major road, into a busy shopping centre or even a school playground. 
 
The safety trace information will be quantitative as far as diagrams and scale drawings are 
concerned but will rely heavily on a qualitative narrative to explain and support the 
methodology and assumptions included within it. 
 
8.6.17   Flight Termination System.  
• Is the UAV system fitted with a Flight Termination System? If so, please provide 
details of its operation. Please ensure that the details supplied identify the method 
by which flight is terminated. (E.g. is flight terminated by driving control surfaces 
or by initiating an explosive device? 
• Does the Flight Termination System rely upon the prime operational ‘Command & 
Control’ link or is it a completely independent system? Please provide details. 
• Does the Flight Termination System default to a ‘safe’ or ‘flight terminated’ state if 
the Command & Control link is lost? Please provide details. 
• Please provide a simple safety analysis of the Flight Termination System, including 
a quantitative (probabilistic) approach, to system integrity. This analysis must 
demonstrate any critical causal paths and methods employed for mitigation and 
reliability assurance. 
• How has the Flight Termination System been tested for reliability? Have any 
engineering or safety standards been used in the system’s design and/or 
manufacture? Please provide evidence. 
• Please provide details of any reliability testing and/or instances where the system 
has failed to operate. These details should include results of any design reviews, 
reliability/suitability testing such as electromagnetic interference, environmental 
testing and system testing following integration into the aircraft. 
 
The author believes that any UAV which uses a Flight Termination System (FTS) must 
communicate the effectiveness and robustness of the termination process to the 
regulatory/supervisory body in a predominantly quantitative manner. Whilst a qualitative 
narrative will be required to explain the assumptions and conditions behind the safety 
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argument the regulatory/supervisory body may require an ultimate quantitative figure to 
ensure alignment with the HSE’s tolerability framework. The author, from experience, 
suggests that FTS systems are predominantly used, in the true sense of flight termination, 
on platforms which operate at relatively medium to high altitudes and with relatively high 
speeds. The potential energy available from such an UAV impacting with the ground is 
relatively large and is probably orders of magnitude greater than those levels specified by 
the CAA. 
 
The regulatory/supervisory body may require the quantitative analysis to take the form of 
an FTA which may decompose the final event of a terminate action (e.g. explosive charge 
initiation, servo actuation of control services, etc.) down through the various components, 
including the command link. 
 
The qualitative component of the safety argument would communicate the various logic 
states of the FTA and relate them to the various individual components which were 
operational within the UAV at that point in time. 
 
8.6.18   Hazard Register and Failure Modes. 
• Please provide a list, or log, of all hazards and failure modes within the whole 
system and describe how they have been mitigated, or controlled, to an appropriate 
state.  
• This list/log will include not only items which are based on the pre-dominant, ‘hard 
engineering’ sub-systems (e.g. aircraft, command console, etc.) but the whole 
operation as a system (e.g. impact of weather change whilst aircraft is airborne, 
recovery of aircraft components following a crash, etc.) 
• Please identify within the list/log any hazards which are mitigated, or controlled, by 
procedure. 
• This list/log will clearly identify first, second and even third order hazards so that 
all parties are aware of roles and responsibilities; such a list/log will clearly identify 
who owns any particular hazard or risk. 
• Please describe the process on how the list/log was assembled. Who participated in 
the exercise?  
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• Has the list/log been independently verified? Please provide details. 
• Has the list/log been revisited as the project has matured? Have ‘lessons learnt’ 
from incidents and/or trials been fed into the list/log? Please provide evidence. 
 
A simple hazard register may be created in a similar manner to the hazardous materials 
log described within 8.6.10. The hazard register augments the hazardous materials log and 
communicates to the regulatory/supervisory body that an effective degree of hazard 
identification for the whole operation has occurred within the project (4.11). A typical 
response from a small UAV company may look like the following; 
 
Hazard Location  Hazard Source Specific Hazard Mitigation / Control Measures 
UAV aircraft. Fuel. Fire and Explosion from 
lightning or high static. 
Preclude operations on fully 
assembled aircraft during 
thunderstorms. Earthing systems. 
UAV aircraft. Impact with 
public property. 
Destruction of property, 
bodily harm or death. 
All flights conducted by 
competent and current UAV pilot. 
UAV Launcher 
Unit. 
Stored energy in 
launch springs. 
Strike by inadvertent 
release of bogie causing 
bodily harm or death. 
Use cordoned area & safety key. 
Do not leave charged system 
unsupervised. 
UAV aircraft. Parachute 
ejection system. 
Facial or limb strike by 
parachute ejector cover 
when working on live 
system pre-launch. 
Safety pins to be removed during 
pre-launch checks. Use of trained 
and competent launch crew. 
Warning signs on fuselage. 
 
Smaller and simpler UAV project teams may not have conducted a formal HAZOP exercise 
(4.12.2.1) but will have considered listing the predominant risks in a table following a 
‘brainstorming’ exercise. The hazards identified should encompass all potential hazards 
that may risk the safety of the operation; these will include hard engineering issues, people 
issues as well the environment of operation. 
 
8.6.19   Residual risks. 
• Please list all residual hazards and failure modes inherent within the complete 
system. 
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• It is essential that any outstanding and/or residual risks are given the required level 
of focus to ensure that they remain within the identified boundaries. This approach 
also minimises any opportunity for an independent safety assessor to erroneously 
believe that all identified system hazards have been effectively neutralised through 
the control and mitigation process.  
 
The ability of an UAV project team to highlight and disclose the residual hazards within 
their system shows both maturity and cognisance to other parties that may be affected. 
Many of the residual items may be discussed with the  regulatory/supervisory body who 
may offer guidance and support on various methods that may be used to mitigate and/or 
limit the consequences and likelihood of an event occurring. In the author’s experience it 
may be requested by the regulatory/supervisory for the UAV to be operated in a relatively 
benign environment prior to being allowed to operate in a ‘riskier’ environment. 
 
8.6.20   Environmental Information. 
• What environmental assessment has been conducted on the complete system?  
• What impact will the system have upon its operating environment? Sufficient 
information must be included to demonstrate that an effective and consolidated 
environmental impact assessment has been conducted.  
• What environmental research and/or risk assessments have been conducted to 
identify any environmental issues? (E.g. fuel spillages, fire risks, noise 
contamination, man-made fibre contamination, etc.) 
• What instructions and (emergency) procedures are in place to manage, control and 
mitigate any environmental occurrences? 
• How has the support/operational team been briefed on instigating those procedures? 
Please provide evidence. 
• Do the environmental risk assessments deal with any social impact of operating the 
system in the vicinity of the general public? (E.g. how noisy is the system? Could it 
become a nuisance to third parties? etc). Such information must demonstrate the 
application of due diligence, and cognisance, to third parties who may be within the 
periphery of the operation. (E.g. Noise during launch, Exhaust fumes, etc.) 
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It should be noted that for any flights scheduled to be flown over the sea, or within littoral 
environments, specific requirements are placed upon the operator of the UAV and the 
owner/operator (if applicable) of the sea area (e.g. T&E Ranges). Any article(s) which may 
be deposited into the sea, regardless of any intent to recover to land, requires a full 
materials list of the system to be provided to the Environmental Agency, or licensed 
authority acting on its behalf, (e.g. Range Operator). The materials list allows the authority 
to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) and/or the Food & Environmental Protection Act (FEPA), as appropriate. 
 
These series of questions focus specifically upon the environmental impact of the UAV 
operation on the flora, fauna and human components which may be affected by the activity. 
A typical response may identify that the noise from the power plant is irritating rather than 
too loud; control measures to help minimise complaints from the public may suggest that 
no engine runs are to be conducted before 09:00hrs and after 17:00hrs. 
 
If the UAV activity demands that hydrocarbon based fuels are to be used for the power 
plant then fuel stores may require the appropriate degree of bunding to ensure that storage 
leaks are minimised and that a designated area is used for aircraft fuelling. The latter may 
demand the use of drip trays and for emergency spill kits to be made available. 
 
Whilst the whole operation must be supported by the appropriate risk and hazardous 
substance assessments, there is an overriding requirement for emergency procedures to be 
at hand to ensure that any occurrences, which have the potential to impact upon the 
environment, are effectively dealt with. 
 
8.6.21   Training, Competence and Responsibilities for Health and Safety. 
• How are the managers and workforce within your organisation made aware of their 
responsibilities for health and safety? How does your organisation ensure that those 
individuals fully understand the health and safety risks associated with their roles 
and tasks? 
• How does the organisation ensure that the health and safety related instructions and 
procedures used are appropriate for the level of understanding that the staff may 
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have in that area? How are the principles of the risks and control measures 
effectively communicated to those staff? 
• How does the organisation allow any individuals to feed back any issues or 
uncertainties regarding health and/or safety to the organisation’s controlling mind? 
• How does the organisation demonstrate a clear understanding of those aspects of 
the tasks which are critical to safety? 
• How are individuals within your organisation consulted to establish their 
foundational and developmental training needs? These training needs relate to any 
health, safety and/or technical requirements of the organisation. 
• Please identify any competence gaps within your organisation, e.g. technical, 
safety, managerial, flying, etc. By identifying any competence requirements the 
supervising authority may work with your organisation to overcome them and to 
assign the appropriate degree of support and supervision. 
 
These series of questions relate the understanding of safety from within the UAV project to 
the regulatory/supervisory body. This is a qualitative assessment and relies heavily upon 
the competency, training and experience of the regulatory/supervisory body to tease-out 
and understand the depth of skills embedded within the UAV organisation (6.13.1). 
 
Manager and workforce awareness and attitude towards a positive safety culture are 
affected greatly by the level of communication within the organisation (6.12). For larger 
companies, the regulatory/supervisory body may explicitly require related information on 
both the company as a whole and from the UAV project team due to the prevalence of sub-
cultures within larger organisations (6.11). Effective communications allow positive safety 
arrangements (6.10.3) to be created across the whole organisation including management 
safety meetings and safety management plans. 
 
The competency and experience profiles of key individuals such as Designers, Chief 
Engineers, Lead Engineers, Supervisors and Pilots, when supplied to the 
regulatory/supervisory body, will convey the UAV organisation’s abilities in a qualitative 
way. Note that formal training in general health and safety may be weak in some 
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organisations (6.10.5) and therefore there is a clear need to understand what the standards 
are within the UAV company. 
 
8.6.22   Employment Security and Satisfaction. 
• How secure do you consider your organisation’s future? (There is no requirement to 
state any financial or confidential business information here.) 
• How important to your organisation’s future is this activity? What are the 
implications (if any) of slippages to your planned timeline? 
• What is the typical staff turn-over rate in your part of the organisation? Have any of 
your team members recently left or joined your team; if so, why? 
• What impact do you consider that job security has on safety within your 
organisation? 
• Does this UAV activity involve any repetitive or boring tasks to be conducted by 
any members of your team? 
• What mitigations are in place to minimise, or highlight, any departure from 
procedure? Please provide details. 
• How does your organisation challenge and motivate its staff? 
• How does the organisation measure job satisfaction within its staff? What does it do 
with the results? 
 
Adverse reactions from work related pressure may affect a manager’s ability to operate 
efficiently and safely (6.10.4). The whole UAV team may be under some form of pressure to 
deliver a successful series of flights; these pressures will be somewhat different for a senior 
manager that it would be for a team member like a technician. The pressures will also vary 
considerably if the team is a small and rather personal unit rather than a part of a major 
company. Small companies may have personal contributions of money at stake; houses may 
have been mortgaged or money may have been borrowed to enable the activity to take 
place. Such personal risks may bring with them a degree of risk taking in order to reduce 
costly timelines or to fulfil promises made to others. Larger companies may use peer 
pressure to greatly influence the decision making process that a senior manager may take 
in tackling a problem. The regulatory/supervisory body would seek to understand how 
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important the UAV project is to the team and to understand how the activities fit into a 
larger activity or business opportunity. 
 
Regulators and supervisors, from experience, understand that it is very difficult to try to 
identify and formally record every activity that may be carried out on an UAV system to 
allow it to be constructed, operated and maintained in a formal manner. There are always 
opportunities for issues or faults to be raised which have not had an instruction written for 
them; it is on these occasions that the indigenous and positive safety culture of the team 
will be relied upon. Any variations from, or vagueness within, the written procedures 
should be instantly raised with the Chief Engineer and dealt with appropriately. Upon the 
reporting of such instances the team may be offered a team reward to both support the safe 
and professional attitude and to motivate. 
 
8.6.23   Work Related Pressure. 
• How often within your organisation is safety relegated due to financial and/or 
operational pressures? 
• Does your organisation consider that processes may need to be accelerated or 
changed, on occasions, in order to deliver an important operational requirement? If 
so, then how is this done? 
• Is there sufficient staff available to enable tasks to be completed without undue 
pressure or excessive overtime? As a percentage, or effective man-hours, what is 
the typical overtime level for the team involved with this planned activity? 
• Do the supervisors and staff within the team feel comfortable that flying operations 
could be halted on safety grounds despite high operational and delivery pressures? 
Provide a degree of evidence to support this response; e.g. company policy, 
operational briefings, personal e-mail exchanges, etc. 
 
These questions explore in more depth many of the issues raised in the preceding questions. 
However these questions are less subtle and demand some quite candid answers on the 
UAV company’s behaviours. A degree of cross-checking with previous questions may be 
used by the regulatory/supervisory body to help unveil the organisation’s true attitude 
towards, and understanding of, safety. Fatigue, through excessive hours of work, has been 
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shown to be a major contributor to air accidents, especially within the military; sight of 
any policies or work rosters may provide sufficient information on manning in support of 
any operations. 
 
8.6.24   Safety Related Organisational Communication. 
• How do individuals, including supervisors and managers, communicate any 
concerns and issues upwards through the management chain to the controlling mind 
of the organisation? Please provide evidence. 
• How are contractors and support staff communicated with? Are there any ‘full 
loop’ checks in place to ensure that information is communicated appropriately? 
Please provide evidence. 
• What mechanisms are in place to ensure that appropriate information is exchanged 
at shift handover; e.g. in support of day and night operations, or in support of long 
endurance operations, etc. 
• Do the current staffing levels within the organisation contribute to effective health 
and safety management? 
• How does your organisation ensure that health and safety is taken seriously by all 
members of staff and that it is not merely an ‘overhead’ to protect the management? 
• How does your organisation ensure that information relating to accidents, incidents 
or any unplanned event is communicated to the relevant and appropriate staff? 
Please provide evidence. 
 
Periodic briefings (e.g. daily, weekly, etc.) by the management and supervisors help 
communicate business and operational agendas; safety should be entwined within such 
briefings and not ‘bolted on’ as a ‘must have’ or ‘need to do’. Such briefings should be 
conducted in an informal, or at worse, a semi-formal manner, so that the environment is 
less intimidating for the feedback from the team. 
 
In the interests of a holistic attitude towards safety, any third parties such as support 
contractors should be included in the periodic briefs. If there are commercial issues to be 
discussed then these may be taken outside the briefings if they constitute no threat of safety 
to others.  
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The issue of handover instructions from one operational crew to another has been cited 
many times in recent years as a major contribution to incidents which have resulted in 
personal injury and death; recent related examples that the author has cited in this thesis is 
the BP Texas City incident of 2005 (1.2) and the Piper Alpha oil platform incident of 1988 
(4.4). Long endurance flights of UAVs may require handovers of both pilots and engineers, 
including ground crew; the regulatory/supervisory body may require sight of pre-planned 
briefings to accommodate such handovers. 
 
8.6.25   Accident, Incident and Near-Miss Management. 
• What training and competences are in place within your organisation to allow 
accidents, incidents and/or near-misses to be effectively analysed? 
• How does your organisation identify true root causation; are some investigations 
classified as ‘human error’? Please provide evidence. 
• Does your organisation consider management and policy influences as important as 
engineering and human factors in investigations? Provide a degree of evidence to 
support this response. 
• How are accidents, incidents and near-misses reported within your organisation? 
Please provide evidence. 
• How does your organisation hold individuals accountable for their actions and/or 
inactions? Please provide evidence. 
• How is the information on any accident, incident or near-miss communicated 
within the organisation? Please provide evidence. 
• Is any feedback, in the guise of reports or briefings, given to the staff who were 
involved in the accident, incident or near-miss? Provide a degree of evidence to 
support this response. 
 
Fault and/or accident investigation is well structured within the manned aircraft 
environment; it is imperative that the same issues are dealt with in a similar manner within 
the unmanned environment, especially if the root causes are to be determined and fed back 
into the operation to minimise recurrences. As the civil light UAV market is still within its 
infancy the industry must take relatively cautious and professional steps forward as it gains 
public interest. To be shown as an uncaring, unconscious and amateur company will not 
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bode well for public or even industry acceptance. Specialist courses are available to 
support companies with a need to understand accident causation; the 
regulatory/supervisory body may draw conclusions based upon the absence or presence of 
suitable experience and/or training. 
 
It was highlighted in the research on safety culture how commitment to safety by senior 
management and feedback on issues (6.8) were seen as positive attributes of a good safety 
culture. An open and honest attitude to incident reporting within the team, combined with 
appropriate root cause analysis training, will deliver good opportunities to understand true 
root causation. For smaller UAV companies the ability to sit down as a team and discuss 
all of the components involved with an occurrence may be shown as an example of good 
practice, especially if notes are made and lessons learnt. From the author’s experiences 
one of the greatest hurdles to overcome in any analysis of an occurrence is the actual 
realisation that a degree of investigation is required; so often an incident or occurrence is 
sentenced as a ‘mishap’ or ‘human error’ and is quickly ignored and/or forgotten. 
 
8.6.26   Adherence to Instructions and Procedures. 
• Does your organisation consider that some procedures and/or instructions can be 
changed to allow a task to be completed more efficiently? If so, then give some 
examples on how and why this was done. 
• How often do staff, or teams, breach an instruction and/or procedures to deliver an 
operational requirement or complete a task? If so, then please give some examples 
and provide information on how such occurrences are minimised. 
• How are extant instructions and/or procedures by-passed or re-engineered? Do 
some managers and/or supervisors have the authority to implement such 
deviations? Is so, then how and why? 
• What procedures and/or mechanisms are in place to allow staff to communicate to 
managers that health and safety instructions and/or procedures have been breached? 
• How does the organisation ensure that a positive safety attitude is promoted? 
Provide a degree of evidence to support this response. 
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These last series of questions allow the regulatory/supervisory body to further explore, in a 
qualitative manner, the UAV company’s maturity towards real-time operational and safety 
related issues. If the instructions and/or risk assessments have been written in isolation, 
without a degree of realism or experience, then the information contained within may not 
be appropriate or efficient for managing the task. It is upon such occasions that engineers 
and technicians deviate to overcome a real-world problem without due consideration for 
any formal assessment of risk; the ‘coal face’ operator gets too involved in completing the 
immediate task. These questions not only challenge how the organisation minimises such 
occurrences but asks them, implicitly, if they are cognisant that such issues may occur 
within the UAV’s project team. A relatively candid reply of “we have no incidents where 
our team don’t stick to procedures” would probably start to make the 
regulatory/supervisory body suspect that the dynamics of the team were not optimal for a 
positive safety culture. Honest answers, including examples of failures and/or breaches, 
combined with lessons learnt exercises, would certainly indicate that a good safety culture 
and honest relationship was present. 
 
Whilst blatant breaches of safety and gross incompetence may have to be dealt with in a 
very stringent manner, less serious events may be dealt with as a learning exercise which 
may foster and encourage open incident reporting. Information collected from such events 
may be used constructively as leading indicators and hopefully give sufficient warning 
before a major mishap occurs. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Guidance, Validation & Discussion 
 
9.1   Guidance on Completing the SCET. 
The author has erred on the side of caution in constructing guidance for completing the 
SCET. The fundamental principle of creating a safety argument for a system under scrutiny 
is that of allowing as much pertinent information as possible to be presented by the 
system’s owner, designer and/or operator.  
 
One of the dangers which may have resulted if a robust and lengthy guideline was created 
for SCET users could have been a relatively rigid model; such a model may have limited 
the amount and type of information which should have been presented and may also have 
introduced a fundamental bias or change in mindset. Such a mindset could effectively 
undermine the objectivity of the exercise and even affect the independency of the 
supervisory/regulatory body. If this approach had been adopted then the guideline would 
have become far too restrictive, onerous and prescriptive.  
 
Another more simplistic form of guideline could have been written in a form akin to a 
‘tick-box’ though the constructiveness and objectivity of completing such an exercise 
would have been extremely dubious. The author believes that the use of the SCET by any 
UAV organisation should not be in complete isolation and that the supervisory/regulatory 
body should remain open to communication and offer direction as necessary. For example 
such direction may include, as a function of platform complexity, a limit on word count, 
references to extant organisational or regulatory documentation, etc. It is reiterated that a 
safety case is designed to communicate a safety argument to another party and that for 
effective communication to take place all interactions should be two-way. 
 
Whilst the SCET within this paper includes example responses, they are included for 
contextual and academic purposes; these examples are not to be included if the SCET is 
issued for a real and genuine purpose of elicitating a safety argument. 
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9.2   First Level Review of the SCET by the O&STWG. 
The Operations and Safety Trials Working Group (O&STWG) is a body of SMEs, from 
within QinetiQ’s Air Centre, which meets quarterly to discuss safety and operational 
matters. It consists of senior safety, operational and technical managers from across the 
four Air Ranges and the UK’s Combined Aerial Target Systems (CATS). In order to 
provide the reader with an insight into the body’s qualifications, experience and 
professional status details of its competence is included in Appendix S. The author also 
believes that such a rich pedigree provides much needed credibility to this thesis, especially 
as it is based upon operations predominantly conducted within a very specialised field and 
by a very few specialised individuals. 
 
The working group was presented with the background for the thesis and given an 
overview of the three prime areas which have been investigated; the concept of developing 
a safety case structure for the civil light UAV environment, the use of a more qualitative 
approach to safety and the focus upon the human (people) element of organisations. Whilst 
comments were raised during the presentation, the majority of discussion took place at the 
end. 
 
The largest observation which struck the author was how those present were predominantly 
split into two general groups; the first being quite vocal and voicing concerns and 
comments which were wholly driven by their engineering (and quantitative) backgrounds. 
The second group were more pensive and thoughtful; probably reflecting deeper on what 
was being offered as a change in procedure and protocol; change being the key descriptor! 
The author believes that the first group were acting virtually on a reflex action; many of the 
questions which were voiced were very specific and very much driven by the extant 
methodologies applied to extant safety cases within the Ranges environment. What was 
interesting was how the first (vocal) group quickly became subdued as the second group 
started to explore the concepts through question, debate and open reflection. 
 
Three of those individuals present fell outside the two generalised groups; they had been 
heavily involved in the Synergy project and were aware of the wider influences of people 
within the engineering safety and operational safety environment. Two of the three have 
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just completed Masters level education in Safety Engineering and Health, Safety & 
Environmental Management; the third is approaching his final year in Defence Systems 
Engineering; the author believes that they are very much aware, and cognisant, of the 
concepts which were presented to them in the workshop. 
 
Once the initial flurry of questions and discussions had subsided, the author begun 
questioning their thoughts and comments on the concepts presented. Quite clearly, having 
taken time to carefully highlight some of the key conditions (minimal regulatory advice for 
civil light UAVs, importance of qualitative data and the high degree of human error within 
accidents and incidents) which underpinned the investigations, the whole group started 
engaging and discussing the concepts. A number of observations and issues were identified 
in the ensuing engagement; they are listed, in no particular order, below. 
 
• The SCET concept could work but only if the regulatory body (CAA) was content 
with its use. This thought is driven by the fact that the safety community is reliant 
upon a regulatory, and or legal framework, to work within. Despite the fact that the 
extant controls and compliance framework is minimal for civil light UAVs, the idea 
of adopting a revised (and even safer and tighter) regime, was seen by the working 
group as something that the regulator must agree to. 
• The idea that the SCET concept could be used by the T&E Ranges to create more 
rounded and ‘wholesome’ safety arguments for any small UAVs (either military or 
civilian) was agreed as acceptable. Notwithstanding the aforementioned view on 
regulatory adoption, the body believed that the final safety case would offer much 
more of an insight into the operating company’s state of health. It would be more 
difficult for them to hide behind numbers and lie. 
• The idea of reviewing qualitative data, as well as focussing on the culture related 
information, raised concerns regarding the competencies of the safety managers. 
Whilst some of the working group had received an introductory overview in human 
factors, this was believed to be merely a ‘taste’ of what the topic involved. The idea 
of using people related information to gather a greater insight into an organisation’s 
ability to plan, build and operate a safer product was received positively, but this 
was tempered by the fact that the challenging or regulating authority would require 
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a better understanding of what could be unveiled by adopting such an approach. 
This observation relating to the competency of the regulatory/supervisory body is 
fundamental to the effective use of the SCET. 
• Related to the preceding observation was the concept that whilst the current method 
of reviewing a safety case for an activity, or a system, was carried out by a single 
‘Trials Safety Manager’, the SCET may require a body of individuals to review the 
safety argument. Such a body need not be overly large, but could vary between two 
and maybe five individuals with specialist knowledge covering safety, systems and 
human factors engineering. The body could be increased and decreased in size as a 
direct function of the complexity, and/or the number of specialisms, covered by the 
system under scrutiny. 
 
9.3   Validation of the SCET. 
The author tested the SCET on three extant and fully operational UAV systems which had 
been operated on the UK’s T&E Ranges within the previous 12 months. These systems 
included; 
• A military UAV built and operated by a well established international defence 
company on behalf of the UK MoD. 
• A civil UAV which was built by a well established defence company, operated and 
maintained as an aerial target by QinetiQ. 
• An UAV designed and operated by Cranfield University as part of a joint project 
between a major international defence company and a number of academic partner 
institutions.  
 
Collectively the systems covered an extensive variety of technical disciplines, regulatory 
demands and organisational structures; such a variety provided a high degree of confidence 
that the SCET was indeed veritable across a wide application. Due to the sensitive 
commercial and security natures of the systems reviewed, the author cannot discuss 
specific elements of his findings; however, some brief and subjective observations are 
included in the following text. A qualitative validation of the SCET driven safety cases 
revealed a high degree of confidence that all pertinent safety and operational related 
information had been included. 
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The following table identifies the author’s observations and findings when comparisons 
were drawn between the SCET approach to constructing a safety argument and the more 
traditional, goal-based and quantitative approach. 
 
Matters covered within 
both approaches 
Matters covered within the 
traditional safety case 
Matters covered within 
the SCET 
 
Quantitative safety figures. 
Overall quantitative figure 
highlighting gross risk to public 
from complete system. 
Quantitative figure of safety 
system or command control  
sub-system failure. 
Overall system technical 
description. 
Some degree of dilution within 
the technical description. 
Greater granularity of system 
technical description. 
Operational description Some degree of dilution within 
the operational description. 
Greater granularity of system 
operational description. 
 Cursory information on design 
and manufacture; heavy reliance 
on quoting standards. 
Focus on engineering design  
& manufacture competence; 
including standards and people. 
 
Maintenance & Repair regime. 
No depth of how maintenance 
and repair is managed and/or 
delivered. 
Greater amount of information 
supplied regarding 
maintenance and repair. 
Competence of engineering 
staff. 
Dilution of competence 
requirements. 
Greater focus on competence 
of engineering staff. 
Competence of pilot/operator. Dilution of competence 
requirements. 
Greater focus on competence 
of pilot/operator. 
  Focus on organisational safety, 
culture & drivers. 
 Reliance on hierarchical 
command of responsibility. 
Focus on individual & team 
responsibilities. 
 No focus on operating 
environment. Work related 
pressure categorised and 
managed under European 
working-time directive. 
Focus upon operating 
environment including 
employment security and work 
related pressure. 
 
Table 9.1 – Comparison between SCET and goal-based safety cases. 
 
The left hand column of the table identifies those elements of the UAV systems which were 
covered by both the traditional and SCET approaches to safety case development. The 
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middle column lists those elements which were covered by the traditional safety case 
approach, but were not included in the SCET approach. The right hand column identifies 
those elements which were covered by the SCET approach but were not seen to be 
addressed within the traditional approach. 
 
The overarching conclusion from the analysis is that the SCET, through being more 
prescriptive and direct, demands much more detail of the sub-systems. This may merely be 
a function of the three reviewed safety cases but may also be an emergent property that the 
SCET has; the SCET is purposefully designed for the UAV industry and this brief 
qualitative analysis certainly provides evidence that it is targeting the correct sub-system 
areas. It should be reiterated that the detail is largely qualitative in nature and does not 
contain numerous amounts of numerical data to ‘back-up’ or justify relatively weak 
statements of activity. The only intensively numerical data is focussed upon the platform’s 
flight termination and control systems; this is predominantly to allow comparisons to be 
made with published regulatory risk criteria. 
 
The author was already aware that any questions related to the softer and wider issues of an 
organisation such as work pressure, working environment, competency of support staff and 
organisational culture would not be readily observed within the traditional goal-based 
safety case approach. Whilst this observation may hold true for the direct and explicit 
questioning related to the softer issues, it was alarming to see that competence and 
‘professional trust’ was a strong influence in an informal and implicit manner, especially in 
the context of safety. Of particular note was the specific example where an UAV system, 
which had been designed by an University, had been subjected to far less scrutiny by the 
Range safety organisations than systems that had been designed by other authorities. 
Follow-up discussions with members of the Range safety team, corroborated by the 
O&STWG, revealed a mindset which believed that the University, as a learned 
organisation, had a high degree of competency in system design through default; this was 
further driven by the fact that the individuals concerned believed that such an organisation 
would not have been so onerously driven by financial pressures. Such observations may, or 
may not, be accurate but they do provide an insight into some of the human related, 
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intangible and subjective thoughts that the supervisory/regulatory body may exhibit when 
trying to conclude if an UAV system is safe to fly, or not. 
 
The SCET itself may be utilised in two distinct ways; the first as a tool to aid an UAV 
organisation to comprehensively and diligently design, build and operate a system, and 
secondly as a skeleton by which supervisory and/or regulatory bodies may 
comprehensively review the complete system for a safe operation. If applied in its first 
guise the SCET may offer good opportunities for an UAV organisation to minimise costly 
re-design and re-engineering activities which may have only been uncovered at the final 
‘approval to fly’ phase. 
 
When applied in its second and predominant state the SCET acts as a screening function to 
eliminate some organisations which may be lacking in competency, and to clearly establish 
where more focus may be required before a robust safety case may be accomplished. The 
commercial opportunities offered by the expanding UAV market was highlighted and 
discussed in chapter three. Such opportunities will, without question, attract organisations 
(e.g. utility companies, media companies, private security companies, etc.) from outside the 
aerospace industry who may wish to build and operate bespoke UAV systems. The SCET 
would provide an excellent foundation by which a degree of technical assurance and 
compliance may be applied to any proposed UAV platform. Any organisations who are 
eliminated, or fail to provide the required level of assurance, may continue in dialogue with 
the supervisory/regulatory body and gain an understanding of what additional information 
and mitigations are required to advance towards an approval to operate. The SCET 
questions, and any subsequent responses, discriminate any potentially high-risk issues to 
the planned operation; further questions may then be asked by the supervisor or regulator to 
augment what has already been supplied. In a similar manner further questions may be 
added to the SCET as and when the ‘sense and avoid’ issue is effectively dealt with by the 
aerospace industry. 
 
9.4   Discussion. 
The intent of this thesis was to develop a revised approach for managing the safety aspects 
of operating civil Light UAVs within the UK; the need was identified by the extant 
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minimal level of regulatory requirements demanded by the CAA. Analysis of the civil 
UAV environment suggests that this minimal level of requirement is not driven by a 
specific and easily identifiable reason; it is suggested by the author that it is due, 
predominantly, to the fact that the regulatory bodies have not kept abreast with the changes 
within the business and technological arenas of the civil UAV market. The extant 
regulations are virtually wholly focussed upon the very sparse number of recreational 
designers and operators within the model aircraft world. The extant regulations have served 
these recreational users very well for many years but now, predominantly due to ‘loose’ 
categorisations and definitions, the potential is present for such minimal regulations to 
cause harm to the commercial civil UAV market unless tighter restrictions are imposed on 
any commercial venture. 
 
Whilst the SCET allows most, if not all, of the interested parties concerned with the 
development and operation of an UAV platform to gain an understanding of the type of 
engineering methodology which should be applied to achieve a safe and homogenous 
system it has a number of drawbacks. One of the fundamental tenets of any form of safety 
case is that of the provision of true, honest and system representative data. The traditional 
quantitative safety case demands many numerical elements to be provided which cannot be 
easily disguised; for example, the failure rate of a mechanical component may be constant 
under quoted stress and environmental criteria; the numerical answer is clearly defined. 
Within the SCET approach increased reliance is made of the qualitative and often 
subjective views of, at times, a team of individuals. Given the diversity of language and the 
way that different words can be arranged in different sequences, the message conveyed, 
both explicitly and implicitly, can change dramatically. The SCET demands quantitative 
data, predominantly in relation to the control & command and safety related flight 
termination system; this approach not only ensures compliance with published regulatory 
risk criteria but to limit the degree of ‘qualitative freedom’ which may be applied by any 
potentially unscrupulous UAV organisations. 
 
Another drawback that the SCET exhibits is the fact that due to its reliance upon a more 
qualitative approach it relies upon words, lots of them. Conscientious organisations will 
endeavour to provide as much detail as possible, quite possibly to a level of detail which 
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would make the task of scrutiny very laborious and even ineffective. Extant traditional 
safety cases can be very large and may exhibit a high word count; the SCET, by demanding 
information on human factors and other soft issues within the UAV organisations, will 
predominantly increase the level of supplied text. With this in mind the author suggests that 
word limits are applied to the information supplied and that, if appropriate, existing 
organisational and regulatory documentation should be merely referenced. Such an 
approach already exists in many professions which demand and rely upon fundamental 
source information in order to make important and long-standing decisions; examples 
include applications for Chartered Engineer status (CEng, 2010) and applications to 
become a medical doctor (UCAS, 2010). 
 
In instances where the supplied data is minimal in detail, relatively weak and/or deemed 
inappropriate by the regulatory/supervisory body then, as part of an interactive and iterative 
process, more information may be supplied on demand. Whilst unscrupulous organisations 
may decide to offer minimal information at first, and then to simply supply more on 
demand, the experience, expertise and professional judgement of the regulatory/supervisory 
body will no doubt sense the presence of iniquitousness. 
 
Having been immersed in the UAV environment for an extended period of time, the author 
believes that one of the key issues which is seriously affecting the whole civil UAV 
environment, certainly within the UK, is the ‘sense and avoid’ issue. Until a way forward is 
identified to deal with this impasse the potential for market and investment growth will 
continue to suffer from acute strangulation. This is true for most countries which have a 
relatively well established and structured airspace management policy for manned aircraft 
and struggle with the idea of allowing unmanned platforms to co-exist within the same 
piece of airspace. This thesis has not attempted to deal with the ‘sense and avoid’ issue 
though the SCET could be amended to incorporate any key elements which would underpin 
safe flying within shared airspace. 
 
Though the SCET does not tackle the ‘sense and avoid’ issues it does provide a framework 
by which a more vigorous and in-depth analysis may be made of the UAV system. The 
SCET attempts to provide the regulating or inspecting authority with a body of evidence 
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which is more ‘rounded’ in its approach; providing a better insight into many of the 
traditionally ignored aspects of engineering, safety and operations. By delving into the 
safety industry and those important components which it relies upon the author has 
uncovered an array of issues, predominantly concerned with the ‘softer’ parts of the system, 
- the human.  
 
 
 
Fig 9.1 - Diagram illustrating how qualitative data strengthens traditional safety cases and 
combines the people element of systems. 
 
Whilst the more traditional (certainly for the last thirty years) and established method of 
establishing that a system was safe is focussed upon numbers and probabilities, there is 
much to gain from the qualitative side of the equation. By adopting a more qualitative 
approach the tool for assessing and/or arguing safety can better accommodate the people 
aspects of the system under scrutiny; surely this is a step in the right direction when the 
 Original Form of Safety 
Argument 
Greater requirement to 
consider the people 
element. 
Heavily reliant on 
quantitative approaches 
Heavily influenced by traditional 
engineering mindsets. 
Civil Light UAVs 
Competence to understand 
and qualify a wider reaching 
body of evidence? 
Qualitative data used 
as ‘glue’ to join all 
elements together. 
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majority of failures and accidents within the industry are linked to human error. Figure 9.1 
illustrates the author’s thoughts on the revised safety approach. The qualitative component 
is seen as the mortar which is holding the key components (akin to building blocks) 
together to create a more detailed and valuable argument for the system as a whole. Upon 
reflection the concept of using a more qualitative approach seems relatively acceptable and 
would seem to align with some of the principles of good common sense such as 
practicality, discernment and sensibility.  
 
The author believes that whilst the qualitative component offers another way of assessing 
and processing information, in a way which is parallel to the quantitative way that we use, 
he strongly believes it has much more to offer. Qualitative data provides so much richness 
and context to the whole aspect of a system. Whilst he acknowledges the difficulty that can 
arise in trying to create a safety argument based wholly upon qualitative data, the author 
envisages an approach which combines the qualities of both approaches. In plain terms it 
could be said that the ‘safety pendulum’ has swung too far into the quantitative direction 
over the past few years; it may be time to start bringing it back in the other direction for a 
more balanced view to be made available. Such an approach aligns very strongly with the 
work of Hollnagel (2004) and his suggestion that trends in attributed accident causation has 
changed over time. Figure 6.1 illustrates how accident investigation and the sentencing of 
causation is now focussing more upon organisational failures such as inappropriate 
cultures, behaviours and attitudes.  
 
It has already been highlighted in Chapter 7 how UAVs, in general terms, are challenging 
many of the established and more traditional concepts of safety management. Figure 7.1 
illustrated how the light civil UAV regulatory environment compares with other flying 
activities within the procedural and residual risk categories. Given that there is no human 
aboard, the mindset of life preservation from both the pilot’s perspective and that of the 
support organisation (e.g. design, maintenance, repair, etc.)  are possibly not vested as 
strongly or as emphatically as within a manned aircraft. Quite clearly from this lucid 
comparison there is a clear and immediate need to include a wider reaching and greater 
variety of non-quantitative and ‘softer’ engineering elements in any safety argument to 
support UAV flying operations. The need to include the human element, specifically the 
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culture within an organisation has been shown as being important in the overall scheme of 
safety within an operating system. By incorporating the human element with that of the 
technical aspects of the system the resulting output appears to offer a much ‘rounder’ and 
wholesome argument of system safety and integrity. Whilst human factors engineering has 
been present within the manned flight environment for many decades, its use within the 
UAV environment is still relatively light; any human factors engineering which is present is 
predominantly focussed towards operator (pilot) training, competency and currency rather 
than systematically being applied throughout the wider system.  
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CHAPTER 10 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
10.1   Conclusions. 
The author believes that there is a need for a relatively large change in mindset if a more 
qualitative and ‘people’ orientated safety case is to be adopted within the general 
engineering environment. Within, and peripheral, to the industry of T&E, the author is 
cognisant of the fact that the current safety mindset is heavily biased by the probabilistic 
and goal driven regulations which utilise quantitative safety analysis. Whilst quantitative 
approaches appear to be objective, in reality they may be judgmental. Such judgements 
may be quite explicit where data is not available but can be quite implicit where both 
numerical and qualitative data is present; for the latter these judgements may be 
unrecognised and lead to serious unconscious assumptions. Overlooking, or disregarding 
the significance of such judgements may lead to false predictions in the quantitative figures 
which are revered so much in today’s engineering environments. Decision making relating 
to hazard and risk management is a complex activity which must rely upon many other key 
contributors such as social, political and economical factors, and not merely the 
quantitative aspects of risk prediction. 
 
Whilst this thesis has focussed upon the civil light UAV arena, there are large parallels and 
similar opportunities available for such an approach in other environments. Within the field 
of civil light UAVs the author strongly believes that the problem surrounding the ‘sense 
and avoid’ issue is taking much energy and focus away from the need to evolve and grow 
the industry as a whole. The ‘sense and avoid’ issue seems to be stifling much needed 
advancement in other areas of civil UAV use such as engineering safety and human factors. 
Quite possibly, by creating a more welcoming, better regulated and well governed civil 
UAV environment, the problem of ‘sense and avoid’ could be better solved from within the 
environment. By creating a realistically operational and relatively well structured civil 
UAV environment, the regulatory authorities could allow a degree of evolution to take 
place through the adoption of good practice, learning from incidents and accidents (from 
within a relatively sterile operating environment) and technology advancement. The 
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opportunity beckons to allow controlled evolution rather than the creation of a revolution in 
the field of civil unmanned aviation. 
 
Clearly from the research into safety culture and safety climate (chapter six), there is a 
great deal of qualitative information available to underpin the predominantly quantitative 
approaches within the modern business. Informal discussions with Independent Safety 
Assessors (ISAs), reviewing some of QinetiQ’s major projects, suggests that the current 
bias towards a quantitative approach needs to be rebalanced. 
 
The author is conscious that the interpretations and thought processes within this thesis are 
based upon his own self beliefs and perceptions based upon research and experience; the 
latter based upon over twenty years within the T&E environment. Risks and hazards are 
very subjective and the boundaries by which they are sentenced and managed varies greatly 
on the immediate environment and experiences of the reviewer. The author would have 
liked to have had the opportunity to discuss the SCET with other cultures in different 
countries in order to better understand the variation in subjectivity and to better understand 
the weaknesses, and strengths, within the SCET. 
 
Safety, like many other professional disciplines (such as medicine) will evolve with time, 
and quite possibly will come ‘full circle’. Virtually all of the research and background to 
this thesis, including the author’s experiences, relate to the western world and its doctrine 
for analysing and managing safety. If safety evolves again into a more qualitative era then 
we may have much to learn from less restrictive cultures where the focus is not on 
numbers, compensation and materialistic trophies but on communication, ‘common sense’ 
approaches and enjoying life. Whilst based upon sound and moralistic foundations to 
minimise damage to our loved ones and our employees, has safety evolved to be solely a 
tool to minimise management litigation; or has it created an industry of self perpetuating 
professionals which justifies its presence by hiding behind legislation and the ignorance of 
the uneducated? The author offers no answers but raises the questions to stir the mind. 
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10.2   Original Contribution to Knowledge. 
The following points describe how this thesis offers an original contribution to knowledge; 
 
• From investigation of past and current literature, a distinct and extant gap in the 
safety management and regulation of civil light UAVs (< 150kg) has been 
identified. This thesis analyses this gap and offers a tool to allow organisations, and 
individuals, operating within the environment, to create and review the safety of 
their system with a degree of robustness. 
• Having reviewed past and present literature on the creation and management of 
safety cases, the author has identified that whilst there are general definitions for 
what a safety case is, the level of granularity for what should be included is 
minimal. This thesis, and the SCET contained within it, attempts to provide another 
level of granularity, specifically within the field of civil light UAVs. 
• By adopting a Systems Engineering approach, and by investigating the areas which 
cause the most accidents and incidents within the general UAV environment, the 
author has identified the need to take more cognisance of the human element within 
any safety argument. Whilst ‘human factors’ is used to sentence some incident 
causations, the degree of investigation to find the absolute root cause is minimal. 
Review of past and current literature suggests that whilst the industry is aware of 
these issues, rarely are they combined at a single point such as a safety case. 
• Having established the need to use more data from the human element the author 
has identified the need for a more qualitative approach to safety cases. Safety cases 
are predominantly assembled by engineers, or individuals with a quantitative 
background. Employing such individuals automatically creates a mindset within the 
safety community which is almost wholly focussed upon a quantitative approach. 
In-depth discussions within the thesis identifies how qualitative data contains 
important information relating to safety and that quantitative data in isolation may 
be subject to errors in interpretation. This thesis attempts to highlight this 
observation and to readdress the balance between a quantitative and qualitative 
approach. 
• The civil light UAV market is in its infancy within the UK. The SCET’s qualitative 
approach allows smaller businesses and organisations to create a safety argument 
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without the need to employ relatively complicated, expensive and specialised 
quantitative analysis tools. The use of such tools can be restrictive due to the 
training required to ensure that the tool is not only used correctly but is applied with 
the appropriate degree of context for the argument. The SCET allows for lighter 
and smaller UAVs to be safety assessed in a less expensive and onerous manner 
whilst maintaining an acceptable, yet alternatively derived, body of safety 
information. 
 
This revised approach to assembling a safety case for Civil Light UAVs does not tackle the 
most demanding of current UAV challenges which is that of ‘sense and avoid’. The aim of 
this new type of safety case approach is to facilitate a more complete body of evidence so 
that safety engineers, safety managers or regulators may make a more accurate, relevant, 
and consolidated judgement of the system under scrutiny. The decision upon how to 
manage the ‘sense and avoid’ issue may be incorporated into the safety case, at a later 
stage, once an agreed policy and procedure has been identified by the relevant regulatory 
authorities. 
 
10.3   Recommendations. 
The following recommendations are made by the author; 
 
• The SCET be used by the civil UAV community to allow a more detailed and 
holistic body of information to be assembled in support of light UAV (< 150kg) 
operations.  
• The SCET be adopted by the T&E safety management environment (primarily 
through the O&STWG) as the basis for safety management of UAVs and weapon 
systems. Whilst the extant regulatory and operational framework suggests a 
quantitative approach, additional data in qualitative terms may be gathered, 
especially in relation to organisational culture and the people element of the 
business. 
• Further work is carried out to gain progressive assurance of the SCET’s validity 
through continued applications. This may be achieved by obtaining feedback from 
both military and civil users of the tool in a wider application. 
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• This thesis is used as a catalyst for more research in the creation of safety cases 
which take serious cognisance of the human element within systems; such an 
approach should see humans as an integrated component and not a somewhat 
isolated ‘soft system’ to be bolted onto the ‘hard engineering’. 
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APPENDIX A 
Geographical layout of MoD Aberporth Range Danger Area. 
 
 
RANGE DANGER AREA & LOWER AIRSPACE MAP
NOTE :-
ALL LOWER ROUTES SHOWN HAVE AN 
ASSOCIATED UPPER ROUTE AND ADDITIONAL 
AIRSPACE ROUTES (NOT SHOWN), THAT DO 
NOT INFRINGE THE RANGE DANGER AREAS TO 
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APPENDIX B 
Geographical layout of MoD Hebrides Range Danger Area 
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APPENDIX C 
Regulatory & Statutory Documentation for MoD Air Ranges 
 
Regulatory Document/Protocol Descriptor 
Joint Services Publication 550 Series. 
Military Aviation Regulatory Group. 
(Edition 1, Issue 5, 1st Nov 06) 
Joint Services Publication 403. Handbook of Defence Land Ranges Safety. 
Defence Standard 00-56 (Interim) 
Parts 1 & 2 
Safety Management Requirements for 
Defence Systems 2004. 
Range Standing Orders for the Conduct of 
Trials. 
MOD Aberporth and MOD Hebrides 
operational documentation. 
Manual of Air Traffic Services. 
Including TESD Air Traffic Control 
Instructions 
MATS Parts 1 & 2 
NATS Aberporth and NATS Hebrides 
operational documentation. 
Test & Evaluation Support Division (TESD) 
Airfields and Ranges (A&R). 
MOD Regulator and Airspace sponsor, T&E 
Operations. 
Defence Ordnance Safety Group (DOSG) MOD Safety Regulator. 
Joint Services Publication 440 & 480 
Security Configuration & Installation 
Design Authority (SCIDA), MOD  
compliance management. 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
Specifically Safety Regulatory Group 
(SRG). 
Hazardous Activity Scrutiny Panel (HASP) QinetiQ internal safety review panel 
Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 670 (Issue 
2 inc. amendments 2006) 
Air Traffic System (ATS) Safety 
Requirements. 
Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 722 (Issue 
1 inc. amendments 2004) 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations in UK 
Airspace – CAA guidance. 
 
(Non-exhaustive) 
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FTR4 EXPLOSIVES TEAM (GENERAL)
Q=2.465e-8
FTR4 A member
of the explosvies
team is killed.
TRANSPORT (AMMO 02)
Q=2.833e-9
Explosives
initiate during
transport on site
Page 59
PROCESS/ PREP ELEC (AMMO 03)
Q=1.801e-8
Electrically initiated
device functions
during processing /
preperation
PROCESS / PREP MECH (AMMO 04)
Q=2.700e-9
Mechanically
initiated device
functions during
processing
Page 69
STORAGE (AMMO 05)
Q=2.090e-8
Death or injury of
ammunition
worker in storage
area
Page 71
ENERGY SOURCE
Q=1.801e-8
External
energy source
present
LOW VOLT DET
Low voltage
detonators are
used.
Q=1
Q=1.000
RF INIT
Q=9.000e-9
Explosives
initiated by radio
frequency
transmsission
Page 65
LIGHT STILL WORK
Q=1.069e-11
Lightning is
predicted but
work continues
Page 66
SITE STAT1
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Build up of static
during
processing of
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gun firing activity
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Frequency of
breech failure
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Gun
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breech failure
due to incorrect
assembly
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Frequency of
oversize charge
leading to
breech failure
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Probability of
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used in trial
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RAN_BREECH_EX
Probability of
oversized charge
resulting in a
breech explosion
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
RAN_H39_MF
Weapon/
equipment/ site
maintenance
failure
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
RAN_CP_MD
Probability of
maintenance/
assembly failure
leading to dangerous
weapon s tate
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Q=1.000e-2
RAN_INSP_EQ
Equipment
inspection procedure
incorrectly followed
prior to start of trial
Q=0.003
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GC PROC FAIL
Gun captain fails
to follow procedure
specified in firing
detail
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
GSO FAIL
GSO fails to
observe error
in procedure
Q=0.003
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PERS COVER FAIL
Failure of member
of trials team to
ensure they are
under cover
Q=0.003
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TEAM LEAD COVER FAIL
Failure of team
leader to ensure all
members of team
are under cover
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TCO COVER FAIL
Failure of TCO
to ensure all
persons under
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fails to identify
team have not
left the area.
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Failure to follow
Firing Detail
(inadvertent
actuation)
STAFF PROC FAIL
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Failure of
procedure to
ensure all staff
are under cover
77,88
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Failure of
procedure to
ensure all staff
are under cover
73,88
FTR 6.1.1
Q=2.060e-7
Sighter fires
when not
intended
FTR6.1.1.1
Q=9.000e-8
Firing
Commanded
Early
Page 78
FTR6.1.1.2
Q=1.797e-8
Range RF
Emmisions
cause initiation
Page 79
T_11.1.2
Q=3.000e-8
EMC/Lightning
Initiation
Page 80
FTR6.1.1.3
Q=8.003e-9
Initiation
following a
misfire
Page 82
FTR6.1.1.4
Q=6.000e-8
Static initiates
explosive during
loading and
wiring
Page 85
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FTR7 EXPLOSIVES (LOAD SEA SKUA)
Q=1.527e-8
Explosives team or
Navy team member
killed during
helicopter loading
STOP WORK
Q=3.300e-5
Failure to stop
trials preparation
when lightning
threatens
Page 81
RAN_H26_IL1
Probability of
being struck by
lightning
Q=3.8e-007
Q=3.800e-7
EXPL PRESENT
Explosives
present on trial
site
Q=0.1
Q=1.000e-1
FTR7.2
Q=6.001e-9
Warhead
initiates during
loading
FTR7.1
Q=9.270e-9
Person killed
by Sea Skua
motor firing
T_11.1.2
Q=3.000e-8
EMC/Lightning
Initiation
Page 80
FTR7.1.1.1
Q=6.270e-8
Inadvertant
initiation
Page 87
FTR7.2.1
Q=6.000e-9
Fire causes
explosion
T_11.2.2
Q=1.254e-12
Lightning
Initiation
80
FTR7.2.1.1
Aircraft fire
occurs during
loading activity
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
FTR7.2.1.2
Navy team fail to
retire to safe
distance before
cook-off time expires
Q=0.2
Q=2.000e-1
FTR7.2.1.3
Chief Fire Fighter
fails to retire
everybody before
cook-off time expires
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
FT7.2.1.4
GSO fails to
ensure evacuation
prior to cook-off
time expiring
Q=0.01
Q=1.000e-2
FTR7.1.1
Q=9.270e-8
Motor initiates
during loading
FTR7.1.2
Probability of
actually killing a
team member
Q=0.1
Q=1.000e-1
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FTR8 EXPLOSIVES (DISPOSAL)
Q=1.769e-7
A member of the
explosives team is
killed or seriously
injured during
disposal activty
PERS COVER FAIL
Failure of member
of trials team to
ensure they are
under cover
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
TEAM LEAD COVER FAIL
Failure of team
leader to ensure all
members of team
are under cover
Q=0.01
Q=1.000e-2
TCO COVER FAIL
Failure of TCO
to ensure all
persons under
cover
Q=0.01
Q=1.000e-2
CROWS NEST COVER FAIL
The crows nest
fails to identify
team have not
left the area.
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
FTR8.1
Q=1.760e-7
Explosives
initiate when
not intended
STAFF PROC FAIL
Q=9.000e-10
Failure of
procedure to
ensure all staff
are under cover
73,77
FTR6.1.1.1
Q=9.000e-8
Firing
Commanded
Early
Page 78
FTR6.1.1.2
Q=1.797e-8
Range RF
Emmisions
cause initiation
Page 79
FTR6.1.1.3
Q=8.003e-9
Initiation
following a
misfire
Page 82
FTR6.1.1.4
Q=6.000e-8
Static initiates
explosive during
loading and
wiring
Page 85
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FT1 ASM/AIM9 IMPACTS AIRCRAFT
Q=1.906e-9
FT1 An ASRAAM or
Sidewinder not utilising
FTS impacts with a
non-participating
aircraft.
FT1.1
Q=1.944e-10
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range and is
hit by the missile
FT1.2
Q=1.711e-9
The missile exits
the Range and hits
a non-participating
aircraft
22
FT1.3
Aircrew fires
weapon or releases
store without
authority causing
accident
Q=0
Q=0.000
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or
run not aborted
Page 2
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT1.1.3
Missile hits
intruder
aircraft
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
FT1.2.1
Q=1.711e-6
The missile exits
Range / safety trace
due to wrong safety
trace, incorrect display
data or comms failure
Page 8
FT1.2.2
The probability
that an aircraft is
hit if the missile
exits the Range
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
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FT5 ASM (TOM) IMPACTS AIRCRAFT
Q=5.735e-9
FT5 The probability
of an ASRAAM
impacting a
non-participating
aircraft
FT5.1
Q=5.540e-9
The missile exits
the Range and hits
a non-participating
aircraft
Page 22
FT1.1
Q=1.944e-10
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range and is
hit by the missile
FT1.3
Aircrew fires
weapon or releases
store without
authority causing
accident
Q=0
Q=0.000
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or
run not aborted
Page 2
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT1.1.3
Missile hits
intruder
aircraft
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
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FT8 AIRCRAFT IMPACTS AIRCRAFT
Q=1.951e-10
FT8 A participating
manned aircraft
collides with a
non-partcipating
aircraft
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or
run not aborted
Page 2
FT8.1.1
Aircraft hits
intruder aircraft
(random
chance)
Q=7.17e-006
Q=7.170e-6
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT8.1
Q=1.394e-12
An intruder aircraft
enters the Range
and collides with a
participating aircraft
56
FT8.2
Q=1.937e-10
Participating aircraft
under RCS impacts
with a non-participating
aircraft outside Range
56
FT8.2.2
Q=3.001e-3
Air Controller
fails to provide
warning or
avoidance advice
Page 29
FT8.2.1
Random
chance of
impact
Q=7.17e-005
Q=7.170e-5
FT8.2.3
Participating
pilot fails to take
avoiding action
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
FT8.2.4
Non-participating
pilot fails to take
avoiding action
E
Q=0.3
Q=3.000e-1
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FT9 GUIDED BOMB IMPACT AIRCRAFT
Q=3.411e-12
FT9 A Paveway or
JDAM impact with
a non-participating
aircraft
FT9.1
Q=3.480e-13
An intruder aircraft
enters the Range
and is hit by store
/ missile / UAV
33
FT9.2
Q=3.063e-12
The store exits the
Range and hits a
non-participating
aircraft
33
FT1.3
Aircrew fires weapon
or releases store
without authority
causing accident
Q=0
Q=0.000
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or run
not aborted
Page 2
FT9.1.1
Store / missile
hits aircraft
Q=1.79e-006
Q=1.790e-6
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT1.2.1
Q=1.711e-6
The missile exits
Range / safety trace
due to wrong safety
trace, incorrect display
data or comms failure
Page 8
FT9.2.1
Q=1.790e-6
Store / missile
hits aircraft
FT9.2.1.1
Random chance
of impact for full
safety trace
outside Range
Q=1.79e-005
Q=1.790e-5
FT9.2.1.2
Store / missile
has sufficient
altitude outside
the Range 
Q=0.1
Q=1.000e-1
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FT12 NON-GUIDED IMPACT AIRCRAFT
Q=3.411e-12
FT12 A non-guided store
(e.g safe seperation,
BNG, towed decoy,
s licks) impacts a
non-participating aircraft
FT9.2
Q=3.063e-12
The store exits the
Range and hits a
non-participating
aircraft
30
FT9.1
Q=3.480e-13
An intruder aircraft
enters the Range
and is hit by store
/ missile / UAV
30
FT1.3
Aircrew fires weapon
or releases store
without authority
causing accident
Q=0
Q=0.000
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or run
not aborted
Page 2
FT9.1.1
Store / missile
hits aircraft
Q=1.79e-006
Q=1.790e-6
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT1.2.1
Q=1.711e-6
The missile exits
Range / safety trace
due to wrong safety
trace, incorrect display
data or comms failure
Page 8
FT9.2.1
Q=1.790e-6
Store / missile
hits aircraft
FT9.2.1.1
Random chance
of impact for full
safety trace
outside Range
Q=1.79e-005
Q=1.790e-5
FT9.2.1.2
Store / missile
has sufficient
altitude outside
the Range 
Q=0.1
Q=1.000e-1
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FT15 MAV/SKUA IMPACTS AIRCRAFT
Q=3.411e-11
FT15 A Maverick or
Sea Skua missile
impacts with a
non-participating
aircraft.
FT15.1
Q=3.480e-12
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range and is
hit by the missile
FT15.2
Q=3.063e-11
The missile exits
the Range and hits
a non-participating
aircraft
FT1.3
Aircrew fires
weapon or releases
store without
authority causing
accident
Q=0
Q=0.000
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or
run not aborted
Page 2
FT15.1.1
Missile hits
aircraft
Q=1.79e-005
Q=1.790e-5
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT1.2.1
Q=1.711e-6
The missile exits
Range / safety trace
due to wrong safety
trace, incorrect display
data or comms failure
Page 8
FT15.2.1
Missile imapct
aircraft
Q=1.79e-005
Q=1.790e-5
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FT18 SHELL IMPACTS AIRCRAFT
Q=3.480e-13
FT18 A gun shell
impacts with a
non-participating
aircraft.
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or
run not aborted
Page 2
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT9.1.1
Store / missile
hits aircraft
Q=1.79e-006
Q=1.790e-6
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FT21 SIGHTER IMPACTS AIRCRAFT
Q=3.480e-13
FT21 A sighter
rocket impacts with
a non-participating
aircraft
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or
run not aborted
Page 2
FT1.1.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.000625
Q=6.250e-4
FT9.1.1
Store / missile
hits aircraft
Q=1.79e-006
Q=1.790e-6
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FT26 MIRACH(R) IMPACT AIRCRAFT
Q=2.829e-11
FT26 Mirach
impacts with a
non-participating
aircraft
FT26.1
Q=4.154e-13
The Mirach exits
the Range and hits
a non-participating
aircraft
FT26.2
Q=2.788e-11
An intruder aircraft
enters the Range
and collides with a
participating aircraft
FT26.1.1
Q=4.825e-7
The Mirach exits
Range due to wrong
safety trace,
incorrect display data
or loss of control
53
FT26.1.2
Random Chance
of impacting an
aircraft outside
the Range
Q=8.61e-007
Q=8.610e-7
FT26.1.1.1
Q=7.413e-8
The UAV exits Range
due to wrong trip
wires or incorrect
display data
Page 50
FT1.2.1.3.1
Q=2.384e-7
Critical Key Internal
Range
Communications Fail
preventing unsafe
trial being aborted
Page 14
FT26.1.1.3
The Mirach exits the
Range due to a loss
of control and ability
to recover / terminate
Q=1.7e-007
Q=1.700e-7
FT1.1.2
Q=3.110e-4
The intruder is
not detected by
Air Control or run
not aborted
Page 2
FT8.1.2
Aircraft hits
intruder aircraft
(random chance)
Q=7.17e-006
Q=7.170e-6
FT26.2.1
An intruder
aircraft enters
the Range
Q=0.0125
Q=1.250e-2
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APPENDIX R 
Store Breaches the Weapon Operating Boundary (FT B3) 
 
GA.1.3.2
Q=1.999e-6
Store excurs
the WOA
3,11,15,17
GA.1.3.5
Q=1.462e-6
Safety trace is
inappropriate in size
or shape for the
store or profile
Page 6
GA.1.3.2.6
Q=1.040e-2
FTS System fault or
termination
requirement is
unexpectedly quick
P.07
Store reaches
inappropriate cut
down boundary
without errant traj
Q=0.01
Q=1.000e-2
GA.1.3.2.1
Q=1.999e-6
Store w ith
correct trace
excurs WOA
GA.1.3.2.2
Q=1.856e-10
Store with an
inappropriate trace
leaves the WOA
GA.1.3.6
Q=5.127e-11
Misalignment of
trajectory  leads
to control errors
3
T.01
Is the s tore
FTS
equipped?
True
Q=1.000
W.02
Errant trajectory
through store
sof tware error
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
W.08
Errant trajectory
through launch
platform software
error
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
W.03
Errant trajectory
through store carry
time related
hardware error
Q=0.001
Q=1.000e-3
NOT 01
Store is  NOT
FTS equipped
Page 4
GA.1.3.2.5
Q=4.003e-4
FTS Failure:
Ground or A ir
system fault
Page 5
NOT 05
An ATCO has NOT
been deployed for
this trial
3,10,11,21,..
M.08
ATCO fails to
notice error
Q=0.003
Q=3.000e-3
GA.1.3.7
Q=3.000e-3
ATCO fails to
notice the
fault
GA.1.3.8
Q=1.709e-8
Misaligned/false
positional data leads
to control errors
Page 8
T.05
Is an ATCO
deployed for
this  trial?
True
Q=1.000
GA.1.3.2.3
Q=4.003e-4
Unterminated
store w ith
correct trace
12
GA.1.3.2.7
Q=4.993e-3
Store's flight control
fails such that the
store heads for the
WOA boundary
9
GA.1.3.2.4
Q=1.856e-10
Store with FTS and
an inappropriate
trace leaves the
WOA
NOT 01
Store is  NOT
FTS equipped
4,12
GA.1.3.2.5
Q=4.003e-4
FTS Failure:
Ground or A ir
system fault
Page 5
I.07
Emergency
termination too slow
due to unusually
quick requirement
Q=0.01
Q=1.000e-2
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APPENDIX S 
Competence & Professional Standing of the O&STWG 
 
The Operations and Trials Safety Working Group is primarily assembled from the 
Operations Controllers (OCs) and the Trial Safety Managers (TSMs) from across the four 
QinetiQ operated Test & Evaluation (T&E) Air Ranges. Together with representation from 
the QinetiQ’s Combined Aerial Target Service (CATS) the aforementioned form the 
working group’s quorum whilst other Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) are drawn in to 
enhance its technical abilities on a case-by-case basis. This forum is acknowledged by 
MoD regulators outside the company as the single and critical mass of competency in Air 
Range activities within the United Kingdom (UK). Within the company the working group 
is acknowledged by engineering and technical directors, including other divisions, as the 
single source of expertise in Air Range activities. The forum gives collective advice to 
internal projects upon various activities, including peer reviewing of safety cases and safety 
related activities. The following text attempts to qualify the forum’s competence and 
professional standing within the environment of T&E, including UAV operations. 
 
Experience within the O&STWG. 
The working group has a vast amount of experience within the field of T&E. With a 
typical, collective, annual number of sorties approaching 800 per year across the four sites, 
combined with individual experiences in T&E approaching 30 years for some members, the 
forum can claim to have been involved in the planning and execution of over 125,000 T&E 
trials sorties. From a domain perspective these experiences include, but are not limited to; 
 
• Air to Air activities. (e.g. live and inert weapon releases, combat manoeuvring, etc.) 
• Air to Surface activities. (e.g. live and inert weapon releases, platform drops, safe 
separation trials, special forces equipment releases, etc.) 
• Surface to Air activities. (e.g. live and inert weapon, UAV and rocket launches, 
etc.) 
• Surface to Surface activities. (e.g. live and inert weapon releases, etc.) 
 332 
• Non release activities. (e.g. commercial airline height monitoring, laser designator 
qualifying and integration trials, satellite tracking, UAV qualifying trials, missile 
approach warner system qualifying, etc.) 
 
Professional Status and Formal Qualifications within the O&STWG. 
The O&STWG consists of individuals who are members of professional institutions and 
who also hold an array of T&E, engineering and safety related qualifications. In all cases, 
basic qualifications are heavily augmented by attendance at specialised courses including, 
but not limited to, tracking and surveillance radar, laser safety, guided weapons, ballistic 
weapons, explosive safety, radio communication, UAVs, UCAVs and flight termination 
systems. Many are recognised as leading authorities within the UK’s T&E environment.  
 
The table overleaf records the experience, professional status and qualifications of the 
group. A glossary of professional membership is attached below. 
 
 
Glossary of Professional Membership within the O&STWG. 
APM  Association for Project Management. 
CMI  Chartered Management Institute. 
IEMA  Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment. 
IET  Institution of Engineering & Technology. 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering. 
Inst.LM Institute of Leadership & Management. 
IOSH  Institution of Occupational Safety & Health. 
RAeS  Royal Aeronautical Society. 
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Experience, Professional Status and Qualifications of the 
O&STWG. 
Member Qualifications Experience within 
T&E/ Aerospace 
Safety/ 
Operational 
Specialist 
Professional 
Membership/Status 
A 
HNC Mechanical Engineering with 
Aerospace. 
Diploma in HS&E 
35 years Yes 
MIOSH 
AIEMA 
B 
BSc (Biology).  
Numerous Biochemistry and 
Nuclear courses. 
18 years 
(+8years Nuclear 
commissioning RSA & 
USA) 
Yes MAPM 
C C&G Electronics 35 years Yes Nil 
D 
HNC & BSc Electronics.  
Part MSc Systems Engineering 
5 years Yes MIET, INCOSE. 
E 
C&G (Engineering), Army 
Aviation, Systems Auditor 
(various.). 
39 years Yes MInst.LM, MIET. 
F HNC & BSc Electronics 11 years Yes MIET, CMI. 
G C&G (Telecoms) 30 years Yes Aff.CMI 
H 
BA, BSc(Hons), MSc (Safety 
Engineering) 27 years Yes MIOSH, MRAeS. 
I RAF Radar Systems Eng. 34 years No FRAeS, MIET, CMI. 
J 
BA, BSc(Hons), MSc (Safety 
Engineering) 
35 years Yes MIET, MRAeS. 
K 
HNC Electronics. 
MSc (HS&E Management) 
20 years Yes Grad.IOSH, AIEMA. 
L HNC Aero Engineering 30 years No MAPM 
M 
Secondary School Education, 
Qualified Aircraft dispatcher. 
23 years No MIOSH 
N IOSH Cert. 21 years Yes MAPM 
 
.  
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